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ABSTRACT
An important product of the nominalist-realist de
bate of the fourteenth century was a renewed interest in the
theology of grace and merit.

For Ockham and his followers,

since "real" knowledge of God through natural reason was im
possible, God seemed to transcend his creation so absolutely
that his ways might become incomprehensible to man.

This,

added to the fourteenth-century interest in voluntarism, led
to the further inference that God could use his absolute
power to overrule what he had ordained.

Accordingly, all

man could do was offer his good works to this omnipotent
Judge in the hope that he might receive mercy.

Some nomina

list theologians even suggested that God could, by his abso
lute power, elect a sinner whose merits had not been digni
fied by sanctifying grace.

To conservative followers of

Augustine such as Bradwardine and Wyclif, this was rank Pelagianism.

They fought the "Modern Pelagians" so zealously

that they gravitated to the opposite extreme, contending that
no act could be truly meritorious without God's direct parti
cipation through grace.

Thus, while the nominalists exalted

divine omnipotence in order to free man, conservative Augustinians used the same starting point to argue that God gave

man whatever merits he might have.
There is considerable evidence that the impact of
this dispute was widespread, notably among the principal
poets of the time.

In the Cotton Nero A.x manuscript, for

example, Pearl features a debate over grace and merit, with
the conclusion that God elects the sinner through grace; the
sinner does not elect God by his own merits.

Purity balances

this with a complementary doctrine, of merit, stressing man's
responsibility to perform good works if he would be saved.
But Patience illustrates, through the story of Jonah, how
man is ultimately dependent upon God's absolute power.

In

Sir Gawaln and the Green Knight, a reconciliation of these
doctrines crystallizes around the hero, who commits serious
sin but yet is willing, finally, to cooperate with grace and
reinstate himself in divine favor.

Then St. Erkenwald, per

haps by the same author, relates a legend which elsewhere
in medieval poetry sanctioned man's power to appeal to God
by good works alone, but which here confuses the issue by
stressing man's powerlessness without divine grace.
Piers Plowman treats basically the same problems
in an extended dialectic in which Will, man's faculty for
moral action, searches for the means to earn salvation.
The doctrinal issues are defined in the Vislo, especially
in the pardon scene, and the Vita dramatizes Will's efforts
to learn how he may reach God in terms of grace and merit.

Chaucer, unlike these other two poets, avoids the
risks of their often exciting doctrinal experiments and opts
rather for a moderate view of the God-man relationship.
Both in Trollus and Crlseyde and several important Canterbury
Tales, he expresses confidence in human nature, though
stressing the need for divine providence to direct man's
actions, and assures us that God will not use his absolute
power to overrule or contradict the covenant with man.
Chaucer's contribution to the controversy, then, was to show
that there is a viable alternative between the extremes of
the Ockhamists and the Augustinians, whereas many writers
tended to polarize the dispute into these two positions
alone.
The conclusion that this dissertation seeks to
support, therefore, is that this great intellectual debate was
not confined to the universities or the monasteries, but
stimulated the imaginations of the most distinguished poets
of the time to produce some of their finest works.
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Chapter I:

God and Man in the Fourteenth Century

Very little is now known about the development of
ideas in the fourteenth century, even though an enormous
amount of medieval scholarship has been accomplished in the
last hundred years.

Most histories of philosophy or theolo

gy afford this period scant attention, little more than a
superficial glance at this 11intermission" between the great
cultural explosions of the high Middle Ages and the Italian
Renaissance.

The reason for this is not far to seek.

Prot

estant scholars have usually scorned the later Middle Ages,
with its ecclesiastical corruptions and the decline of scho
lastic theology, except where they could find a "forerunner"
of the Reformation to come.1

Catholic philosophers, inspired

by Leo X I I ^ s famous encyclical Aeteral Patrls ( 1 8 7 9 ) » have
concentrated awesome energy in reconstructing the system
of St. Thomas Aquinas, with the result that we probably
understand his works today better than his contemporaries
1For a very lucid overview of the whole historical prob
lem of the "forerunner," see Helko A. Oberman, Forerunners
the Reformation (New York, 1966), esp. pp. 3-^9•
1

did*

Some scholars have also attended to St. Eonaventure,

Duns Scotus and, more extensively, St. Augustine; hut the
vanguard of the twentieth-century revival of Scholasticism,
led hy men like Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and
O
Anton Pegis, has championed St. Thomas.
This has produced
an extreme emphasis on the thirteenth century as a time of
creative growth, the pinnacle of medieval civilization.
Conversely, since the most important thinkers of the four
teenth century criticized and eventually destroyed the
syntheses of Thomas and Bonaventure, this later period has
been characterized as a "decline,” promoting the disinteg
ration of Scholasticism into endless sterile subtleties.3
In this spirit, one of our most distinguished medievalists,
Etienne Gilson, has described William of Ockham as an "appr
entice sorcerer" who unleashed vast destructive powers to
corrode "the golden age of Scholasticism," without creating
any positive synthesis of his own.^

Such an attitude,

2I am not minimizing the contributions of such distin
guished thinkers as Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Blondel, Karl
Rahner, or Teilhard de Chardin, but they represent reactions
against the mainstream of modern Catholic thought.
3a notable exception is the great scholarship of the late
Phllotheus Boehner, O.F.M., who helped to overcome our igno
rance of Ockham in many important books and articles. See,
for example, his Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius
Buytaert, O.F.K. (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1958). A good
measure of Fr. Boehner*s Influence is the remarkably know
ledgeable and balanced account of Ockham's philosophy by
Frederick Copleston, S.J., in the third volume of his
History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md., 1952).
^History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (N; T.

195'5)»P."W.

3

especially since it is widespread, has

fostered little

interest in the problems, the controversies, the intellec
tual concerns of the fourteenth century.

Yet this very cen

tury not only destroyed confidence in the past, but also
made positive contributions of its own, not the least of
which is a philosophic ground favorable to the growth of mo
dern science.

The fourteenth century also went far beyond

just dissolving the Thomistic union of faith with reason:
it promoted the growth of a profound mysticism, a renewal of
Augustinian thought, and the main doctrinal issues of the
Reformation.

In the following discussion, therefore, most

of our attention will be directed toward the positive
aspects of fourteenth-century thought.
The chief issue between the thirteenth- and four
teenth century schoolmen is over the relation between phil
osophy and theology, which is in turn part of the larger
debate between realism and nominalism.

Following a tradi

tion set by Augustine and Anselm, Eonaventure

and Thomas

were realists: they began with the common supposition that
there— ts an absolute order in extramental reality which the
mind is capable of understanding, at least in part, by confer
ming itself to that order.

In spite of the differences in

neo-Platonic or Aristotelian influences on their thought,
these realists all agreed that a man's ideas provided an ac
curate description of the world around him. Anominalist, or
conceptualist, such as William of Ockham argued rather that the

mind receives some primitive sense-knowledge from

the extra

mental world, but then the mind orders such data into its
own patterns, patterns which have no absolute claim on truth,
but which are nevertheless valuable because they lead to
probable statements about reality.

The implications of this

innovation in the theory of knowledge are extremely farreaching.

If we apply It to our knowledge of God, for

example, then where the realist has Insisted that he can
reach certitude about God's existence, the nominalist will
contend that God's existence Is at best probable.
at issue here is natural theology itself:

What Is

whether man can

infer God from examining the structure of his own thoughtprocesses, as Augustine claimed, assuming that this leads us
back ultimately to the God from whom all human knowledge
originates;5 or whether man can, as Thomas contended, Infer
God from our experience with the world around us, reaching
by analogy from secondary causes to the First Cause.^

Great

as the differences between the Augustinians and Thomists
often were, both groups regarded such a natural theology
necessary to Christian philosophy.

William of Ockham re

plied for the nominalists that (1 ) only those mental proces
ses which draw directly from sense experience are legitimate,
5»See, for example, the De Maglstro. which is devoted en
tirely to this process.
^See, for example, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Bk. I, ch.
10 f.

5

or at least have a valid claim to being true;^ and (2) God
and man are so totally different that there can be no meanO
ingful analogy between them.
By this two-part criticism,
Ockham cut the believer off from rational demonstrations of
G o d ’s existence and thus, a fortiori, from the possibility
of any knowledge of God through human means.

With this dis

mantling of Christian philosophy, faith and reason tended
more and more to go their separate ways.

Faith came to rely

ever more heavily on Scripture, as with the Lollard movement,
or to develop its own psychological resources, as with the
mystics.

Season, no longer the dutiful handmaid of theology,

began a more modest exploration of. natural experience, re
fining its logical techniques and assisting in the laborious
birth of modern science.
One of the best illustrations of the consequences of
the nominalist divorce of faith from reason is fourteenthcentury v o l u n t a r i s m . V o T u r ^ ^

its insistence on

the superiority of will over reason, came as a direct refuta
tion of Thomistic rationalism.
ascend to God through reason.

For St. Thomas, man may
Both God and man share in

being, and so there is an analogy between them which is suf
ficient for Thomas to postulate a natural law that binds both
man and God immutably together.
^Copleston, III, 66 f.
^Copleston, III, 90 f.

Such a view of the God-man

6

relationship was repugnant to the English Franciscans,
particularly Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.

Though him

self a realist, Duns prepared the way for Ockham by his
notion of being as unlvocal, in a sense, and not analogous.
But even more important than this distinction, in terms of
the direction fourteenth-century thought would afterwards
take, was Duns* conception of God's will.

For Thomas, God's

will is knowable through the natural law implanted in crea
tion, though he does allow that there are some few things
which are revealed exclusively in Scripture.

Duns admits

that God has revealed something of himself in the order of
his creation, but this does not mean that we can thereby de
duce God's will from what he has willed.

For behind these

manifestations of God's power, his potentla ordlnata. there
remains his transcendent will as it is in itself, his potentia absoluta, which is by its very nature unknowable to man.

9

With Ockham, and even more drastically with his followers,
these ideas were to take a radical course.

For Ockham, as

we have seen, God can be known only by faith since nominalist
logic renders the God of philosophy a mere concept, subject
to the same laws of probability as other concepts.

This en

genders scepticism everywhere in the fourteenth century, a
scepticism that is deepened by a new approach to God's poten
tla absoluta.

In Ockham's effort to free God's will from

^Copleston, II, pt. 2, 2*14-257.

any restraints whatsoever, he even claims that God's potentla absoluta may override or contradict his potentla ordlnata.

Acts are no longer good or evil in themselves

according to natural law, as St, Thomas had taught, but
derive their moral value solely from God's will.

Thus, God

can overturn the natural law, the product of his potentla
ordlnata. and by his potentla absoluta will that a man
commit murder or adultery.

If God were to do this, then

such acts would become morally good, simply because God's
will is the only criterion for good and evil.

10

The only

action that Ockham considers necessarily evil is not loving
God, for not even God can ask us not to love him without
contradiction.

11

Here again, the attitude fostered by such

reasoning is markedly sceptical: man is cut off from God by
the very arguments used to exalt the divine nature.

By

asserting that we cannot know either God's existence or his
will with certainty, the Ockhamists Introduced into the
fourteenth century a bewildering world of possibilities to
displace the comforting certainties of the thirteenth
century.
The next stage of this movement is even more signi
ficant for medieval culture because it enters the sacred
realm of theology itself.

Their radical stress on God's

10Copleston, III, 116.
•^Quodllbeta. Ill, Q. 13; reprinted by Philotheus Boehner,
O.F.M., in his edition of Ockham's Philosophical Writings
(New York, 196**)» PP» 160-163*

freedom

forced the nominalist theologians to formulate an

equally radical explanation of the natufe of man and his
relation

to God.

Thus, releasing God from the restrictions

of traditional moral law implied a similar release for man,
with the result that just as man was freer than before, so
also could he be less certain than before about the proper
(or improper) way to gain salvation.

In this new condition

of uncertainty old questions clamored for new answers: what
is human merit? how could fallen man be justified? what is
the relation between divine grace and human freedom? could
God's potentla absoluta predestine a sinner to glory or a
righteous man to damnation?

These are the great questions

of the fourteenth, century, and the measure of their signi
ficance is that they shaped Christian thought, both Catholic
and Protestant, for the next several hundred years.
II
The orthodox tradition on these questions was first
firmly established by St. Augustine In the early fifth cen
tury.

In his writings against the Manlchees, Augustine

sought to vindicate God from the charge that he is respon
sible for evil in the world.

Thus, in De llbero arbitrio,12

Augustine insists that "all things are to be praised for
the very fact that they exist; for by the very fact that
^2Trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (New York,

1964

).

they are, they are good" (3 .7 .71).

For to claim that God

could create something that is evil would seem to challenge
either his omnipotence or his love toward his creatures.
The solution, as Augustine later summarized it in his
13
Confessions. ^

is that evil is not a substance at all:

Therefore, all things that are, are good, and as to
that evil, the origin of which I was seeking for, it
is not a substance, since, if it were a substance, it
would be good. For it would either have to be an
incorruptible substance (which is the highest form of
goodness) or else a corruptible substance (which,
unless it had good in it, could not be corruptible).
(Bfc. VII, ch. 16)
The source of evil, then, is man's perverse will turning
away from God to the pleasures of this world: from carltas
to cunldltas. a favorite theme of Augustine*s.

In terms

of human actions, this means that actions are either good or
evil as they turn toward or away from God, that is, they are
good or evil in themselves, not because God wills them so.
Human freedom is necessarily implied in the belief that man
is morally responsible for his actions, so that man is always
free to commit sin, though this does not mean that man is
always or necessarily able to perform meritorious works,
as we shall see.

God gave man free will so that he could

freely choose God, but Augustine qualifies this by adding
that sinning is a misuse of such freedom (De llbero arbltrio,
2.1.5-6).
choose?

Where, then, does man learn what he ought to
Augustine answers this with his famous and extremely

^Trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1963).

influential doctrine of illumination.

God not only tran

scends the world in the sense that he does not partake of
its imperfections, but he has chosen to implant himself in
some mysterious way in the soul of man.

Thus, as the De

Maglstro extensively argues,1** we find God by withdrawing,
one stage after another, from the external world and travel
ling inward.

As we proceed away from sense data and pro

gressively more and more into the realm of abstraction, we
are moving away from the mutable, corruptible world and to
ward eternal truths, leading ultimately to the supreme truth
that is God.

In this sense, God is the divine maglster

who illuminates our minds with his sacred truth.

But not

all men are capable of perceiving this illumination or,
having perceived it, able to live their lives according to
it.

For just as all good flows from God, so also man cannot

by his own efforts will any good without God having first
moved him toward that good.'*'’ And this introduces Augustine*s doctrine of grace, which has had such far-reaching
influence that all subsequent discussions of grace, works,
freedom justification, and predestination by both Catholic
and Protestant theologians have been dominated by his form
ulations.
■^This is one of Augustine’s clearest descriptions of his
theory of illumination.
1^Confessions. Bk. VIII, ch. 5» £e llbero arblfrrlo. 3*18.
177 and 179; £e doctrlna Christiana. 4.16.33*

Throughout most of his career as bishop of Hippo,
Augustine was embroiled in controversy with the Pelagians.
Pelagius, a British monk who spent some time in Augustine’s
area while on his way to the East, developed a doctrine
based on the efficacy of works.

Though Pelagius himself did

not go to the extremes of many of his followers, his thought
was generally interpreted as arguing that man could merit
salvation by his own good works.

For Pelagius, this pre

supposes that man must have been justified— that is,
redeemed from utter depravity in original sin— through
Christ’s coming, but Pelagius contended that from this point
on man's works could themselves be meritorious, without the
infusion and continuing habitus of sanctifying grace.

Des

pite the moderation of Pelagius’ views when compared to those
of some of his followers, his doctrine of works was repug
nant to Augustine, whose whole experience of sin and conver
sion contradicted Pelagius.

All of Book IX of the Confes

sions. for example, describes tellingly the agonies of a man
who desires to love God and do G o d ’s will, yet is unable to
do so by his own power.

Thus, for Augustine, the question

is not merely that all good works stem ultimately from God,
as we have already seen, but that a man cannot perform moral
ly good works without first being moved toward them by grace.
Everywhere in Augustine grace is a condition sine qua non
for acts to have merit.

Just so, In a long petition to God

in the Confessions. Augustine remarks that ”if a man recounts

to you all the real merits he has, he is only telling you
of your gifts to him" (Bk. IX, ch. 13); and farther along
he adds the important qualification that "My good deeds are
your work and your gift, my evil deeds are my faults and
your punishments" (Bk. X, ch. *0 •

Still more emphatic is

the following passage from the Retractatlones, written at
the end of his long career:
Since, as we have said, all goods--whether great, inter
mediate, or lowest— are from God, it follows that the
good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered
among the great goods, is also from God. Then I pro
ceeded to speak of the wretchedness most justly inflic
ted upon sinners,„from which they can be freed only by
God’s grace; since man could fall by will, that is by
free choice, he could not rise again. To the wretched
ness of a just condemnation belong the ignorance and
difficulty from which every man suffers from birth. No
man can be freed from this evil except by the grace of
God. By denying (£he effects of] original sin, the Pela
gians refuse to account for the wretchedness that results
from man's just condemnation.
One question remains: granting that man's works can merit
salvation only after receiving grace to elevate them to a
level fully pleasing to God (meritum de condlgno, in schola
stic terminology), can man act in such a way as to merit
this grace (meritum de oongruo)?

For Augustine even the

good works that a man performs, such as praying, in order to
merit grace are themselves prompted by a precedent grace.
Here again, the reason for the doctrine is rooted in his own
experience of sin and conversion, as is quite clear in this
selection from the Confessions:
*^In Benjamin and Hackstaff, p. 158.

I call upon you, my God, my mercy, who made me and
did not forget me when I had forgotten you. I call you
into my soul which you are making ready to receive you
by the longing which you yourself inspire. Do not for
sake me now that I call upon you; for before I could
call upon you at all, you were ahead of me; by all sorts
of voices and in all kinds of ways over and over again
you pressed yourself on my attention, so that I might
hear you from far away and be converted and might call
upon you who were calling me. . . .and in everything I
did that deserved well, you were ahead of me, so that
you might give the due reward to the work of your own
hands, the hands that made me.
(Bk. XIII, ch. 1)
Such a view does require that man perform good works, in
spite of

its stress on God's role in the process.

For a

man must

cooperate with the first grace given to him

(lnltlum fldei) by showing God through his actions how much
he desires to merit the further gift of sanctifying grace.
Thus, there are four stages in this movement ^toward God:
(1) God makes available the grace needed to move a man to
ward him (gratia gratis data); (2 ) the sinner may then re
spond by performing actions that can earn further favor with
God (meritum de congruo): (3) God may choose to justify him
by infusing into his soul the habitus of sanctifying grace
(gratia gratum faclens); and (^) the man may now perform
works, elevated by such grace, that can fully merit his
salvation (meritum de condlgno).
These issues continued to be debated even long after
Augustine's death, but it is a sign of his authority as the
Doctor of Grace that his views prevailed.

They were rati

fied by the Sixteenth Council of Carthage (14-18), Popes Inno
cent I and Zoslmus, the definitive Indlcuius of St. Prosper

of Aquitaine, and the Second Council of Orange (529)» whose
pronouncements were confirmed by Pope Boniface II on Janu
ary 25. 531» and have been considered the definitive state
ment of orthodoxy ever since.1?

The influence of Augustine

in each case is clear, as the following example from a decree
by the Council of Carthage illustrates:
Whoever says that the grace of Justification was given
to us so that grace could facilitate our fulfilling what
our free will is ordered to do, as if to say that, if
grace were not given, it would be possible but not easy
to obey God's commandments without that grace: let him
be anathema.
(TCT 529, Denz. 105)
Soon, a new qualification was Introduced by the semi-Pelagians,
who proposed that while God's grace is required for meritum
de condlgno. a

man could merit de congruo without being

first prompted

by grace.

Here again, the official Church

upheld the teaching of Augustine, as in this decree by the
Second Council of Orange:
If anyone argues that God awaits our will before
cleansing us from sin, but does not profess that even
the desire to be cleansed is accomplished through the
infusion and the Interior working of the Holy Spirit,
he opposes the Holy Spirit speaking through Solomon: "The
will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35. Seutuaglnt).
And he opposes the Apostle's salutary message: "It is God
who of his
good pleasure works in you both the will and
the performance? (Phil. 1:13)•
(TCT 5*l4, Denz. 177)
^ J o h n Clarkson, S.J., ed. The Church Teaches: Documents
of the Church in English Translation (St. Louis, 1955)* arts.
527-5^9 (hereafter referred to as TCT). The Latin originals
are in Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schonmetzer, ed. Enchi
ridion Symbolorum. Definltlonum et Declaratlonum de Bebus
Fidel et Morum, 23rd ed. (Freiburg 1m Breisgau, 19^5)* cited
hereafter as Denz.

Evidently, then, while medieval thought in other areas is
generally an amalgamation of diverse elements, in theology,
the "queen of sciences," the authority of Augustine dominates
everyone's thinking.

This is nowhere more clear than in

the doctrine of grace.
The teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, as expressed in
the third book of his Summa Contra Gentiles. and then more
precisely in the later Summa Theologlae. represents a con
tinuation of the Augustinian tradition with one important
qualification.

By explaining Augustine's doctrine of grace

in the context of an Arab-influenced Aristotelian system,
Thomas seemed to some of his contemporaries to have violated,
or at least compromised, the traditional teaching.

Actually,

many of these suspicions were unfair, but it is impossible
to understand the reasons why his critics in the late thir
teenth and early fourteenth centuries construed Thomas'
ideas as they did, except in terms of Bishop Etienne Tempier's
condemnation of various Arabian-Aristotelian propositions
in 1277 as a "correction" of philosophical vagaries at the
1R
University of Paris.
The Arabian philosophers who devel
oped Aristotle's thought during the Middle Ages, particul
arly Avicenna and Averroes, had frozen his cosmology into
a rigid hierarchy of causes extending from the First Mover
to man.

This causality was extremely deterministic, even

*®See David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought
(New York: Vintage Books, 196*0, pp. 272-275 and passim.

to the point of denying any freedom whatsoever to man.

As

a consequence, since almost all the texts and commentaries
on Aristotle had come to Paris from Arabian sources, any ~~
attempt to explain man's relation to God in terms of a First
Mover either was, or at least seemed to be, colored by
Arabian determinism.
In Thomas' explanation of the need for grace to pre
cede meritorious works, we therefore see implications that
go beyond Augustine, resulting from the different metaphys
ical framework Thomas employed.

This is quite evident in
IQ
the following passages from the Summa Theologlae: 7
M a n ’s nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in
its integrity, as it was in our first parent before
sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin
of our first parent. Now in both states human nature
needs the help of God, as First Mover, to do or will
any good whatsoever. . . .But in the state of integ
rity of nature, as regards the sufficiency of opera
tive power, man by his natural endowments could will
and do the good proportioned to his nature, which is
the good of acquired virtue; but he could not do the
good that exceeded his nature, which is the good of
infused virtue. But in the state of corrupted nature,
man falls short even of what he can do by his nature,
so that he is unable to fulfill all of it by his own
natural powers.
(Q. 109, art. 2)
and then again,
. . .since God is absolutely the First Mover, it is
by His motion that everything seeks Him under the
common notion of good, whereby everything seeks to
be likened to God in its own way.
(Q. 109, art. 6 )
*9proia Anton C. Pegis, ed. Introduction to Saint Thomas
Aquinas (New York, 1958). All quotations from Thomas will
be from this edition.

Thomas seems honestly laboring to express Augustine's funda
mental position on grace and merit, but the form he uses
carries far different philosophical suggestions.

For where

Augustine makes us aware of the struggle, the anxiety, the
conflict, Thomas speaks of the sense in which secondary
causes can become efficient causes only at the instigation
of the First Cause.

And where Augustine writhes in the tor

ments of a sinner whose deepest experience has taught him
the paradox of grace and freedom, Thomas reduces this to a
principle of metaphysics: Quldquid movetur ab alio movetur.
His contemporary critics diagnosed this as the "infection”
of Arabian determinism.
But before we look into some of these criticisms and
reactions, there is another important point in Thomas'
teaching that warrants attention.

On the subject of meritum

de congruo, Thomas allows greater flexibility than Augustine
had and thus opens the way for more radical innovations by
fourteenth-century thinkers.

Thomas is, nevertheless, quite

orthodox in maintaining that a man cannot merit de congruo
unless he is first moved by grace (ST: Q. 112, art. 2), but
he opens new possibilities when he argues that a man can, by
his good works, merit de congruo different proportions of
sanctifying grace than might be given another man whose de
congruo merits had been less:
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying
grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature,
grace joins man to the highest good, which is God. But
as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less

inasmuch as one may be more perfectly illumined by the
light of grace than another. And a certain reason for
this is on the part of him who prepares himself for
grace; since he who is better prepared for grace receives
more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the
first cause of this diversity, since man prepares him
self only inasmuch as his free choice is prepared by God.
Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought
on the part of God, who dispenses His gifts variously,
in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church
may result from these various degrees; even as He insti
tuted the various conditions of things, that the universe
might be perfect.
(Q. 112, art. I*)
Though remaining impeccably orthodox, Thomas has introduced
a new element here in trying to explain how it is that some
men receive greater measure of sanctifying grace than others.
While not returning to the semi-Pelagian view that man merits
sanctifying grace de congruo, Thomas argues that the propor
tions of sanctifying grace a man receives depend on the woiks
he performs.

Thomas no doubt would have shuddered at some

of the later developments of meritum de congruo, but he
could not have denied that his cautious half-step beyond
Augustine provided the direction for less orthodox departures
a century later.
Perhaps the most distinguished of Thomas’ early
critics was the English Franciscan John Duns Scotus.

Duns

attacked Thomistic rationalism and asserted the priority of
will over reason in both God and man.

This led, as we saw

earlier, to Duns’ distinction between God's' potentla abso
luta and potentla ordlnata.

Thus, because God could, at

least theoretically, override his ordinances by virtue of
his absolute freedom, not only was Thomas’ natural theology
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weakened, but also the whole direction of the discussion of
merit, grace, freedom, justification, and predestination
began to change.

Actually, Duns himself appears never to
20

have explicitly contradicted accepted teaching.

He holds,

for example, that all meritorious actions must be preceded
by grace

I"per

adiutorlum gratlae datum” ) and rules out even

the semi-Pelagian exaggeration of man's natural powers
("actio merltorla non est in potestate nostra nec naturali21
bus meremur. quod erat error Pelagll.”).
But there remains
an ambiguity in his teaching, unintended perhaps, but an
ambiguity nonetheless.

For if God can reverse his own or

dinances through his potentla absolute. then God could at
least conceivably elect a man to glory who had merited de
congruo but did not have the habitus of sanctifying grace
required ordinarily for meritum de condigno.

It is only

fair to point out here that Duns himself never raised this
point; but his followers did, and this is what interests us
here.

Consequently, Duns holds a middle place in the develop

ment we are tracing:

himself orthodox, he prepared the way

for the most unorthodox speculations on grace and merit of
the fourteenth century.
2°0n the controversy over Duns' orthodoxy, see Charles
Lawrence Balil, "Duns Scotus," New Catholic Encyclopedia, IV
(New York, 1967),1102-6.
21J. Riviere, "Merite," Dlctlonnalre de Thgologle
Cathollaue. X (Paris, 1928), col. 705-
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III
Following Duns Scotus in the first part of the four
teenth century came his Franciscan confrere William of Ockham,
a thinker of great power, range, and subtlety, hut one
whose ideas became so controversial that they have often
been distorted and are not sufficiently understood even to22
day.

The principal source of misunderstanding, even among

modern scholars, lies, I think, in the methods that Ockham
employed.

For he began as a logician, one of the most

brilliant of all time, and brought his logical techniques
to bear in developing his highly original theology.

As

we saw earlier, one of Ockham*s foremost contributions
was to divorce faith and revelation from the dependence they
had on reason in earlier Christian philosophy, particularly
that of St. Thomas.

A rationalist theology was the worst of

impieties, so far as the Franciscan Ockham was concerned.
What I should like to propose here, then, is the thesis that
Ockham*s often quoted extreme voluntarism is really a bril
liant reductlo ad absurdum of rationalist theolofey and, as
such, does not represent Ockham*s true theological position.
Once he had established his framework of voluntarism, he
showed (1) how insufficient was the theology of his adver
saries, and (2) how Insufficient was reason Itself when
turned loose in areas that properly belonged to faith and
22

Cf. note 3» above.
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revelation.

But Ockham had a positive and, on the whole,

orthodox theology of his own to offer, which has almost
invariably been ignored or confused with his negative criti
cism of other men's views.
Specifically, Ockham radically emphasizes the potentla Del absoluta as so totally free from the present order
of creation and moral law that God could contradict the laws
he has ordained in, say, Scripture.

If, for example, God

were to order a man to commit fornication, far from being a
sin, this would become a meritorious act (Sent.. Ill, q. 12
MA)?^

Next, Ockham insists that free will is the only real

determinant of merit because either with or without grace
what is willed will be good or evil according to the dispo
sition of the one who is willing (Sent., I, dist. 17, q. 2 C).
Applying his famous principle of economy— "Ockham's Razor"
(pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate)— he next slices
away at grace.

Grace need not initiate an act for man to

merit de congruo, as Augustine had argued, because God can
accept an act which was not subsequent to grace if he so
wills by his potentla absoluta (Sent.. Ill, q. 8 C).

Simi

larly, in the case of sanctifying grace, God could choose to
accept a man who had not received this habltus that Augustine
believed necessary for merltum de condigno for, once again,
God's potentla absoluta could dispense with such a condition.
2% h e text I am using is Guillelmus de Occam, O.F.K.,
Opera Plurlma (Lyon, 1^-9^-96; facsimile, 1962, by the Gregg
Press Ltd., London).
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This was the first article in Ockham’s theology condemned
2b
by the papal commission at Avignon in 1326.
Finally, and
most reprehensible of all to the commission at Avignon,
Ockham asserted that G o d ’s potentla absoluta could even re25
ject a man who had done good works and accept a sinner. Up
to this point, Ockham appears to have violated the official
and ordinary teaching of the Church on every point.

Why,

then, did Ockham not consider his theology of grace and free
dom heretical, and how could his fellow Franciscans have re
garded him with such esteem?

In answering this, we must

bear in mind that the real issue here is whether or not
Ockham violated orthodox teaching, not how amenable his views
might be to one or another individual or tradition.

The re

ply, I submit, is that Ockham’s opponents took his arguments
literally and out of context.

He did not contend that God

ever did or would order a man to commit sin; nor did he ar
gue that God actually did dispense with grace. Ockham’s ar
gument that G o d ’s potentia absoluta is indeterminate, in
finitely free, and unknowable is merely a strategy to expose
the weaknesses in a rationalist theology, which necessarily
assumes that G o d ’s absolute power and his ordained power
are one and the same.

Such rationalism was repugnant to the

2b
Reprinted by Auguste Pelzer, in ”Les 51 articles de
Guillaume Occam censures, en Avignon, en 1326,” Revue
d ’histolre eoclesiastlque, XVIII (1922), 250-252.
^Article 3; Pelzer, p. 253*

Franciscans, who saw in it an attempt to scale God down to
human understanding.

Asserting the potentla Del absoluta

was, therefore, simply an emphatic way of dramatizing how
far God's nature transcended man's puny efforts to reach
him.
Ockham's technique was so unconventional that it
was misinterpreted, but his Intentions were manifestly
orthodox.

His argumentative method, the reductio ad absur-

dum, was so successful that his opponents and even some of
his followers did not see that his absurd caricature of God
actually caricatured man's attempts to reach God by natural
means.

Eut to argue, as the maglstrl at Avignon did, that

Ockham sought to overthrow God's potentla ordlnata and the
present moral order is to neglect the whole positive side
of his theology.

Fpr Ockham insisted again and again that a

virtuous will is one that conforms, so far as possible, to
the divine will.

And how may men know the divine will?

Through God's revelation (potentla ordlnata).

From this

point Ockham goes on to say that while God's will may be
free from necessity, he has willed that in the present order
we choose what he has willed.

Thus, a wrong act is wrong

because "it would be elicited contrary to the divine precept
and the divine will" (Sent., Ill, 8.13 C).

And again, an

act is either evil or it is "Intrinsically and necessarily
virtuous stante ordlnatlone divina" (Sent., Ill, 8.12 CCC).
Even when he argues that good works are required for merit,

he Is careful to explain that (1) God is under no compulsion
to accept them, and (2 ) this does not exclude a need for
grace, but only the liklihood that a man could merit salva
tion by grace without good works (Sent., I, dist. *H, q. 1 B).
Ockham was, however, much more cautious than many
of his followers.

A good example of one of these is Robert

Holcot (d. 13^9)» another Englishman, who developed some of
the radical tendencies in Ockham*s thought.

In his Commen-
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tary on the Sentences.
Holcot also uses the principle of
economy to slice out what seems unnecessary to him in the
doctrine of grace and merit, seen from the perspective of
God's potentla absoluta.

Thus, God could dispense with the

necessity for sanctifying grace and even accept purely nat
ural actions as worthy of heavenCSent.. I, q. 1, art. b D ) .
Here we see the Ockhamist use of potentla Del absoluta. which
was by this time becoming conventional, but Holcot went even
further by claiming that good dispositions and good works
can by their own merits earn salvation if God chooses to
accept them (Sent.. I, q. 1, art. 5 G and q.

art 3 K).

Holcot does attempt to protect himself by granting that God
must accept a man's works in order for them to earn merltum
de condigno, but this still allows natural actions an Intrin
sic value that is totally foreign to Augustine or Thomas
Aquinas.

The importance of Holcot's attitude lies in this:

?6
See Gordon Leff, Bradwardlne and the Pelagians (Camb
ridge, 1957), PP« 216-227 for pertinent passages from this
text.

while never denying the validity of the present moral order
or God's potentla

ordlnata. he opens the new possibility

that even without

grace, the sacraments,

God could elect a

sinner if

he wished to do so.

even when he does

return to

the potentla Del ordlnata and the

or even the Church,
Moreover,

law of revelation, Holcot introduces interpretations that
would have horrified Augustine.

An instance of this is Hol

cot 's answer to the question, "Can man assisted by grace
earn eternal life by his own full merit {ex condlgno)?" in
his Super Llbros Saplentlae:
Now as to the original question, we can answer that
the statement, man assisted by grace can earn eternal
life by his own full merit, can be understood in two ways.
It can be understood according to the natural value of
man's action or according to its contracted value, Man
would earn salvation according to natural value if his
merit were, by its very nature and existence, such that
eternal life would be suitable payment for it. According
to contracted value, the value of one's merit would be
determined by legal arrangement in the way that a small
copper coin which, in natural value, has not the same
weight or worth as a loaf of bread is assigned this value
by the law of the land.
Now if we understand man's merit according to the
first Interpretation, the natural goodness of our works
does not earn eternal life fully (de condlgno) but only
partially (de congruo), since it is appropriate that if
a man has done all that he can with his finite resources
God should reward him with His infinite resources.
But according to the second understanding of merit
we can say that our works are fully worthy of eternal life,
not because of any merit inherent in the acts themselves
but because of grace, since our Lord has established that
he who does good works in a state of grace shall receive
eternal life. Therefore, through the law and grace of
our ruler Christ we merit eternal life by our own full
merit (de condlgno).
It is true, of course, that Holcot carefully preserves the
2?Reprinted in Oberman, p. 1^3*
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need for grace for actions to merit salvation under the
present contract, but he has introduced qualifications of
his own here.

First, where is Augustine's lnltlum fidei,

which had been everywhere preserved among orthodox thinkers
and had, as we have seen, become an article of faith?
Second, has the emphasis not shifted here from God to man?
Grace is, to be sure, necessary for merltum de condlgno.
b^t -the stress here is on the need for good works on the
part of man.

Now while this does not absolutely contradict

Augustine and orthodox teaching, we can see here the de
velopment away from grace and toward the efficacy of works
which Eradwardine was to call "Modern Pelaglanism."

This

tendency is even more obvious when, later on in the same
work, Holcot asserts that "according to God's established
law the pilgrim who does whatever he can to dispose himself
for grace always receives grace."

28

Or again, in his Com

mentary on the Sentences. he claims that a contrite sinner
can, by his sincere disposition alone, merit justification
in the sense that God will respond to such human goodness
by then electing the sinner to glory (Sent.. IV, q. 1, art.
8 CC).
Still more extreme is the position taken by Adam of
Woodham, an English Franciscan who studied under Ockham at
Oxford, and who acclaimed his master as "brother William
2®Oberman, p. 1^9 *
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Ockham, a Minor by his Order, but a major by the perspica29
city of his genius and the truth of his teaching."
Yet
Adam clearly goes beyond his master in his teaching on merit
and grace, beginning with the now common proposition of
God*s transcendently free potentla absoluta.

Adam claims

that this potentla Del absoluta can accept a sinner without
any supernatural gift of grace preceding such acceptance.
The only thing that matters is that God wills to accept the
sinner, for whatever reason, not that the sinner does or
3O
does not have sanctifying grace (Sent.. I, dist. 17* q. 1).
Adam does add that God has ordained the requirement of pre
cedent grace, but his insistence on divine freedom is so
strong that it suggests little confidence in any stable re
lation between God and man.

This becomes clear when Adam

argues that God can exercise his potentla absoluta to accept
a sinner who, far from just lacking grace, is in a state of
mortal sin (Sent.. I, dist. 17* q* 3)*

On the other hand,

a man can merit God*s acceptance de congruo because he is
capable of this by his very nature, independently of grace
(Sent., I, dist. 1, q. 10).

Thus, where Augustine had

taught that God rewards his own gift in us when we perform
good works, Adam now claims that God rewards our actions for
themselves.

Adam never formally rejects the traditional

^ Q u o t e d by Gilson, p. 500.
•^Original texts in Leff, pp. 2^1-254.
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doctrine of grace as such, but what remains In his system
is an immediate confrontation of the divine and human wills,
a confrontation for which the habitus of grace has become
irrelevant.

As in Ockham, then, the attempt to assert God's

freedom, even over the ordained moral law, has led to as
serting an equally radical human freedom, a freedom from
the necessity of grace as man stands alone with his works
before God.
The growth and popularity of Ockhamlst theology was
extremely widespread, first In England and at Paris, and
then elsewhere on the continent.

It would be impossible to

document all of the evidence of this spread, but perhaps
one further example will help to show its pervasiveness.
31
Uthred of Bolden (C. 1315-97). a little-known teacher in
a provincial English priory, was censured by a commission
appointed by Archbishop Langham for, among other things,
holding some extreme Ockhamlst views.

Uthred had read the

ology at Oxford and absorbed the ideas and controversies of
his day, without offering much of his own that was original.
He probably would never have come to Langham's attention
except that he became embroiled in a conflict with a Domin
ican named William Jordan over a novel theory of Uthred's
on final "clear vision" afforded a sinner before death.
David Knowles, "The Censured Opinions of Uthred of
Boldon," Proc. Brit. Acad.. XXXVII (1950), 305-3^2.
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When the commission decided to investigate Uthred's ideas,
however, it saw fit to look into some of his statements about God's power, man's freedom, grace, merits, and justi
fication.

As recorded in Article XIV of the commission's

report, Uthred claimed that grace is not an entity in itself;
but rather a "relation" between God and man.

Further,

coming more directly to the point, the commission censured
his opinions that men could merit eternal life ex purls
naturallbus (Article XVII), that human nature possessed all
the powers needed for salvation (Article XIX), and that a
sinner always has the power to regain grace (in the sense
of a proper "relation" to God) in this life (Article XX).
These propositions are so clearly unorthodox that it is no
surprise that they were firmly censured, but it is a sign
of the pervasiveness of such ideas that Uthred was only in
vestigated by a local commission.
is obvious:

The implication of this

the papal commission at Avignon had time only

for really important and original heresies, not for an ob
scure monk who taught ideas that were already widespread.
The Church's magisterlum was, nonetheless, clearly
moving to bring pressure against at least the most extreme
Ockhamlst tendencies; and the response from orthodox pro
fessional theologians, scholarly maglstrl at Oxford, was
not long in coming.

It is also quite worth noting, I think,

that the conservative reaction was essentially a return to
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Augustinian theology on all fronts.

Thus, Richard FitzRalph

(C. 1300-60), who read theology at Oxford during the early
enthusiasm for Ockhamism, remained a solid Augustinian and
later became a defender of conservative theology as the
02
Bishop of Armagh-;
On the relation of works to grace, for
example, FitzRalph criticizes the Scotist-Ockhamist emphasis
on the role of will in merit and, though not excluding free
will, he maintains that grace must first move the will to
seek the good before a man can perform meritorious actions
(Sent., I, q. 12, 8^ rb).

Further, FitzRalph reverses the

Ockhamlst tendency toward overstressing merltum de congruo,
arguing that man's free will cannot generate grace by its
own good actions; only God can create grace in man (Sent..
I, q. 11, a.2, 77 vb).

Generally, however, FitzRalph did

not engage significantly in the controversies over grace
and merit, nor was he a thinker of great power or original
ity.

For such power and originality we must turn to the

greatest adversary of Ockhamism in the whole period, Arch
bishop Thomas Bradwardine (C. 1290-13^9 ), whose De Causa
Del contra Pelaglum did more than any other single force to
reassert the Augustinian doctrine of grace.

His place in

the thought-contest of the age is perhaps best summed up in
his own description of his days at Oxford during the first
32

The best full-length study, with pertinent passages
from original texts. Is Gordon Leff's Richard FitzRalph.
Commentator of the Sentences: a Study in Theological Ortho
doxy (Manchester. 1963)•
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surge of Ockhamism:
I was at one time...while still a student of phil
osophy, a vain fool, far from the true knowledge of God,
and held captive in opposing error. From time to time
I heard theologians treating of the questions of grace
and freewill, and the party of Pelagius seemed to me
to have the best of the argument. For I rarely heard
anything said of grace in the lectures of the philoso
phers, except in an ambiguous sense. Butevery day I
heard them teach that we are the masters of our own free
acts, and that it stands in our power to do either good
or evil, to be either virtuous or vicious, and such like.
And when I heard now and then in church a passage read
from the apostle, which exalted grace and humbled free
will— such, for instance, as that word in Romans, ix.l6 ,
"Therefore it isnot in him that willeth, nor in him
that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy", I had no
liking for such teaching, for towards grace I was still
graceless.
I believed also with the Manichaians that
the apostle, being a man, might possibly err from the
path of truth in any point of doctrine. But afterwards,
and before I had become a student of theology, the truth
before mentioned struck upon me like a beam of grace.
It seemed to me as If I beheld in the distance, under a
transparent image of truth, the grace of God as it is
prevenient both in time and nature to all good works—
that is to say, the gracious will of God, which precedently wills that he who merits salvation shall be
saved, and precedently works this merit in him,— God,
in truth, being in all movements the primary Mover.
Wherefore also I give thanks to Him who freely gave me
this grace.33
In rather dramatic fashion, this sums up the conflicting
forces of a whole age, here battling within the same man.
Since their effects were so far-reaching, it will be worth
our while to look at Bradwardine1s views in some detail.
His first point Is that all good works, including
any a man might perform, come from God and can in no sense
^ Q u o t e d fey Herbert B. Workman, in John Wycllf: a Study
of the English Medieval Church. I (Oxford, 1926), 120-1Z1.
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be attributed to man himself (De Causa Del, p. 307)2^

This

leads quite naturally to the inferences that (1) God is the
sole agent in effecting a m a n ’s salvation (De Causa Del, p.
2*17), and (2) God alone moves the elect toward good actions
since such actions cannot follow from one’s own natural in
clinations (De Causa Del, p. 319)-

Going even further,

Bradwardine in effect rules out merltum de congruo altoge
ther:

not only are good works performed independently of

God impossible, but even good works prompted by precedent
grace cannot merit sanctifying grace since for Bradwardine
this would imply that man could control God (De Causa Del,
p. 325).

There is no half-way point in Justification.

man is either accepted by God or he is not:

A

his actions

either merit de condlgno or they do not merit at all.

To

allow man an opportunity to cooperate with God’s first
grace and thus earn the further gift of sanctifying grace,
which was the position of Augustine, was out of the question
for Bradwardine because this would suggest some claim that
man might have on God.

Consequently, in his efforts to vin

dicate the necessity of grace from the teachings of the
" M o d e m Pelagians," Bradwardine violated orthodox doctrine
by the opposite extreme:

where his opponents stressed

merltum de congruo, and therefore free will, over merltum

^ A l l quotations and citations of De Causa Del are from
the only printed edition, Henry Savile, ed. (London, 1618).
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de condlgno. Bradwardine insisted so heavily on the priority .
of grace and merltum de condlgno that he excluded merltum
de congruo altogether, denying any independent value to
human acts.
ple.

This may perhaps become clearer with an exam

Bradwardine*s theology eliminated the value of contri

tion.

If a man committed a sin and, at the prompting of

God's grace, became genuinely sorry for his sin and prayed
earnestly for forgiveness and reinstatement in G o d ’s good
(sanctifying) grace, this in traditional doctrine would be
meritorious de congruo and likely to lead to God*s acceptance.
Bradwardine excluded this possibility from his system,
arguing that this would suggest a proportion between man's
acts and God's.

Only faith, the effect of grace not its

cause, can justify the sinner; works are irrelevant in Brad
wardine 's system ("sed sola fide sine onerlbus praecedentl
sit homo lust us11 £pe Causa Dell] p. 39*0.

The importance of

this innovation has been well assessed by Gordon Leff:
Bradwardine has reached the point in his doctrine of
grace where its entirely supernatural and unmerited
character allows of no human action. He marks a break
in kind, not merely in degree: for it is a logical
extension of his own teaching either to transfer belief
into a personal and emotional experience, as Luther
did; or, on the other hand, to establish a theocracy on
the certainty of God's predetermined will, such as Cal
vin was to found.35
The more immediate effects were no less profound, as we
shall now see in the controversial careers of Thomas
-^Leff, Bradwardine. pp. 85-86.

Buckingham (c .1300-c .1356) and John Wyclif (d.1384).
Buckingham's early work, represented by his Commen
tary op the Sentences, shows a radical Ockhamlst tendency
that often goes beyond even Robert Holcot or Adam of Wood36
ham.

On the subject of works, for example, Buckingham

claimed that man could be good by nature without any habitus
of sanctifying grace (Sent., q. 6 ).

He, like the other

Ockhamlsts, used God's potentla absoluta to destroy any
fixed moral relation between God and man, but he went fur
ther than most of the others by arguing that (1 ) grace and
sin could coexist in the same soul, and (2 ) grace does not
insure charity nor sin demand damnation (Sent., q. 6 ).
Faced with such indeterminacy, even a man in mortal sin
could merit salvation de congruo If God chose to accept him
(Sent.. q. 3* art. 2).

This is Ockhamism pushed to the ex

treme, but Buckingham has not yet said his last word.

Soon

after Buckingham produced this early work, Bradwardine»s De
Causa Del appeared and transformed the whole debate.

One

way that we can measure Bradwardine»s effect on his contem
poraries is to note the change in Buckingham's later work,
37
the Questions.
,This tract was conceived as a response to

^Original texts of Buckingham's Cornmantft-rv on the Sen
tences in Leff, Bradwardine. pp. 227-2*H •
•^Original texts of Buckingham's Questions In J. A.
Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1966);
see esp. pp. 65-6^.
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Bradwardine, but It quite significantly does not revert to
Buckingham's earlier opinions.

The Questions reveals a very

moderate Augustinism, carefully rejecting Ockham on the one
side and Bradwardine on the other.

Buckingham now taught

that grace always precedes merit and that good works cannot
by themselves satisfy God, but only after they have been
elevated by grace (merltum de condlgno).

Still, he was also

careful to preserve the value of man's free will, arguing
that a man's disposition toward grace and the quality of
his works may merit God's favor de congruo. though they are
not themselves (naturalIter) sufficient for justification.
The moderation of these views, therefore, is a tribute to
the influence of Bradwardine who, though himself as extreme
in one way as the Ockhamists were in another, so strongly
reasserted Augustinian theology that he made a via media
such as Buckingham's possible by the middle of the four
teenth century.
The last figure we shall consider here was perhaps
the most vigorous mind of the latter half of the century,
John Wyclif.

Wyclif also participated in the conservative

response to Ockhamism and, as Thomas Netter of Walder re-
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ported, "his disciples called him John son of Augustine."^
Besides this adherance to Augustine, Wyclif placed great
value on Bradwardine and FitzRalph, whom he cited often as
-^Quoted by Workman, I, 119»
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contemporary authorities against their common opponents.
his opposition to the "Modern Pelagians" on questions of
grace and merit is accordingly severe, as is evident in the
following passage from De voluclone D e l :
Yet it would be heretical and utterly profane to say
that in God's co-operation with man through his grace,
m a n ’s acts are naturally prior to and more important
than those of God through grace; but this is what seemed
good to the Modern Pelagians to say, that man may pos
sibly act without God's cooperating with him. And con
cerning this they suggest that grace is an absolute and
self-sufficient quality, so that by God's absolute, but
not by his ordained power, man can merit without it.
And so they are ridiculously compelled to say that a
man naturally performs meritorious acts before God works
in him, on the ground that such acts can only be done
by that man...and so, according to such people, manq
could act without the grace of God working in him. y
As J. A. Robson points out, "However suspect other features
of Wyclif*s theology might be, his doctrine of grace was im40
peccably orthodox.11
The only thing that is "suspect" here
is the premise from which his doctrine of grace is deduced,
his extreme predestinarian view of God's relation to man for
which he has become so famous in doctrinal history.
With Wyclif we come to the end of our examination
of this long controversy, and it now remains to show how
widely these ideas influenced the intellectual milieu of the
fourteenth century as a whole.

In such a project, it would

be wrong to assume that because this was a theological
^ Q u o t e d by Robson, p. 211.
40
Robson, p. 209•
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dispute, it was therefore too abstruse or too divorced from
their everyday concerns to interest laymen much, if at all.
We must be careful not to infer a disinterest in technical
theology in the fourteenth century from our experience of
such a disinterest in a later age.

William of Ockham, in a

famous protest, once complained that Oxford theologians were
constantly besieged with arguments and opinions from laymen
and old women on such questions as necessity, contingency,
and God's power.

These theological disputes were not con

fined to musty libraries or stuffy lecture halls, but were
among the most pervasive intellectual interests of the later
Middle Ages.

The following chapters will examine much of

the best poetry of the fourteenth century, none of which was
written by Oxford schoolmen, but all of which shows how deep^
ly the controversies over grace and merit affected the ideas
and values of the age.

In

Gulllelml de Ockham Opera Polltlca. Ill, ed. H. S. Offler
(Manchester, 195^)» 231.

Chapter II:

The Pearl-Poet

A decade ago, it might have "been necessary at this
point to justify the analyses we are about to begin by
arguing that, at least for medieval poetry, a study of
theological doctrine is legitimate as literary criticism.
Perhaps the question of how far a critic may extend his
sphere into the area of “ideas" has not yet been settled,
but judging from the kinds of studies of medieval literature
that have appeared since the early 1950’s, the question no
longer seems particularly Important, at least to medieva
lists.

Whatever one may think of the exegetical method

*
1
developed by Robertson, Huppe, Kaske, and others,
it has
excited such lively controversy and renewed such interest
in the study of patristic and medieval theology among
literary scholars that The Well Wrought Urn has largely
been abandoned for the Patrologla Latina, and Archetypal
Patterns in Poetry for the Vulgate and the Glossa Ordinarla.
■^This method has been described in, for example, Dorothy
Bethurum, ed. Critical Approaches to Medieval Literature (New
York, i960). A recent judicious evaluation may be found In
Paul Beichner, C.S.C., "The Allegorical Interpretation of
Medieval Literature," PMLA. LXXXII (March, 1967). 33-38.
38
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There Is little reason for worry that stylistic criticism
will he neglected, however, because of the growing interest
in medieval rhetoric, long the province of a small band of
scholars armed with the texts in Edmond Faral's Les Artes
Po^tlaues du XIIe et du XIIIe Siecle,

and now available to

the nonspecialist as a result of the recent translation of
Geoffrey de Vinsauf*s Indispensable Poetrla Nova.^ Still,
even writers concerned primarily with stylistic analysis can
scarcely afford to insulate medieval poets, even for the sake
of critical method, from the intellectual and cultural
elements of the medieval synthesis that the poetry struggles
to articulate,.

For poetry, no less than the encyclopedia

or the summa, reflects the passion of the Middle Ages to
unite all areas of human experience into a single, compre
hensive system.

This may seem foreign to our twentieth-

century mind, which attempts to divide experience into
specialized compartments for scientific analysis, and which
has labored to divorce art from life, at least in several
notable cases.

But to apply this bias to fourteenth-century

poetry would render sympathetic analysis impossible.

With

this in mind, the intent of this chapter, as well as of
succeeding chapters, is to search out the responses in
several important poems of the later fourteenth century to
^ (Paris, 192*0.
^Trans. Margaret Nims (Toronto, 1967).
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the controversy over grace and merit described in the first
chapter.
Most scholars now agree that the Pearl-noet wrote
all of the poems found in the Cotton Nero A.x manuscript(
and there is increasing evidence that he may have written
L
S t . Brkenwald as well.
This makes for a convenient assump
tion because we can now study these poems as a group, but
unity of authorship is not absolutely essential to the thesis
I shall try to prove here.

All that is necessary to assume

is that these five works exhibit a general similarity of
language and style, and that they are roughly contemporary
with one another.

Beyond this, all five poems provide exten

sive evidence of interest in the same intellectual problems
and remarkable agreement on approaches to these problems.
Most interpretations of Pearl in the past have
focused on such questions as the nature and subject of the
a l l e g o r y , ^ the genre to which the poem belongs,^ the Jewel

^See especially Henry L. Savage, ed. St. Erkenwald.
(New Haven, 1926), pp. liii-lxv.
-’Useful summaries of various theories regarding allegory
may be found in E. V. Gordon, ed., Pearl (Oxford, 1953),
pp.xi-xix and xxvli-xxix; and John Conley, "Pearl and a
tost Tradition," JEGP. LIV (1955). 332-3^7.
^This is an old controversy which is not yet dead,
as Dorothy Everett's intelligent analysis shows. See
the essay on Pearl in her Essays on Middle English
Literature, ed. Patricia Kean (Oxford, 1955)•

symbolism,

7

and the rhetorical function of the narrator.

p

Each of these has proved valuable in helping us to a better
understanding and appreciation of the complexity and rich
ness of the poem, and it is not my purpose to challenge any
of them here.

Surprisingly, there has been little discus

sion of the doctrinal questions raised by the poem, and I
have not been able to find any thoroughgoing effort to
relate the debate between the dreamer and the pearl-maiden
9
to the contemporary debate over grace and merit.
Many years ago, there was a theory, proposed
10
by Carleton Erown and supported by Walter Greene,
that
the narrator of Pearl is orthodox and the maid heretical
in their views on the equality of heavenly rewards.

Brown

argued that the poet "is laboring to prove that, since sal
vation is not a matter of merit but of grace, even a baptized
child dying in Infancy will receive in the heavenly kingdom
^Robert J. Blanch, "Precious Metal and Gem Symbolism
in Pearl," in Sir Gawaln and Pearl. Critical Essays
(Bloomington, 19^6), pp. 86-9 7 .
^Charles Moorman, "The Role of the Narrator in Pearl,11
MP, LIII (November, 1955). 73-81.
^This is not to say, however, that no one has commented
on this at all. See the pointed, though general, remarks
in William H. Schofield's English Literature from the
Norman Conquest to Chaucer (London. 1906). p. 101; and see
Dorothy Everett’s essay (cited in note 6 , above).
10

Carleton F. Brown, "The Author of The Pearl. Considered
in the Light of His Theological Opinions," PMLA,XIX (190^).
115-153; Walter Kirkland Greene, "The Pearl— A New
Interpretation," PMLA. XL (1925), 81^-827.
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a reward equal to that of the Christian who has lived a life
of righteousness and holy works.”

1 1

This is, according to

Brown, a revival of the Jovinian heresy and represents a
doctrine strongly opposed by all orthodox theologians of
the Middle Ages.

Interestingly, he uses Bradwardine as

his standard of contemporary orthodoxy:

"It will be ob

served that the objections raised by the father to the no
tion that a baptized child will receive equal reward with
an adult entirely coincide with the views of Bradwardine—
in both, even the same verse of Scripture is appealed to."

12

Thus, the dreamer, who loses his argument with the heretical
maiden, provides a target through which the poet can also
strike Bradwardine.
Soon after Brown published his theory, Jefferson
13
E. Fletcher rejected it, pointing out evidence in the poem
of a hierarchy in heaven (lines 885-888 and 1119)•

Such

a hierarchy depends on the common distinction between the
objective reward that is given equally to all the elect and
the subjective enjoyment of that reward, which differs from
one individual to another according to their different
merits.

Fletcher sums up his argument by observing that the

1:1Brown, p. 132.
12

Brown, p. 136.
^ " T h e Allegory of the Pearl," JEGP, XX (1921), 1-21.
Another important defense of the poet's orthodoxy is Rene
Wellek's "The Pearl: An Interpretation of the Middle
English Poem,." Studies in English. IV (1933)* 1-33*

poet
.......... is not c o n e e m e d to edit the sooial register of
paradise* He is discussing only one issue in the
problem of the divine reward of merit, namely, the
comparative worth for salvation of the vicarious merit
of Christ*8 sacrifice and of the direct individual
merit of good works; and he decides in favor of the
former. The example of the little child, bora in the
faith and dying after baptism, is simply an extreme.
cas au vlf of one saved by vicarious merit solely.1^
This seems to have solved the problem for scholars interested
in the Pearl-uoet*s doctrine of grace, if we may Judge by
the absence of any further studies that might have added
new insights into the dispute.
There is, nevertheless, another perspective from
which we may view the question*

Neither Brown nor Fletcher

allows for an interaction between grace and meritorious
works; they both split the problem in half, os if grace and
works were mutually exclusive, and it were possible to
choose only one or the other.
tomy.

But this is a false dicho

Orthodox tradition from Augustine onward recognized

a connection between grace and works, a connection so
intimate that one is fruitless without the other.

Thus, a

more satisfactory account of the significance of the debate
in Pearl will have to begin with the central issue of that
debate:

whether grace or works is more important in

meriting salvation.

*^Fletcher, p. 19*

Of the two, the poet does place greater emphasis
on grace than on works, but only because the case is extra
ordinary to begin with.

The issue is not whether grace is

required for salvation— both the dreamer and the maiden
agree that it is— but whether works are needed to complement
the power of grace in order to merit God's acceptance de
condigno.

The conclusion that "£e grace of God is gret

innogh" does not exclude the value of works; it merely
confirms the Church's traditional teaching that the saving
grace of baptism (gratia gratum faciens) is sufficient to
Justify a child who has not yet had the chance to perform
i

good works before dying.

We may well ask, however, why

the poet chose the extreme case that he did.

Considering

the fourteenth-century interest in the relation between
grace and merit, this question is crucial in understanding
both the poem and its place in late medieval thought.
Placed in this context, Pearl dramatizes a debate,
similar to the Scholastic dlsputatlo. between the Ockhamist
tendencies of the dreamer and the Augustinian conservatism
of the pearl-maid.

His stress on the importance of works

leads to a doctrine of merltum de congruo. at least in
some places in the poem, which she, with her overwhelming
emphasis on grace, tends to Ignore, if not actually to
eliminate.

Further, the contemporary distinction between

potentia Del absoluta and potentia Del ordinata underlies
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the arguments presented on both sides of the debate.
Even before the debate gets under way, moreover,
there are clues to the dreamer’s Ockhamist leanings.

In

the fifth stanza, for example, he describes the predomi
nance of his will over his intellect and rational Christian
1 *5
teaching, thus introducing us to his voluntaristic scheme: ^
Bifore t»t spot my honde I spenned
For care ful colde ]?at to me ca^t;
A deuely dele in my hert denned,
•Da3 resoun sette myseluen sa3t.
I playned my perle fcat fcer wat3 spenned
Wyth fyrce skylle3 fcat faste fa3t;
■Da3 kynde of Kryst me comfort kenned,
My wreched wylle in wo ay wra^te.
(*+9-56)
After meeting Pearl, the dreamer assumes, on the basis
of sense experience, that she exists as a physical reality.
This may reflect the empirical bias of Oxford nominalism,
but whatever its source the maid chides him for it:
© o u says fcou trawe3 me in l>is dene,
Bycawse t>ou may wyth y3en me se.
(295-296)
No doubt, these passages can be explained in other ways,
but when we see the further evidence of the dreamer’s
Ockhamist tendencies, it seems not too far-fetched to see
in the lines quoted above a preparation for the theological
position of the dreamer.
Be this as it may, the Pearl goes on to be much
more specific in her criticism:
•^All quotations are taken from Gordon’s edition (cited
in note 5* above).

•I halde t>at iueler lyttel to prayse
©at leue3 wel J>at he se3 wyth y3e,
And much to "blame and vncortayse
■Dat leue3 oure Lord wolde make a ly^e,
©at lelly hy3te your lyf to rayse,
© a 3 fortune dyd your flesch to dy3e.
3e setten hys worde3 ful westernays
©at leue3 nofcynk "bot 3e hit sy3e.
And Jjat Is a poynt o sorquydry3e,
©at vche god mon may euel byseme,
To leue no tale be true to try3e
Bot fcat hys one skyl may dem.
(301-312)
She is, of course, censuring his scepticism again, but this
time she raises a new point.

Is the dreamer, she asks, one

of those m o d e m ! doc tor es who would argue that God is so
completely free of his contract with man, established de
potentia Del ordinata, that he cannot be relied on? that
he could, de potentia Del absoluta, even lie to man?

Such

radical suggestions were not unusual in the fourteenth
century, as the evidence presented in Chapter I shows.
By way of contrast, she constantly reaffirms the
stability of the present moral order, as in stanzas 2 6 , 29,
38, and k2.

She never rejects the concept of potentia Del

absoluta. but at the same time she insists that God would
never in fact violate what he has ordained as the proper
relation between himself and man:
Deme Dry3tyn, euer hym adyte,
Of ]ae way a fote ne wyl he wry£e.
(3^9-350)
Turning this argument to his own advantage, the dreamer
suggests that her account of her state in heaven implicitly
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accuses God of violating the covenant with man, of being
unjust in rewarding the maid as he has:
'That cortayse is to fre of dede,
3yf hyt be soth £at fcou cone3 saye.
Sou lyfed not two 3er in oure fcede;
Sou cowl>e3 neuer God naufcer plese ne pray,
Ne neuer nawfcer Pater ne Crede;
And quen mad on i>e fyrst day!
I:may not traw, so God me spede,
■Dat God wolde wry]?e so wrange away.
Of countes, damysel, par ma fay,
Wer fayr in heuen to halde asstate,
Ofcer elle3 a lady of lasse aray;
Eot a quene! Hit is to dere a date.'
(481-^92)
Confused and upset, the dreamer has three alternatives open
to him at this point:

(1) Pearl is misrepresenting her

self, though this would be hard to accept when he is faced
by evidence to the contrary;

(2 ) a child who has not earned

any merit could become a queen in heaven;

(3) God has,

by

asserting his potentia absoluta over his potentia ordlnata.
overturned the usual standards of Justice.
of course, is that he does

His problem,

want to afccept any of these.

In her reply, Pearl reassures him that God's word
and God's justice are absolute:
'£>er is no date of hys godnesse, '
Sen sayde to me i>at worfcy wy3te,
'For al is traw£e £at he con dresse,
And he may do nofcynk bot ry3t.
(^93-^96)
This contrasts sharply with the Ockhamist contention that
God could, de potentia Del absoluta. even will that a man
sin against the present moral law.

Against Ockham's view

that God's will is the sole determinant of what is right or

wrong, the maiden insists on a fixed moral order which hinds
God as well as man.

But even Bradwardine never would have

tolerated such a restriction of God's freedom, though he
would have agreed with her on the absoluteness of divine
justice.
To support her case, she next leads into the heart
of the poem, the parable of the workers in the vineyard.
Just as the men who came to work for the shortest time were
paid equally with those who labored through the heat of the
day, so also she, who lived only a brief life on earth, has
been justly rewarded in heaven along with men and women who
suffered through long lives.

The Important thing, from her

point of view, is not whether a man does or does not per
form good works because no man's behavior is sufficiently
meritorious to meet the full standard of God's justice
(merltum de condigno) by his own efforts (ex purls naturalibus):
'More haf I joye and blysse hereinne,
Of ladyschyp gret and lyue3 blom,
■Ben alle J>e wy3e3 in be worlde my3t wynne
By be way of ry^t to aske dome.
J
(577-580)
While the dreamer cannot very well attack the parable it
self, he shifts his tactics and produces a Scriptural text
of his own to support his side:
Then more I meled and sayde apert:
'Me bynk by tale vnresounable.
Godde3 ry3t is redy and euermore rert,
Ober Holy Wryt is bot a fable.

In Sauter is sayd a verce cmerte
Bat speke3 a poynt determynable:
”Bou quyte3 vchon as hys desserte,
Bou hy3e kyng ay pretermynable."
Now he J>at stod be long day stable,
And bou to payment com hym byfore,
•Benne be lasse in werke to take more able,
And euer be lenger be lasse, be more.1

(589-600)
It is true, as we have seen, that all medieval theologians
gave some place to man's works in salvation.

The real

difference between Ockham and Bradwardine is not that one
favored and one opposed the value of works; it is rather
that Ockham emphasized man's potential for meriting sal
vation de congruo. while Eradwardine virtually eliminated
all but merltum de condlgno.

In the passage just quoted,

it is impossible to be certain about which kind of merit
the dreamer is attempting to describe here.

If God

"quyte3 vchon as hys desserte,” how do we define the con
ditions under which a man's works may merit such reward?
What is man's "desserte”?

Does the dreamer mean that his

actions may have intrinsic value such that God will "quyte”
him for them (ex natura rei deblta). or does God simply
honor his commitment to reward a man to whom he has given
the grace to merit heaven (ex debito lusticiae)?

The

dreamer's statements are not entirely clear on this point,
but we may infer from his interest in the quantitative re
lation between works and rewards that he is in any event
unwilling to dispense with works.

Furthermore, his
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asstimption that there is, or should be, a balance of pay
ments between man and God implies that human actions have
value independently of God's participation or partnership
in them through grace (auxlllum gratlae),

Though the

dreamer does not appear to realize it, this borders suspi
ciously on Pelagianism.
Pearl has already taken care to preserve meritum
de congruo. as against Eradwardine1s tendency to ignore it
in his system:
■By prayer may hys pyte byte,
Bat mercy schal hyr crafte3 kype.
(355-356)
Eut at the same time, she has also ruled out the possibility
that men's works merit salvation "Ey pe way of ry^t" (580).
While meritum de congruo may be possible, granting the
goodness and mercy of God, only meritum de condigno offers
real security that one will actually be among the elect.
This leads logically to her response to the dreamer:
'Of more and lasse in Gode3 ryche,'
Dat gentyl sayde, 'lys no joparde,
For per is vch mon payed inlyche,
Wheper lyttel oper much be hys rewarde;
For pe gentyl Cheuentayn is no chyche,
Queper-so-euer he dele nesch oper harde:
He laue3 hys gyfte3 as water of dyche,
Oper gote3 of golf pat neuer charde.
Hys fraunchyse is large pat euer dard
To Hym pat mat3 in synne rescoghe;
No blysse bet3 fro hem reparde,
For pe grace of God is gret inoghe.
(601-612)
What matters here is not that the rewards given to men are
equal, but rather that God has chosen to give rewards at
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all.

Man has no claim on God by "ry3t.,,

Only God's free

gift of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens) can
justify the sinner and make him acceptable to God.

This

is what Pearl shares with those who have been saved after
having lived much longer than she:

justifying grace alone

raises man out of the massa perdltlonls.

This is proved

from the fact that even those who havethis gift
are

of grace

constantly slipping back into sin.If God were

to

judge men by their works alone, no one would be saved.
Thus, she claims, the dreamer's objection is not to the
point:
Eut now fcou mote3 , me for to mate,
©at I my peny haf wrang tan here;
©ou say3 fcat I J)at com to late
Am not worfcy so gret fere.
Where wyste3 fcou euer any bourne abate,
Euer so holy in hys prayere,
©at he ne forfeted by sumkyn gate
©e mede sumtyme of heuene3 clere?
“And ay fce of ter, fce alder t>ay were,
©ay laften ry3t and wro3ten woghe.
Mercy and grace moste hem ]?en stere,
For fce grace of God is gret inno^e.
( 6 1 3 - 621#-)
It is impossible that there be any real congruity between
man's faltering actions and God's Justice, and so it is
necessary that man be elevated to a state of grace (habitus
gratlae) in which he may meet the standards that God has
committed himself, de potentia Del ordinata, to accept as
full (de condlgno) merit
In the following three stanzas, the maiden describes

how man first fell through A d a m ’s sin, thus requiring the
justification brought about by Christ in order to be cap
able of meritum de condlgno.

She is quite careful to point

out that, even now, God's good will is necessary for such
merit to be achieved at all, thereby excluding semi-Pelagianism:
Now is t>er no3t in fce worlde rounde
Bytwene vus and blysse bot £at he wythdro^,
And £at is restored in sely stounde;
And fce grace of God is gret innoghe.
(657-660)
Even so, she is willing to allow a place to meritum de
congruo.

A man in the state of sin may, through contrition

and repentance, perform well enough that God will send
him grace (gratia gratis data) to prepare himself for the
sacramental grace of penance that will restore the sinner
to God's friendship (gratia gratum faclens):
Grace innogh J>e mon may haue
©at synne3 fcenne new, 3if hym repente,
Bot wyth sor3 and syt he mot hit craue,
And byde fce payne £erto is bent.
Eot resoun of ry3t fcat con not raue
Saue3 euermore fce innosent;
Hit is a dom Jsat God neuer gaue,
Bat euer fce gyltle3 shulde be schente.
Be gyltyf may contryssyoun hente
And be bur3 mercy to grace 3?ry3t.

(661-670)
Here, as well as in the following stanza, Pearl disting
uishes between two kinds of sinners: (1 ) those adults who,
having committed sins by their free will, may only be admit
ted back into saving grace through God's generosity, not
by right; (2 ) those children who, though they share in the

general fallen state of man, have not performed any evil
works by the time they die and are, therefore, "ay saf by
ry3t" (68U).

The point is that the "innocents" of the

second group are in a special class of their own, one to
which it is irrelevant to apply the question of merit at
all.

The maiden presupposes that, having been Justified

by the purifying waters of baptism, such children have all
that is required for salvation.

Any merits on their part,

were they capable of meritorious works, could not do any
more toward their being saved than baptism has already
i
done, de potentia Dei ordlnata. This may take care of her
own situation, but her function in the poem takes her much
further.

She has not only to convince the dreamer of the

Justice of God's ways of dealing with man; she has also
to teach a doctrine of grace and merit that will include
him as an adult as well.
For a man who is not one of the "innocents," it
is possible that he cooperate with God's will, as this has
been described for man, de potentia Dei ordlnata.

Thus,

the man who wishes to be among the righteous should do what
he can to avoid sin:
'The ry3twys man also sertayn
Aproche he schal ipat proper pyle,
©at take3 not her lyf in vayne,
Ne glauere3 her nie3bor wyth no gyle.

(685-688)
But she also qualifies this, once again, by pointing to the
impossibility of a man, even a very good man by ordinary

human standards, earning a heavenly reward by his own
merits alone:
'Anende ry3twys men
Dauid in Sauter, if
"Lorde, by seruaunt
For non lyuyande to

3et sayt3 a gome,
euer 3e sy3 hit:
dra3 neuer to dome,
be is Justyfyet."

Forby to corte quen bou schal com
©er alle oure cause3 schal be tryed,
Alegge be ry3t, b°u may *>e innome,
Ey bis like spech I haue asspyed.
(697-70^}
This is a doctrine so important in her theology that the
maiden does not seem to tire of repeating it: man has no
claim on God, but God has chosen to extend to his wayward
creatures the free gift of sanctifying grace.

Even though

man may apply for divine mercy by offering his works as a
sign of his good will, these may not Justify him.

Only

the grace which God has committed himself to provide to the
righteous man is sufficient to merit heaven (ex deblto
iusticlae rather than ex natura rei debita).

Thus, though

she has been careful to allow some place toworks

in the

salvation of adult Christians, the exigencies ofher

subject

lead her to give far greater emphasis to grace than to works.
In order to defend her own state in heaven, she has had to
argue that grace may save a baptized Christian independently
of works.

Now, the logic of her position forces her to ad

mit the same of adult salvation: works have some place,
ill-defined though it may be, but in the Judgment of God
grace alone suffices.
The dreamer, however, is either unable or unwilling

to accept this teaching.

For after seeing a vision of the

New Jerusalem, he tries to swim the river separating him
self from the heavenly city.

This is a direct attempt to

seize salvation by an act of the human will, which is outand-out Pelagianism.

Only after he has failed does the

dreamer finally recognize the folly of his action.

Man's

works are— not only in theory, but also in practice— incap
able of earning what does not belong to him by right.

Only

by humbly submitting himself to God's will, which has already
expressed its gratuitous liberality toward man, may the
dreamer have genuine hope of reward:
To J>at Prynce3 paye hade I ay bente,
And kerned no more ben wat3 me gyuen,
And halden me ber in trwe entent,
As be perle me prayed bat wat3 so frryuen,
As helde, drawen to Godde3 present,
To mo of his mysterys I hade ben dryuen;
Eot ay wolde man of happe more hente
■Den mo3te by ry3t vpon hem clyuen.
Derfore my ioye wat3 sone toriuen,
And I kaste of kythe3 bat laste3 aye.
Lorde, mad hit arn bat agayn be stryuen,
Ober proferen be cnt agayn by paye.
(1189-1200 )
The dreamer has at last come around to Pearl's point of
view.

Works are, in spite of the prevailing Ockhamist

teachings of the day, ultimately irrelevant if it is not
the "Prynce3 paye.”
In all this, then, there is clear evidence of the
poet's response to the fourteenth-century debate over grace
and merit.

Though it would surely be a grave injustice to

the poet to reduce his marvelous poetry to a prosaic dis-

cussion of theology, it is not possible to understand the
dialectic tension which organizes the poem except through
its central doctrinal theme.

Nor would it be possible to

understand how Pearl is itself a significant contribution
to the controversy, steering as it does a course between
the extremes of Ockham and Bradwardine.

Like both of these

thinkers, the Pearl-poet stresses the ultimate power and
authority of the divine will: but unlike Ockham, he rejects
works as either justifying in themselves or even likely to
evoke God's acceptance, de potentia absoluta: and unlike
Bradwardine, he is willing to grant limited value to
meritum de congruo.

The poem is nevertheless, basically

conservative in its overriding emphasis on God's grace,
though this may be attributed partly to the subject of the
poem and not to the poet himself, as his other poems show.
Norman Davis claims that Pearl "differs conslderably" from the other poems in the manuscrlpt-group,
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and

he is quite right if we consider stylistic matters alone.
But an investigation of the thematic content of these poems
reveals a striking coherence in the development of the
doctrine of grace and merit through them all.
this chapter, therefore, will examine the ways

The rest of
in which

the doctrine presented in Pearl receives further qualifi
cation and refinement in Purity. Patience. Sir Gawaln and
the Green Knight, and, because of mounting evidence of
common authorship, St. Erkenwald.
1^J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon* ed. Sir Gawain and
the Green Knight, rev. ed. (Oxford, 1967], pT TxlTl.------

The old interpretation of Purity as a collection
of poetic glosses on several disconnected Biblical narra
tives has long since been overturned by Gollancz and Menner,1?
but the full extent of the poem's thematic unity has yet
to be understood.

Among others, one of the most important

themes in the poem is its doctrine of works, which nicely
balances the doctrine of grace in Pearl.

But even though

the poet places a greater emphasis on works in Purity than
in Pearl. it is also clear here that such good works derive
their motive and value from prevenient grace.

Thus, while

Pearl develops the theme "be grace of God is gret innogh,"
Purity complements it by dramatizing the importance of man's
response to God, thereby preserving a delicate balance
between the two.
Accordingly, in the parable from Matthew describing
the guests at the wedding feast, the poet finds in the
clothes of the guests a symbol for the good works a man
must "wear" if he is to be acceptable to God:
Wich a m benne by wede3 bou wrappe3 be inne,
©at schal schewe hem so schene, schrowde of be best?
Hit arn by werke3 wyterly, bet bou wro3t haue3 »
& lyued wyth be lykyng bet ly3e in Ipyn hert,
©at bo be frely & fresch fonde in by lyue,
& fetyse of a fayr forme to fote & to honde,
& syben alle by*i ober lyme3 lapped ful clene;
•Denne may bou se by sauior & his sete ryche.
(169-176)
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Israel Gollancz, ed. Cleanness (London, 1921), p. xv.
R. J. Menner argues the same view in his edition, Purity (New
Haven, 1920). All quotations from the poem will be from
Gollancz's text.

This is not yet sufficiently precise for us to determine
whether these good works that the Christian must "put on"
in order to be acceptable to God are (1) merita de congruo,
prompted by gratia gratis data and generously accepted (ex
natura rel debita), or (2 ) merita de condigno, possible
only through gratia gratum faciens and accepted according
to the divine contract with man (ex deblto lustlolae).
The poet begins to clarify his position for us
further on when, commenting on the Flood, he remarks that
good works are valueless unless a man has been lifted out
of sin by grace:
For is no segge vnder sunne so seme of his crafte3 ,
If he be sulped in synne bat sytte3 vn-clene;
On spec of a spote may spede to mysse
Of be sy3te of be souerayn bat sytte3 so hy3e.
(5^9-552)
Absolute sinlessness is necessary for divine acceptance and,
since a man in sin might merit de congruo but not de condigno,
the poet is evidently commenting on the requirement for man
to meet the full standard of God's justice only through
meritum de condigno.
In the very next section of the poem, however, the
poet hastens to protect himself from the extreme of Brad
wardine, pointing out that a man may also merit de congruo.
For at least in certain cases when one's heart is "honest
and hoi," God may choose to extend his generosity to the
sinner:
& bere he fynde3 al fayre a freke wyth-lnne
Wyth hert honest & hoi, bat habel he

and again,
A lie pyse ar teches & tokenes to trow vpon 3et,
& wittnesse of pat wykked werk, & pe wrake after
■©at oure fader forperde for fylpe of pose ledes:
©enne vch wy3e may wel wyt pat he pe wlonk louies.
& if he louyes clene layk pat is oure lorde ryche,
& to be coupe in his courte pou coueytes penne,
To se pat semly in sete & his swete face,
Clerrer counsayl con I non, bot pat pou clene worpe.
(10^9-56)
The poet follows this up, clarifying his doctrine of meritum
de congruo even further, by drawing an analogy with Jean
de Meun's section of the Roman de la Rose,
man behave in order to win God’s grace?

How should a

He should act to

ward God as a lover does toward his lady in order to win
her favor: try to imitate her actions so that she will
love her suitor for his likeness to herself.

So also with

God, who is likely to reward a "suitor” who strives to
imitate the behavior of Christ:
For so Clopyngnel in pe compas of his clene Rose,
©er he expoune3 a speche, to hym pat spede wolde,
Of a lady to be loued,— loke to hir sone
Of wich beryng pat ho be , & wych ho best louyes,
& be ry3t such in vch a bor3e of body & of dedes,
& fol3 pe fet of pat fere pat pou fre haldes;
& if pou wyrkkes on pis wyse, pa3 ho wyk were,
Hir schal lyke pat layk pat lyknes hir tylle.
If pou wyl dele drwye wyth dry3tyn penne,
& lelly louy py lorde & his leef worpe,
©enne confourme pe to Kryst, & pe clene make,
©at euer is polyced als playn as pe perle seluen.
‘ '
(1057-68)
It is important to notice here that there is no reference
to G o d ’s cooperation with man during the process of the
"courtship;” nor is there evidence that a m a n ’s behavior

could have a full claim on God's acceptance.

In terms of

the analogy itself, God's will is, like a beautiful
woman's, the sole determinant of success in the relationship.
All a man may do is to offer his sincere efforts, which
are meritorious de congruo. and hope that the divine will
may prove less capricious than a lady's.
Carrying this doctrine a step further, the poet
argues that even Christians who have lost sanctifying grace
through their own sinful actions are
A

not

altogether lost.

repentant sinner, by virtue of his sorrow for his past

behavior, may merit (de congruo) the grace (gratia gratis
data) to motivate him to receive the sacrament of penance.
If he so chooses, this will restore him to God's friendship
(gratia gratum faclens) and permit him to earn merit (de
condigno) toward his salvation:
Hov schulde pou com to his kyth bot if pou clene were?
Nov ar we sore & synful & sovly vch one;
How schulde we se, pen may we say, pat syre vpon throne?
3is, pat mayster is mercyable, pa3 pou be man fenny,
& al to-marred in myre whyle pou on molde lyuyes;
©ou may schyne pur3 schryfte, pa3 pou haf schome
serued,
& pure pe with penaunce tyl pou a perle worpe.
(1110 -1 6 )
This is, moreover, completely a matter of man's free choice.
There is none of Bradwardine's or Wyclif’s predestinarlan
theology in Purit.v: man's ultimate election or rejection
by God is simply not an issue here.

What is significant,

according to the poet, is that man is, de potentia Dei ordinata. free either to apply for God's mercy or to turn away

toward "ober goddes" (1161-68 and 1225-32)*

Yet even this

freedom, one of the absorbing interests of the poet, does
not obviate his belief that all goods, including meritor
ious works, flow ultimately from God in some mysterious
fashion:
Who-so wolde wel do, wel hym bityde,
& quos deth so he de3yred, he dreped als fast;
Who-so hym lyked to lyft, on lofte wat^ he sone,
& quo-so hym lyked to lay, wat3 lo^ed bylyue.
(16^7-50 )
Thus, the poet may not escape the fourteenth-century volun
tarism that balanced an emphasis on m a n ’s will with an even
greater stress on G o d ’s will, the final criterion of all
value.

With this in mind, the poet ends his work with a

prayer for grace, which he implies is a condition sine qua
non for a man to do well:
©at we gon gay in oure gere, his grace he vus sende,
©at we may serue in his sy3t, be** solace neuer blynne3
(1811 - 1 2 )
Such was the pressure on religious thinkers of the time

that such a poem as Purity, concentrating as it does on
man's response to God through works, had to conclude with
this reassurance that the poet's attitudes toward grace
were, after all, thoroughly orthodox.
Turning now to Patience,

1A

we see still another

representation of the late medieval conflicts over G o d ’s

l®Edited by Israel Gollancz (London, 1913)*
tions are from this edition.

All quota

will, man's freedom, grace, and merit.

For Jonah, the prin

cipal character in the poem, is a rehel, again and again
questioning the ways of God toward men.

Consequently, while

Pearl presents the case for justifying grace and Purit.v for
good works, Patience explores the complicated theology of
divine willing— the grand passion that sooner or later
seduced all the best minds of the fourteenth century.
In the first part of the narrative, Jonah seeks to
escape the power of God's will by fleeing his responsibili
ties.

Then, when God searches him out even on the high

sea, far from his native land, and thrusts him into the "hell"
of the whale's stomach, Jonah finally turns submissively
toward God, praying for release.

Such a release, however,

involves nothing less than God, de potentia absoluta. over
ruling his just punishment of Jonah, which had been willed
de potentia ordinata.

For the poet clearly states that, to

save Jonah from inevitable death, God must suspend natural
law:
For nade fce hy^e heuen-kyng, £ur3 his honde my3t,
Warded J>is wrech man in Warlowes gutte3 ,
What lede mo3t lyue bi lawe of any kynde,
©at any lyf my3t be lent so longe hym wyth-inne?
(257-260)
It may be, as I shall argue here, that this section of
Patience is an allegory of man's relation to God; or more
specifically, an allegory of the sinful man requiring
justification.

Man has chosen to alienate himself from

God's friendship, and God has justly abandoned him to the

’’hell" of the whale's belly.

The only hope that man has

left is to pray that God might withhold vengeance, over
ruling the ordinary standards of divine justice:
& per he lenged at pe last, & to pe Lede called:—
'Now, Prynce, of py prophete pite pou haue!
■Ba3 I be fol & fykel, & falce of my hert,
De-woyde now py vengaunce, pur3 vertu of rauthe;
Tha3 I be gulty of gyle, as gaule of prophetes,
©ou art God, & alle gowde3 ar graypely pyn owen;
Haf now mercy of py man & his mys-dedes,
& preue pe ly3tly a lorde in londe & in water.'
(281-288)
Realizing that his own merit cannot measure up to the stan
dard of God's expectations, Jonah beseeches God to assert
his potentia absoluta to "de-woyde" his punishment.

Thus,

according to the poet, the sinner may be condemned de poten
tia Del ordlnata. yet his situation is never hopeless so
long as he can appeal to the potentia Dei absoluta:
& 3et I sayde, as I seet in pe se-bopem,—
"Care-ful am I kest out fro py cler y3en,
& deseuered fro py sy3t, 3et surely I hope
Efte to trede on py temple, & teme to py seluen."
(313-316)
And even more pointedly, he is sure that such an appeal
will be granted by the all-merciful God:
•Bou schal releue me renk, whil py ry3t slepe3 #
■Bur3 my3t of py mercy, pat mukel is to tryste.
(323- 32*0
Without further qualification, this could well be the Pela
gian doctrine that Bradwardine accused the Ockhamists of
holding.

For it is fundamental to Ockhamist theology, as

we have seen in Chapter I, that works which could at best
only merit de congruo could be accepted de potentia Del

6U>

absoluta if God were favorably disposed toward the sinner.
But the poet here guards Patience against such a charge
by almost immediately adding that works without grace (habi
tus gratlae) are incapable of rising above sin:
I haf meled wyth hy maystres mony longe day,
Bot now I wot wyterly, fcat hose vnwyse ledes
•Dat affyen hym in vanyte & in vayne fcynges.
For blnk hat mountes to no3t, her mercy forsaken.
(329-332)
Jonah is only saved, presumably, because he sees the error
of his disobedience and the need to repent.
doctrine of grace is somewhat ambiguous.

Still, the

Does the poet

suggest that even those whose lives are dedicated to "vanyte"
might, like Jonah, also appeal to the ultimate court of God's
mercy and potentia absoluta?

The poet does not explicitly

say so, but the logic of his position thus far would seem
to commit him to such a notion of meritum de congruo in
spite of his effort to affirm his orthodoxy on grace.
In the next major section of the poem, Jonah tempor
arily repudiates what he has Just learned from his own
experience with God's infinite mercy.

For when the people

of Nineveh, who have incurred the divine wrath, make the
same prayer that Jonah had made earlier— that they be saved
from God's Judgment against them— they appeal to the potentia
Dei absoluta.

Thus, their king argues,

What wote ofcer wyte may, 3if he vyje lykes,
Dat is hende in |>e hyot of his gentryse?
I wot his my3t is so much, 1»3 he be mysse-payed,
Dat in his mylde amesyng he mercy may fynde.

&

if we leuen he layk of oure layth synnes,
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& stylle steppen in pe sty^e he sty3tle3 hym seluen,
He wyl wende of his wodschlp, & his wrath leue,
& for-gif vus pis gult, 3if we hym God leuen.1
(397-W)
The people then respond to their king's urging, and we may
measure the success of their good works of "penaunce" (not
the sacrament, since this is an Old Testament event) by
the following comment:
■Denne al leued on his lawe & laften her synnes;
Par-formed alle pe penaunce pat pe prynce radde;
& God pur3 his godnesse forgef as he sayde;
•Da3 he dper bihy3t, wyth-helde his vengaunce.
(405-^08)
This is, as in the case of Jonah's rescue from the whale,
an explicit affirmation of the doctrine that meritum de
congruo may so appeal to God's generosity that he may elect
sinners, de potentia absoluta.

Whether this is actually

Pelagian is, for our purposes here, less important than
the fact that conservatives like Eradwardine and Wyclif
Interpreted it as such.

Furthermore, as we have seen

earlier, this combination of meritum de congruo with the
emphasis on God's potentia absoluta— that is, God's freedom
to transcend even his own ordinances and judgments— was
characteristic of the Ockhamist theologians of the four
teenth century.
Jonah demonstrates that he has not yet learned his
lesson, however, and rages against God for being merciful
toward the sinners of Nineveh.

The final section of the

poem, then, serves to teach Jonah once again not to question
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God*s will and reiterates Jonah*s own moral responsibili
ties.

Accordingly, God chastizes him:
"Herk, renk, is bis ry3t so ronkly to wrath.
For any dede J»at I haf don o|>er demed J>e 3et?*
-if.3 2)

God's infinitely powerful, infinitely free will, whosa ways
so far transcend man*s understanding that it is idle to
question them, is the sole criterion of value, the sole
determinant of what is right or wrong.

This is the teaching

of Ockham and, a century and a half later, of Luther a6
well.

While Patience seems dwarfed in the company of these

two giants in Western thought, it nevertheless contributed,
however modestly, to the tradition that linked the two.
At first reading. Sir Gawaln and the Green Knight,
the final poem in the manuscript, may not appear to fit in
to the thematic development we have been tracing through
the other poems.

Sir Gawaln is the greatest courtly romance

in English, and our interest in its vivid action, its
remarkable descriptive imagery, its skillful adaption of
Old French rhetorical patterns, its "lnf-danger," and its
famous plot construction, which is perhaps unsurpassed by
anything else in medieval literature except Dante's
Cftimnedla— »all these have obscured the serious theological
implications in the poem.

Only recently have scholars

begun to explore such problems as the two confession
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s c e n e s ,-1 9

the precise nature of Gawaln's sin,^® and. the

problem of grace and merit,

?1

though this last point has

not yet received sufficient attention.

It seems appropri

ate, therefore, to continue the work of these scholars by
investigating the relation of Sir Gawaln to the contempo
rary dispute over will, merit, and grace.
Before proceeding to this theme, which is really
secondary in Sir Gawaln in a way that it was not in the
other poems in the manuscript, it is necessary first to
understand what I take to be the primary theme of the poem,
the moral conflict between carltas and cupldltas.
conflict takes place on three levels:

This

(l) the supernatural

powers of the Virgin and Morgan la Fey, both struggling to
win Gawain;

(2) the materialistic values of courtly society

in opposition to the moral idealism of Christianity; (3)
the contradiction within Gawain himself, produced by his
having uncritically accepted irreconcilable value systems,
which he only gradually becomes aware of in the poem.

All

three are, of course, related in the sense that their com
mon point of reference is Gawaln himself, but it is
^ J o h n Burrow, "The Two Confession Scenes in Sir Gawaln
and the Green Knight.'1 MP, LVII (1959). 73-79.
20David Farley Hills, "Gawaln's Fault in Sir Gawaln and
the Green Knight." R E S . N.S., XIV (1963), 12^131.
21

Larry S. Champion, "Grace Versus Merit in Sir Gawaln
and the Green Knight." M L Q . XXXVIII (December, I967), 513525.
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important for us to recognize also that the poet goes beyond
the psychological limits of Gawain’s personality to a cri
ticism of the value-structure of the late medieval world.
For Gawain, thus understood, is everyman, or at least what
everyman might be, granted Gawain’s intelligence, sensiti
vity to moral issues, and experience.
Shortly after being welcomed into Bercilak's castle,
Gawain is escorted to a bed chamber whose lavish decoration
signals the temptation to cupidity to come:

22

. . . a bry^t boure, per beddyng watz
noble,
Of cortynes of clene sylk wyth cler golde hemmez,
And couertorez ful curious with comlych panez
Of bry^t' blaunner aboue, enbrawded bisydez,
Rudelez rennande on ropez red golde ryngez,
Tapitez ty^t to pe wo3e of tuly and tars,
And vnder fere, on pe flet, of fol3ande sute.
(853-859)
During the three temptation scenes, which are set in this
"bry^t boure,1' Gawain slowly comes to understand the con
flict between the values of "cortaysye" and charity (e.g.,
920-927 and 177^-76).

It is important to recognize here

that there are two really distinct temptations:

(1 ) the

beheading game, instigated by Morgan la Fey to humiliate
Arthur through his most chivalrous knight; (2) the sexual
temptations by Lady Bercilak, who was prompted by her hus
band to try to seduce Gawain, as we learn at the end of the
poem (2358-63).

These two plots account for Gawain’s two

22A11 quotations are from the Tolkien and Gordon edition,
as revised by Davis; see note 15, above.

sins, his virtual adultery with his host's wife and his
'cowarddyse and couetyse" in taking the green girdle and
breaking the pact with Bercilak.

Further, as we shall ex

amine in greater detail later, the two plots also necessi
tate the two confessions, one to the priest for his sin
against chastity, and the other to Bercilak-Green Knight
for his "sin" against the chivalric code.

Both of these

plots thus describe Gawain seduced to cunldltas. what
Augustine defined as an excessive concern for one's physi
cal state here in this world, but only the bedroom scenes
involve any direct violation of the Christian code as such.
The importance of this has been generally overlooked in the
past, and since the moral issue in these scenes will be
crucial to our study of grace and merit in the poem, let
us glimpse briefly Into the actions and implications of this
plot.
Contrary to common Christian teaching,

Gawain sins

against chastity by allowing himself to be exposed to

the

proximate occasion of sin on the second and third mornings.
On the first day, Gawain may be excused on the

ground that

he could not have known that

coming to

Lady Bercilak was

his chamber, but this is not true on the succeeding mor
nings.

Gawain is trying to play a dual role here:

he

strives to avoid actual physical intercourse with her, yet
at the same time his vanity over his "cortaysye" will not
permit him to send her away.

When he goes so far as to
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actually kiss and embrace her as the two lie together in
his bed on the third day, special grace from the Virgin
Mary— and this grace alone— keeps Gawain from culminating
the affair.

But what is essential to keep in mind here,

what virtually never has been recognized in print, is that
such action on Gawain’s part is itself mortally sinful; in
deed, it is scarcely less sinful than the physical act of
adultery would have been, according to the standards of the

23

time as represented in Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale. ^ Perhaps
even more significant, however, is the dubious morality of
the host and his wife.

They cannot claim immunity from

criticism by claiming to have been under Morgan’s influence
in this plot, for it was their own idea to test Gawain's
chastity.

Bercilak and his lady are, in the moral structure

of the work as a whole, a court panderer and his courtesan
trying to destroy a Christian soul under the guise of love
and openness.

It is not possible to investigate all of the

implications of this here.

All we may conclude at this

point is that the poem is organized around a searching
analysis of the contradictory values that existed side by
side, usually without question, in late medieval society.
The primary theme is in turn related to a secondary
one, the problem of grace and merit.

For just as all of

the major action of the poem dramatizes the conflict
23See especially the Remedlum contra pecoatum luxurie,
* * Ge?ffrey
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between carltas and cupldltas. so also now we must ask how
a Christian may avoid sin and merit
we

salvation.Furthermore,

must try as well to discover the relationship between

Sir Gawain and the other poems in Cotton Nero A.x in terms
of this same theme.
Despite Gawain*s ability to act as an ideal
Christian knight, seen again and again in the poem, we are
never permited to overlook his dependence on God.

In many

cases, this is done simply by little reminders that Gawain
is only capable of such success "as God wyl" (5^9. 592-593.
737-739. 773-776, 1063. 1967. 2208-9, 2480).

Eut more

significant, to take one example, is the following passage
describing Gawain*s prayer for deliverance from the wintry
wilderness through which he has been traveling:
And perfore sykyng he sayde, *1 beseche pe lorde,
And Mary, pat is myldest moder so dere,
Of sum herber per he3ly I my^t here masse,
Ande py matynez to-morne, mekely I ask,
And perto prestly I pray my pater and aue
and crede.’
He rode in his prayere,
And cryed for his mysdede,
He sayned hym in sypes sere,
And sayde 'Cros Kryst me spede!'
Nade he sayned hymself, segge, bot prye,
Er he watz war in pe wod of a won in a mote,
Abof a launde, on a lawe, loken vnder bo3ez
Of mony borelych bole aboute bi pe diches:
A castel pe comlokest pat euer kny3t a 3te.
(753-767)
The poet is obviously suggesting an almost automatic causeeffect relationship between the prayer and God*s response.

Presumably, Gawain might have wandered all night amid the
snow drifts and icicles if he had not called upon God's
mercy.
Far more important, however, is the divine inter
vention, through Mary since Gawain is her knight, in the
third bedroom scene.

In this case, the poet is quite

Insistent that Gawain could not have saved himself by his
own effort.

He has allowed his passion such liberty that

only a special act of potentla Del absoluta can save him
from further sin:
Gret perile bitwene hem stod,
Nif Mare of hir kny3t mynne.
(1768-69)
Again, when his guide tempts him not to go to the green
chapel to keep his appointment, Gawain reaffirms his com
plete dependence on the absolute will of God:
Ful wel con Dry3tyn sehape
His seruauntez for to saue.
(2138-39)
Such an attitude is quite reminiscent of Patience, with its
concern for how God controls the destinies of his creatures
so absolutely that he may even overturn his own laws to
save them if he wishes.

Gawain expresses the same faith

here, faced as he is with the extraordinary threat of the
Green Knight, as did Jonah, who was also threatened by an
unusual peril in the whale's belly.

Gawain even repeats

his affirmation of faith in God's potentia absoluta before
arriving at the green chapel:
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*Bi Goddez self,' quop Gawayn.
*1 wyl nauper grete ne grone;
To Goddez wylle I am ful bayn.
And to hym I haf me tone.*
(2156-59)
So far. his own actions do not seem to count for much, at
least In contrast to God's omnipotent will.
This does not mean, however, that Gawain has no
responsibility of his own.

The poet reminds us at several

crucial points that Gawain must work to merit the grace he
needs.

No one knows the ways of the divine will; all a man

can do is to try to do well.

By thus offering

his good works

to God, a Christian may hope for some reward:
i)e kny3t mad ay god chere,
And sayde, *Quat schuld I wonde?
Of destines derf and dere
What may mon do hot fonde?*
(562-565? cf. 2208-11)
Gawain is not talking here about a blind, impersonal Fortune,
but rather about man's need to act in order to
his own destiny,

try to shape

as far as possible. This is more

clearly

defined, and more clearly related to merltum de congruo. in
the description of how God preserved Gawain from death or
injury during his Journey:
Nade he ben dujty and dry3e, and Dry3tyn had serued,
Douteles he hade ben ded and dreped ful ofte.
(72^-725)
To be sure, God does assist Gawain, and without that assis
tance Gawain would not have survived.

But we also learn

that Gawain's own actions merited that assistance, even
that the divine aid would not have come at all had it not
been for his efforts.

The same point comes up once more in
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his initial rejection of any presents from the lady:
And he nay |»t he nolde neghe in no wyse
Naufcer golde ne garysoun, er God hym grace sende
To acheue to t>e chaunce }>at he hade chosen fcere.

(1836-3 8 )
The fact that he later does accept the girdle is irrelevant
to the doctrine presented here.

The poet's point is that,

while Gawain's success depends on God's grace, this grace
itself depends on Gawain proving himself worthy of it, or
merltum de congruo.
Later, when he is about to leave Bercilak's castle
to seek the Green Knight, Gawain speaks of how a man must
act in order to earn his heavenly reward:
3if £ay Tor charyte cherysen a gest,
And halden honour in her honde, J>e hat>el hem ^elde
■Dat haldez l>e heuen vpon hy^e, and also yow alle!
(2055-57)
This speech, part of his expression of gratitude for the
hospitality he has received, could well be taken as a
gloss on the parable of the Good Samaritan.

He interprets

his hosts' motive as charity, and whether it was that or
not is beside the point.

Charity, he reasons, has a claim

on God, who will reward it with salvation— or at least this
is what Gawain hopes.

Thus, in this as in the preceding

cases, the poet promotes a doctrine of merltum de congruo.
based on the belief In man's ability to perform good works
and God's willingness to accept them.
The corolary to this is, of course, that man can
also use his freedom to fall from grace.

An instance of
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this occurs on the evening of the second day.

Gawain now

cannot help but know the lady's intention to seduce him,
but he is willing to play his game of "cortaysye" with her
nonetheless:
Such semblaunt to bat segge semly ho made
Wyth stille stollen countenaunce, bat stalworth to
plese,
-Dat al forwondered watz be wy3e, and wroth with
hymseluen,
Bot he nolde not for his nurture nurne hir a^aynefc,
Bot dalt with hir al in daynt£, how-so-euer pe dede
turned
towrast.
(1658-63)
Disturbed though his moral sensibilities are, Gawain chooses
to continue in his courtly role no matter what the conse
quences might be.
Finally, the poet clearly seems to intend that we
admire Gawain as a model Christian knight, one in whom we
may see homo viator struggling along the perilous route to
the heavenly Jerusalem.

Just as the doctrine of works in

Purity balances the insistence on grace in Pearl, so also
the view we have of man's will in Sir Gawain complements
the overwhelming significance of God's will in Patience.
This does not mean that the Gawain-poet has polarized the
doctrine of works and grace into a two-valued option, imply
ing that man can function altogether without grace.

Man's

will, in Sir Gawain. may choose evil by virtue of its free
dom (liberum arbltrlum).,but it cannot likewise choose the
good without some assistance from God.

This is somewhat
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complicated because God’s assistance, in the form of grace,
differs in kind and function at different points in the
poem.

In the early action, before the second and third

temptation scenes, Gawain enjoys a state of sanctifying
grace (gratia gratum faclens). in terms of which his actions
may merit God's attention de condigno.

Eut after Gawain,

fully realizing the consequences of his action, turns toward
satisfying his own desires in opposition to charity, the
only grace available to him— the only grace that

could

coexist with sin— is a free gift by which God prods the
sinner to repent (gratia gratis data).

The poet does allow

considerable scope to meritum de congruo:

more than in

Pearl, though perhaps less than in Purlty and Patience.
The only problem that remains, so far as this anal
ysis is concerned, is with the two confession scenes.

Some

have argued that the first (sacramental) confession is
false, ^ but this assumes that Gawain's cowardice with the
green girdle is mortally sinful, thereby invalidating his
confession to the priest (l8?6-84).

This assumption is not

supported by the text, however, since there is no mention
whatsoever of the content of Gawain's discussion of his
sins with the priest.

Judging from his relief after receiv

ing the sacrament (1885-88), and from the poet’s statement
that the priest "asoyled" the knight (1883)* it seems more

^ F o r example, see Champion, p. 423.

reasonable to believe that the confession includes at least
all mortal sins that the knight had committed.

From what

we have seen, these would include his behavior with his
host’s wife on the second and third mornings.
he have had to confess taking the girdle?

But would

Two factors

argue against it: (1 ) his confession would not seem to be
valid if a serious sin were omitted, yet his subsequent
actions show that he consistently resolves to use the
girdle;

(2 ) there is no necessary reason to conclude that

such an act was a serious violation of the Christian moral
code.

Gawainfs "sin" in using the girdle is more under

standably a violation of the knightly code of honor, an
interpretation which is borne out by the fact that he con
fesses this "sin" to a fellow knight rather than to a priest
(237^-88).

Furthermore, the Green Knight clearly recognizes

it as such when he "absolves" Gawain (2393-9*0# and this
makes it easier to understand the otherwise puzzling amuse
ment at Arthur's court when Gawain relates his experience
to them.

Would the court have laughed so heartily over

Gawain's admission that he had committed a mortal sin and
then made a mockery of the sacrament of penance?

Would

Gawainfs fellow knights have decided to wear green s&shes
to memorialize such blasphemy?

Confronted with these ques

tions, it seems reasonable to conclude that (1) Gawain
sinned with the lady, even though he had grace available to
him; (2) God freely chose to save Gawain from further sin,

even when the knight did not in any sense merit that grace;
(3) Gawain did cooperate with God's grace, except during
the second and third "bedroom scenes; (ty) he restored himself
to God's favor through sacramental confession;

(5) he did,

nevertheless, "break his social contract with Bercilak,
though Bercilak's action toward him was really far worse;
(6 ) Gawain and Bercilak resolve this difficulty by mutually
confessing to each other at the end.
Turning from Sir Gawain. which is impeccably ortho~
dox even by Bradwardlne1s rigid standards, to St. Erkenwald.
we find ourselves confronted with a most perplexing doctrine
of grace and merit.

I do not wish to enter into the author

ship question here, and I am not taking up St. Erkenwald
because of any conviction that its poet was the same as the
one who wrote the poems in Cotton Nero A.x.

It is enough

that the work was composed in the same dialect area at
roughly the same time as the others, since this by itself
provides Interesting room for comparisons of doctrinal
themes.

Also, the poem raises an argument which nicely com

plements those we have already seen, and which Very strik
ingly parallels a vital point in Piers Plowman, which is
the subject of the next chapter.
S t . Erkenwald relates the story of a good pagan
who is saved even though he is outside the Church, the
usual avenue of salvation.

This would seem to be a case

of merltum de congruo. which is accepted as justifying the

sinner, de potentia Dei absoluta. though there is some
question about this.

In spite of the fact that the narra

tive takes place in England, its source was apparently the
Trajan-Gregory story, which will be analyzed in some detail
in Chapter III.

Nothing could have been more explosive in

the fourteenth century, for this is precisely the sort of
thing that Bradwardine and other conservatives were howling
against as ‘'modern PelagianlSm."

The poet does take some

steps to guard against this charge, especially by using
the miracle to glorify God's omnipotence rather than man's
natural abilities.
When the citizens of London encounter the miracul
ously preserved corpse, they call for their bishop, St.
Erkenwald.

Erkenwald prays for the grace to learn the sec

ret of the miracle, which obviously could come about only
through a suspension of the potentia Del ordinata, and for
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his piety and persistence he receives this grace (126-127).

The bishop uses the opportunity to teach his people about
the potentia Del absoluta:
'Hit is meruaile to men, i>at mountes to litelle
Toward fce prouidens of fre Prince Jjat Paradis weldes,
Quen hym luste to vnlouke J>e leste of his my3tes.
Bot
And
«Den
■Dat

quen matyd is monnes my3t,
al his resons are to-rent,
lettes hit hym ful litelle
alle }>e hondes vnder heuen

& his mynde passyde,
& redeles he stondes,
to louse wyt a fynger
halde my3t neuer.
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All references are to Israel Gollancz, ed. SJb. Erken
wald (London, 1922)•

©ere-as creatures crafte of counselle oute swarues,
©e comforthe of fce creatore byhoues £e creature take.
& so do we now oure dede, deuyne we no fyrre;
To seche £e sothe at oure-selfe, 3ee se fcer no bote;
Bot glew we alle opon Godde, & his grace aske,
©at careless is of counselle, vs comforthe to sende.
(160 -172 )
Contrary to what we might expect, Erkenwald sounds like
Bradwardine here.

Works, he claims, have absolutely no

intrinsic value, and man's salvation depends on the divine
will, which is not only infinitely powerful but infinitely
incomprehensible to man's feeble understanding.

All we

may do is to pray that we are among the elect and then hope
that God has been generous to us, undeserving though we are.
When the corpse begins to speak, it accounts for
its marvelous condition by assuming that God must have
willed the miracle because he loves the justice that the
magistrate practiced in life:
'Nay, bisshop,' quofc fcat body, 'enbawmyd wos I neuer,
Ne no monnes counselle my clothe has kepyd vnwemmyd;
Bot ]?e riche kynge of reson, t>at euer rl3t alowes,
& loues al |>e lawSs lely J>at longen to trouthe;
& moste he menskes men for mynnynge of ri3tes,
©en for al ]?e meritorie medes J>at men on molde vsen;
& if renkes for ri3t fcus me arayed has,
He has lant me to last fcat lojtes ry3t best.'
(265-272)
There is a peculiar inconsistency here, which is character
istic of the poem as a whole.

On the one hand, the corpse

claims that God has exercised his potentia absoluta to pre
serve the body and, further, that God did so because he
"loues ry3t best."

On the other hand, however, man's actions

seem incapable of earning God's favor ex natura rel debita.
Yet if this is so, what is the source of that "ry^t" which
attracted God's mercy?

The poet seems to affirm and deny

the possibility of merltum de congruo at the same time.
The difficulty is partly overcome when Erkenwald,
interested in the possibility that this righteous pagan
might have been saved, asks where his soul now is.

The

corpse replies that its soul is suffering in the outer
reaches of hellj it had not been released when Christ har
rowed hell because the man in life had not been redeemed
through baptism (283-300).

Then the corpse excludes the

possibility of merltum de congruo altogether, at least for
unbaptized men:
Quat wan we with oure wele-dede bat wroghtyn ay ri3t,
Quen we are dampnyd dulfully into be depe lake,
& exiled fro bat soper so, Ip&t solempne fest,
©er richely hit a m e refetyd bat after right hungride?
(301-30*0
this does much more than simply reject the radical tenden
cies implied in, say, Patience.

The corpse, whom we may

take as the poet's spokesman, virtually denies the possi
bility of man approaching God at all except through
merltum de condlgno.

This is underscored by the saving

effect of the baptism in Erkenwald's tears (321-332), a
device which serves as a rather artificial deus ex machlna
and only compounds the doctrinal confusion.
In attempting to teach a doctrine of grace that
allows, like Bradwardine, only for merltum de condlgno. the

poet has made a very poor choice in his exemplum of St. Erk
enwald.

The nature of the story Itself, with its associa

tions with the Trajan-Gregory myth, was to uphold the pos
sibility of meritum de congruo even for a good pagan as a
glorification of G o d ’s infinite mercy and absolute power.
Thus, the very material itself was intractable, considering
the purpose to which the poet tried to put it.

Whether or

not he could also have written the great poems in Cotton
Nero A.x is perhaps an unanswerable question; at least the
evidence we have seen here is not conclusive.

What is

important is that St. -Erkenwald represents an extremely
conservative reaction against Ockhamist theology and, i*
its somewhat confusing use of the Trajan-Gregory motif, pre
pares us for the eminently more successful handling of the
same problems, both doctrinal and artistic, in Piers Plowman.

Chapter III:

Piers Plowman

Piers Plowman has long stimulated scholarly efforts
to settle its authorship and editorial problems, but after
many years most of the same controversies are still with us,
and it does not appear likely that they will be solved in
the near future.

In the past few years, more and more

scholars have turned rather to the poem as a poem, especi
ally to its complex structure, rhetoric, and doctrine.

Of

these three, doctrinal questions have attracted most atten
tion since Piers Plowman is primarily, if not exclusively,
a religious poem.
Various theories about theological content have
emerged: the Wells-Coghill-Chambers argument that Dowel,
Dobet,.and Dobest correspond to the

ictive, contemplative,
*1
and mixed lives defined in popular mystical writings;-1 the
j
Neroney-Donaldson theory that the three "lives11 are rather
2
the mystic’s purgative, illuminative, and unitive states;
enry W. Wells, "The Construction of Piers Plowman,"
PMLA. XLIV (1929), 123-liK); Nevill Coghill, "The Character
of Piers Plowman Considered from the E-text," Medium Aevum.
II (1933)• 108-135;
w * Chambers, Man's Unconquerable Mind
(London, 1939), PP. 88-171.

^Howard Meroney, "The Life and Death of Longe Wille," ELH.
XVII (1950), 1-35, E. Talbot Donaldson, Piers Plowman, the
C-Text and Its Poet (New Haven, 19^9), esp. pp“ 15b-161.

83

R. W. Frank's rejection of all such elaborate "parallels”
in favor of reading the development from the Visio through
O
the Vita as the Christian pilgrimage toward salvation; and
Morton Bloomfield's attempt to show in the poem a monastic
philosophy which promoted an apocalyptic view of life,
rather than either mysticism or concern with salvation as
L
such.
As a result of these and other less well known
studies, we have learned a great deal about the poet whom,
for the sake of convenience, I shall call William Langland
here, and about his spiritual and intellectual responses to
the stormy religious life of the fourteenth century.

But

so far as I know, no one has yet placed Langland or his poem
in the context of the debate we have been following for the
last two chapters, and yet I feel that the relation between
grace and merit is the central doctrinal theme of Piers
Plowman.
In this chapter, I shall argue that Will, man's
faculty for action, takes part in a complicated moral
struggle in which the Christian soul seeks salvation.

The

poem is not, however, an allegory of salvation as such
because Will has not completed his journey at the end of
the poem.

But he has learned how he may be saved.

In

the Visio, Will has learned how to act to gain Piers'
^Piers Plowman and the Scheme of Salvation (New Haven, 195%
U
Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse (New
Brunswick, N. J., 1961).
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pardon, though the pardon itself raises the most puzzling
questions of the poem.

In an effort to answer these ques

tions, he turns inward, as Augustine taught, to examine his
various faculties and spiritual resources.

After long

wrangling over the problem of grace and merit, the problem
of how to do well raised by Piers' pardon, Will learns com
plementary doctrines from Imagination and Patience, which
show how a Christian must act in order to do well.

From

this point on, Will learns how to live an even more perfect
life by modelling his life, with God's grace, on Christ's
life of true charity.

Finally, Will investigates how it is

best for a Christian to live, to carry out one's charitable
mission in union with others in the Church.

Throughout the

poem, then, the most important question is always how a man
may merit salvation, that is, what works he should perform
and how God's grace may influence them.
The field full of folk pictures the active life of
the bustling, workaday world.

As such, it introduces that

section of the poem most explicitly concerned with the per
formance of good works.

In Passus 1,^ Holy Church sets

forth a doctrine of works in response to Will's question,
"How I may saue my soule" (13.1.8*0, which provides a doctri
nal basis for the Visio as a whole.

In traditional

5The text I am using for this analysis is the E-version
as printed in Walter W. Skeat, ed. The Vision of William
concerning: Piers the Plowman, in Three Parallel Texts. 2 vdls.
c©xford, is m r
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Augustinian fashion, Holy Church points out that God begins ~
the process of man's salvation by providing the initial
grace which prompts man to seek him (B.I.136-14^ and 3 6116*4-).

Seemingly good works are valueless, therefore, unless

one first has the grace of charity (E.I.178-187)•
does a man first acquire charity?

But where

Holy Church replies that

For-thi this wordes • ten wryten in the gospel,
Date et dabltur vobls • for I dele 3ow alle.
And that is the lokke of loue-« and lateth oute my
grace,
To conforte the careful • acombred with synne.
Loue is leche of lyf • and nexte owre lorde selue,
And also the graith gate • that goth in-to heuene;
For-thi I sey as I seide • ere by the textis,
Whan alle tresores ben ytryed • treuthe is the beste.
(B.I.198-205)
This is quite Augustinlan.

What we give out of charity

returns to God what he first gave us, the initial grace to
seek him, perform meritorious works, and earn further grace:
"Date et dabltur vobis.n

To sum up, prevenient grace

prompts charitable works, which in turn "lateth oute" fur
ther grace to "conforte the careful • acombred with synne."
In terms of the fourteenth-century controversy over
grace and merit, Langland in the first passus strikes a
traditional balance between works and grace, which prepares
us for what will follow.

For in the remainder of the Visio

he will concentrate chiefly on one side of the scale, that
of works, and the doctrinal importance of Passus I is to
acquaint us with both sides of the balance, so that his
emphasis on works in the next six passus may not be
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interpreted as Pelagian.
In Passus II Meed appears, dressed out in all the
brilliant finery of cuplditas;
Purfiled with pelure • the finest Vpon erthe,
Y-crounede with a corone • the kyng hath non better.
Fetislich hir fyngres • were fretted with golde wyre,
And there-on red rubyes . as red as any glede,
And diamentz of derest pris • and double manere
safferes,
Orientales and ewages • enuenymes to destroye.
Hire robe was ful riche • of red scarlet engreyned,
With ribanes of red golde • and of riche stones;
Hire arraye me rauysshed • suche ricchesse saw I
neuere.
(B,II.9-17)
The contrast between Meed and Holy Church appears quite
clearly in the following lines in which Holy Church des
cribes herself:
Mi fader the grete god is • and grounde of alle
graces,
0 god with-oute gynnynge • and I his gode dorter,
And hath 3oue me mercy • to marye with my-self;
And what man be merciful • and lelly me loue,
Schal be my lorde and I his leef • in the hei3e
heuene.
And what man taketh Mede • myne hed dar I legge,
That he shal lese for hir loue • a lappe of caritatis.

D

(B.II.29-3

These two figures represent opposing value systems, parallel
to Augustine's two cities, which introduce the allegorical
struggle for control of man, both as an individual and as
he lives in comminity with other men
Interpretations of Passus II through IV have usually
explored the social, political, and topical aspects of the
allegory, and it is not my intention here to displace or
devalue any of these.

The temptation to search for
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contemporary allusions is great and sometimes rewarded,
but I wish to focus rather on the psychological allegory
in these passus.

For just as the struggle for the king’s

favor has broad political and social significance, this
same struggle mirrors the tensions within everyman as he
tries to work out his salvation.
On the ’'level" of psychological allegory, the king
represents man's will, free to turn one way or another, free
to choose good or to choose evil.

Against Meed and her par

ty Langland places Conscience and Reason, whose partnership,
he suggests, is absolutely necessary if the will is to have
sound guidance (B.Ill.282-283 and IV.4-5, 42-43, 190-195)Neither one is complete without the other, but together they
can reveal Christian values and recommend to the will good
works over the falseness and cupidity of Meed.

Further,

the allegory here stresses m a n ’s natural abilities to deal
with temptation and overcome sin, though this is not
Langland’s final word on this matter.

Up to the conclusion

of Passus IV, Langland has been working out an answer to
W i ll’s question asking Holy Church hew he might discover
Truth:

"3et mote 3* kenne me better,/By what craft in my

corps • it comseth and where" (B.I.136-137)•

Will has now

learned that m a n ’s natural powers to discover truth and
avoid sin are Conscience and Reason.

Yet these are by them

selves insufficient to earn salvation, as we shall see more
clearly later on.

To conclude that Will could find the

fullness of grace through Reason and Conscience alone would
be out-and-out Pelagianism.
In Passus V, the poet presents the confession of
the seven deadly sins, deservedly one of the most famous
passages in Middle English literature.

Reason prepares for

the confession by explaining how man's perverse will may
choose evil and thus draw down God's wrath (B.V.12-20).
Yet even this must be qualified.

In the confession of

Avarice we learn, as in Patience, that God's potentia abso
luta can overrule even the just punishment due a man for
committing deadly sin (B.V.286-291 and ^53-^55)•

Here, again,

is evidence of the fourteenth-century insistence on divine
freedom, a freedom even to override the Law, which by impli
cation makes God's supremely free will the only criterion
of value.
Next comes the resolution to seek Truth, a journey
that all the folk realize must be aided by Grace (B.V.517519) since "there was wy3te non so ays • the wey thider
couthe" (E.V.520).

After rejecting a pilgrim as a guide,

the crowd meets Piers, who stresses the need for good works
in meriting salvation:
'Peter!' quod a plowman • and put forth his hed,
'I knowe hym as kyndely • as clerke doth his bokes;
Conscience and Kynde Witte • kenned me to his place,
And deden me suren hym slkerly • to serue hym for
euere,
Bothe to sowe and to sette * the while I swynke myghte.
I haue ben his folwar • al this fifty wyntre;
Bothe ysowen his sede • and sued his bestes,
With-inne and with-outen • wayted his profyt.
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I dyke and I delue • I do that treuth hoteth;
Some tyme I sowe • and some tyme I thresche,
In tailoures crafte and tynkares crafte • what Treuthe
can deuyse,
I weue an I wynde • and do what Treuthe hoteth.
For thou3e I seye it my-self • I serue hym to paye.
Ich haue myn huire of hym wel • and otherwhiles more;
He Is the prestest payer • that pore men knoweth;
He ne with-halt non hewe his hyre • that he ne hath
it at euen.
(B.V.5^-559)
Such emphasis on works could he quite misleading if this
speech were divorced from its place in the passus as a whole.
For Piers next describes "Truth’s path," which Involves an
inward Journey, as in Augustine and Bonaventure, away from
the world of external action, along a path that leads to
Truth's palace where Grace is the gatekeeper (B.V.604).
Only if Grace grants an entrance may one travel into the
innermost recesses of his own soul to find Truth (E.V.6!^617).

Still, even if a man does discover Truth, he may

not be perfectly secure in his possession while yet in this
life because he always has the freedom to choose a lesser
good than God.

If a man were to make such a choice, he

would be cut off from Truth and Grace, without the power
to reenter the palace unless God, through a special act
of divine will, elected to extend grace to the sinner
(B.V.618-626).

Once again, this is an instance of Langlandte

interest in the absolute power of God, repeated soon after
ward (B.V.638), which becomes still more important in the
discussion of grace and merit later on in the Vita de Dowel.
Here, too, we may see an early example of another theme

that will prove increasingly important as the poet develops
his doctrine of grace, the misuse of indulgences.

At the

end of Passus V, a pardoner and a prostitute, unwilling to
trust in Christ and Mary's mercy, go to fetch a box of
indulgences (B.V.6^8-651)•

This is, as the context shows,

a futile attempt to compel God's grace, even in the absence
of good works.

Such a view of man's relation to God, was,

as we saw in Chapter I, what prompted foruteenth-century
voluntarists, radical Ockhamlsts and conservative Augustinians alike, to insist on the transcendence of potentia Del
absoluta over potentia Dei ordinata.

Despite their opposi

tion on other points, both groups joined in censuring the
assumption that man could get some “hold" on God in order
to achieve salvation.
In Passus VI, Fiers offers to act as guide for the
pilgrims seeking Truth, but he first insists on working his
field and asks that they help him.

Though not claiming that

works are sufficient in themselves, Piers underscores their
importance as preparation for a journey to God.

Eefore

leaving his family, however, he first makes out his will.
The will is rather ordinary, except for the disposition
that “he shal haue my soule « that best hath yserued it"
(B.VI.89).
soul?

How can God be said to have deserved a man's

This could mean either that God has "won" man*s soul

by the atonement or that man, represented here by Piers,
t
may condescend to award his treasure to a worthy God.

It may be that Langland Intended neither of these, though
the first is obviously more likely than the second.

Inter

estingly, the same line in the C-text clarifies the point:
"He shal haue my soule • that alle soules made" (CJX.9 6 ).
Such a change sharpens the doctrine of man's relation to
God, a procedure which is, as Donaldson and others have
shown, typical of the C-poet*s caution in doctrinal matters.
The Visio ends with the much disputed pardon scene,
which Chambers has called "the most difficult thing to un
derstand in the whole poem."^

The pardon "a pena et a culpa*

is actually granted by Truth at the beginning of Passus VII:
Treuthe herde telle her-of • and to peres he sent,
To taken his teme • and tulyen the erthe,
And purchaced hym a pardoun • a pena et a culpa
For hym, and for his heires • for euermore after.
And bad hym holde hym at home • and eryen his leyes,
And alle that halpe hym to erie • to sette or to sowe,
Dr any other myster • that my3te Pieres auaille,
Pardoun with Pieres plowman • treuthe hath ygraunted.
(E.VII.1-8)
The pardon that Truth has "purchaced" is man's redemption
through Christ's atonement.

As a result of the grace which

Christ has made available to man, a man may now merit sal
vation by performing good works.

Since this could, however,

be interpreted as semi-Pelagian, Langland goes on to point
out that a charitable man is merely paying back what God
had first given him (B.VII.80), and the man who thus merits
does so, at least in this context, as a Christian in the
state of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens):
^Chambers, p. 118.
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.Alle lybbyng laboreres • that lyuen with her hondes,
That trewlich taken • and trewlich wynnen,
And lyuen in loue and in lawe • for her lowe hertis,
Haueth the same absolucioun • that sent was to Peres.
(B.VII.62-65; italics mine)
Lest there be any further doubt here, Langland in this
passage is discussing merltum de condlgno. though his over
riding emphasis on the value of works might lead the unsus
pecting reader to think that merltum de congruo were really
the subject.
Next comes an actual reading of the pardon, which
is composed of two lines from the Athanasian Creed:
Et qul bona egerunt. ibunt in vitam eternam;
Qul vero mala, in lgnem eternum.
CE.VII.111-112)
The priest comments that this is not a real pardon at all
because it does not follow the formula prescribed for such
a legal document, and Piers "for pure tene • pulled it
atweyne" (E.VII.116).

At this point, most critics side with

Piers, arguing that the ensuing dispute between Piers and
the priest illustrates how shallow, vain, and pretentious
this priest is— a symbol of the empty legalism in the late
medieval Church.

Some, siding with Coghill,^ claim that

Piers' anger is directed against the pardon itself.

The

point is a vital one, chiefly because one's reading of this
passage will determine how the rest of the poem may be in
terpreted.

For the issues that arise here provide the

?Nevill Coghill, "The Pardon Scene of Piers Plowman.11
Proc. Brit. Accad.. XXX ( 1 9 W , 303-357.

9^

motive behind the various discussions in the Vita de Dowel,
as we shall see later on.
What most readers seem to ignore is that Langland
goes on to side with the priest:
And al this maketh me • on this meteles to thynke;
And how the prest preued • no pardoun to Dowel,
And demed that Dowel • indulgences passed,
Biennales and triennales • and bisschopes lettres,
And how Dowel at the day of dome • is dignelich
vnderfongen,
And passeth al the pardoun • of seynt Petres cherche.
(E.VII.167-172)
Here is no criticism, none of the scorn that we see in
those passages in which Langland excoriates a corrupt clergy.
Thus, to infer that Piers' anger is directed against the
priest is to ignore the evidence of the poem itself.

If

such were the case, if the priest were the object of the
plowman's "tene," then we must conclude that Piers has lost
Langland's sympathy at this point, perhaps even that he
is being satirized here.
evidence.

But this, too, contradicts the

What about the obvious sincerity of Piers'

resolution to do well in the future?

Is this confused?

No, we must clearly look elsewhere for the target.
what about the pardon itself?
with it?

Eut

Surely Piers is disappointed

Such a view is tempting, but it fails to account

for the absurdity of making Piers angry with the Athanasian
Creed and for Piers' subsequent resolution to follow it.
Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation would be
that Piers is angry with himself for misunderstanding the
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true nature and value of the pardon.

Up to the priest's

reading of it, Piers has assumed that he has acquired a
legal document which will assure him of salvation.

The

document itself, however, simply explains the consequences
of doing well or of doing evil, which is merely to remind
Piers of his relation to God.

The whole section of the

creed, from which the lines in the pardon were taken, reads
as follows:
As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God
and man are one Christ, He died for our salvation,
descended to hell, arose from the dead on the third
day, ascended into heaven, sits at the right hand of
God the Father almighty, and from there he shall come
to Judge the living and the dead. At his coming all
men are to arise with their own "bodies; and they are
to give an account of their lives. Those who have
done good deeds will go into eternal life; those who
have done evil will go into everlasting fire.
This is the Catholic faith. Everyone must believe
it, firmly and steadfastly; otherwise, he cannot be
saved.8
Clearly, any prescription to do good works which is extrac
ted from this Creed must also allow for the Creed's insis
tence on grace.

This, then, explains the reference to the

pardon having been "purchaced" by Truth:
salvation."

"He died for our

Such a reminder makes Piers, we may suppose,

painfully aware of both his ambiguous insistence on works
and his assurance that the pardon gave him some legal "hold"
on God's acceptance.

His quotation from the psalm, as his

Q
The Athanasian Creed, in The Church Teaches: Documents
of the Church in English Translation, ed. John F. Clarkson,
S.j. (St. Louis, 1955)* P*
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’’tene’1 is vented, reaffirms the need for grace as a condi
tion for G o d ’s friendship and protection.

The works he now

resolves to perform are quite different from those involved
in plowing his half-acre:
'I shal cessen of my sowyng,1
swynk nou3t so harde,
Ne about my bely-loye • so bisi
Of preyers and of penaunce • my
And wepen whan I shulde slepe •
faille.

quod Pieres . ’and
be namoref
plow shal ben herafter,
though whete-bred me
(E.VII.117-120)

Previously, Piers' works were good ex purls naturallbus.
with no clear relation to grace or merit as such.

Now, he

decides to perform acts of piety which are more clearly
suited to saving his soul, that is, to merltum de condlgno.
Toward the end of the passus, Langland goes to
great lengths to explain how doing well is much more impor
tant than accumulating indulgences since without good works
such indulgences are worthless:
Thelgh 3e be founde in the fraternete . of alle the
foure ordres,
And haue indulgences double-folde • b u t if Dowel 3 0 W
help,
I sette 3owre patentes and 30wre panctounz • at one
pies hele!
(B.VII.192-19*0
Much better were it for man, according to Langland, to seek
G o d’s assistance in the hope that God may then accept him,
permitting works capable of meriting de condigno.

This is

only possible, however, if God first gratuitously chooses
to extend grace to the sinner (gratia gratis data):
For-thi I conseille alle Cristene • to crye god mercy,
And Marie his moder • be owre mene bitwene,
That god gyue vs grace here • ar we gone hennes,
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Suche werkes to werche • while we hen here,
That after owre deth-day • Dowel reherce,
At the day of dome • we dede as he hi3te.
(E.VII.195-200)
As the Vlslo ends, we can already see the direction
the

Vita will take as the exposition of Dowel, Dobet,and

Dobest.

Both Piers and Will have learned that

(1)works

may

be valuable in attracting grace (merltum de congruo), but
(2 ) such works are insufficient by themselves without an
infusion of divine grace, and (3) Dowel (merltum de condlgno)
supersedes any puny human effort to bind God in a legal
contract which would force him to elect a sinner regardless
of actual merit.

Yet for all that. Will still

know how a Christian may do well.

does not

This now becomes his

next goal.
Following

Piers* example, Will turns away from the

active, external world and begins an Inward jouney to find
out what help his various faculties and spiritual resources
may be able to provide.

Before he begins this journey,

however, he first meets two Franciscan Friars, Masters of
Theology such as those who dominated Oxford in the fourteenth
century.

Will debates these masters on the question of how

man may avoid sin, thus Introducing one of the main themes
of the Vita de Dowel.

The friars argue that although no

man may avoid eaamittlng lome' veftial sins, God's grace will
help a good man to keep from mortal sin.

A man may, never

theless, choose sin and cut himself off from God because
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he has been created free, free even to misuse his freedom:
God wole suffre wel thi sleuthe • 3if thy-self lyketh.
For he 3af the to 3eres3yue • to 3eme wel thi-selue,
And that is witte and fre wille • to euery wy3te a
porcioun,
To fleghyng foules • to fissches & to bestes.
Ac man hath moste thereof • and moste is to blame,
But if he worche wel ther-with • as Dowel hym techeth.
(B.VIII.51-56)
So far as this goes, there is nothing clearly unorthodox in
the friars' teaching.

It does, however, seem to give greater

prominence to man's will than to grace in the scheme of
salvation.

Grace is a "help" in avoiding serious sin, but

willing good works is a condition sine qua non for positive
merit.

Will does not understand all the implications of

this yet, and so he cannot be said to learn much from the
friars.

But he has been introduced to the problem that

will occupy him through the next seven passus.
The first figure that Will meets in his inward
journey is Thought, who represents merely the ideas that
Will has already developed up to this point.

Little wonder,

then, that Thought cannot be of much service in directing
Will to Dowel.

Accordingly,

Thanne Thou3t in that tyme • seide thise wordes,
•Where Dowel, Dobet • and Dobest ben in londe,
Here is Wille wolde ywyte • yif Witte couthe teche hym,
And whether he be man or no man • this man fayne
wolde aspye,
And worchen as thei thre wolde • this is his entente.'
(B.VIII.122-126)
Wit, m a n ’s natural faculty of intelligence, carries Will
somewhat further by outlining the nature of man as created

by God (Kynde):
And that is the castel that Kynde made • Caro it hatte,
And is as moche to mene • as man with a soule;
And that he wrou3t with'werke • and with worde bothe,
Thorugh m y 3te of the aaieste : man was ymaked.
Inwit and alle wittes • closed ben ther-inne,
For loue of the lady Anima • that Lyf is ynempned;
Ouer al in mannes body • he walketh and wanareth,
Ac in the herte is hir home • and hir moste reste.
Ac Inwitte is in the hed • and to the herte he loketh,
What Anima is lief or loth • he lat hir at his wille;
For after the grace of god • the grettest is Inwitte.
(B.IX.48-58)
While Wit never loses sight of the importance of grace, as
in the last line of the passage quoted here, his primary
interest, an analysis of human nature, leads him to concen
trate principally on man's natural faculties, especially
Inwit.

This sets the tone for Wit's definition of Dowel,

Dobet, and Dobest (B.IX.94-97) as very practical activities
which evoke a loving response from God:
To alle trew tidy men • that trauaille desyren,
Owre lorde loueth hem and lent . loude other stllle,
Grace to go to hem • and agon her lyflode.
(E.IX.104-106)
Wit does not explain such a relation to God as merltum de
congruo, but this is, by definition common among all late
medieval thinkers, precisely what he has introduced here.
No mention is made here of prevenient grace, only God's
pleasure with the efforts of "alle trew tidy men."

Nor does

Wit explain whether God has, de potentla ordinata, committed
himself to reward man's behavior in any form of legal con
tract.

So far, it is impossible to tell whether or under

what conditions a man might merit de condigno; or, indeed,

whether man may not be faced with the uncertainties of
potentla Dei absoluta such as the "modern Pelagians" des
cribed.
In an effort to clarify these questions, if not
fully to answer them, Wit tells Will at the end of Passus
IX that
Dowel, my frende, is « to don as lawe techeth.
To loue thi frende and thi foo • leue me, that is Dobet.
To 3iuen and to 3emen • bothe 3onge and lode,
To helen and to helpen • is Dobest of alle.
And Dowel is to drede god • and Dobet to suffre,
And so cometh Dobest of bothe • and bryngeth adoun the
mody,
And that is wikked Wille • that many werke shendeth,
And dryueth away Dowel • thorugh dedliche synnes.'
(E. IX.199-206)
Unfortunately, the doctrine set forth here is not as care
fully stated as we might wish.
"lawe" that governs Dowel?

What, for example, is the

Is this the law described in

Scripture, by the Church, natural law, or perhaps all three?
Even assuming that Will can learn what law to follow, is
doing well merely following a set of legal prescriptions?
Is love, or charity, reserved exclusively for Dobet?

If so,

as seems suggested here, does this mean that a Christian
may be saved without charity, that is, by doing no more
than avoiding those sins proscribed by the law?

Finally,

if a "wikked Wille" can perform mortal sin. and thereby
"dryueth away Dowel," does this imply that Dowel can be
achieved by a good will that follows the law?

To this last

question, at least, there is an answer implicit in Wit's
speech.

For if Dowel is driven away by "dedliche synnes,"

then it must presuppose a state of grace of some sort
(auxlllum gratlae).

But what sort of grace is this, gratia

gratis data, which might permit meritum de congruo. or
gratia gratum faciens, through which God would accept Dowel
as merltum de condigno?
vain sophistry.

These are not idle questions nor

On the answers to these questions would

depend the whole issue of orthodoxy or heresy in fourteenthcentury theology.
Happily for Will, who might otherwise have been
left in this befuddlement, Wit has Study for a wife.

She

launches into a diatribe against intellectual pride that
seeks to question God:
I haue yherde hiegh men • etyng atte table,
Carpen as thei clerkes were • of Cryste and of his
mi3tes,
And leyaen fautes vppon the fader • that fourmed vs
alle,
And carpen a 3eine clerkes • crabbed wordes;—
"Whi wolde owre saueoure suffre • suche a worme in his
blisse,
That bigyled the womman • and the man after,
Thorw whiche wyles and wordes • thei wenten to helle,
And al her sede for here synne • the same deth suffred?
Here lyeth 3owre lore11 • thise lordes gynneth dispute,
"Of that 3e clerkes vs kenneth • of Cryst by the gospe];
Flllus non portabit lnlaultatem patris. & c .
Whi shulde we that now ben • for the werkes of Adam
Roten and to-rende? • resoun wolde it neuere;
Vnusaulsque portabit onus suum, &c."
(B.X.101-112)
Dame Study goes on to cite Augustine, arguing that a man
ought not question the ways of God; he should rather submit
himself humbly to the ultimately inscrutable divine will and
praise what he cannot understand:

For alle that wilneth to wyte • the weyes of god alnd^ty,
I wolde his eye were in his ers • and his fynger after,
That euere wilneth to wite • whi that god wolde
Suffre Sathan • his sede to higile,
Or Iudas to the Iuwes • Iesu bytraye.
Al was as thow wolde • lorde, yworschiped be thow,
And al worth as thow wolte • what so we dispute!
(B.X.122-128)
It hardly need be pointed out, after what we have already
seen in the first two chapters, that this is yet another
instance of the fourteenth-century tendency to denigrate
reason in matters of faith, the pure credlbilia that tran
scend human comprehension and depend ultimately on potentla
Dei absoluta.

Here, too, we should note the predestinarian

Implication in Study*s speech:

all human events, even those

which we condemn, have been ordained by God.

Since no

Christian should, according to Study, question God's will,
this means that the divine will becomes the sole criterion
of value— a concept familiar in much of the radical theology
of the time.

Above all, the study of theology does not lead

to scientific statements of fact; its sole value lies in
its ability to communicate values, especially the value of
charity:
Ac Theologie hath tened me • ten score tymes,
The more I muse there-inne • the mistier it semeth,
And the depper I deuyne • the derker me it thinketh;
It is no science for sothe • forto sotyle inne;
A ful lethy thinge it were • 3if that loue nere.
Ac for it let best by Loue • I loue it the bettre;
For there that Loue is leder • ne lacked neuere grace.
(B.X.180-186)
Study, like Wit, does not have the answer that Will is
seeking, but she can at least set Will on the right path.
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Man's natural Intelligence and its application in study may
not discover Dowel by themselves, and so the lady sends
Will on to Clergy and Scripture.
Shortly after Will has introduced himself to them,
Clergy points out that many points of faith, such as the
doctrine of the Trinity, cannot be grasped by human reason,
not even by so learned a man as Augustine (B.X.2^5-2^8)•
This has the effect of reinforcing Study's teachings as
well as precluding any exaggerated expectations Will might
have of the insights Clergy and Scripture can provide.

But

Will, we soon learn, is really less interested in what they
teach him than in making a point of his own.

When Scripture

explains how difficult it is for a rich man to be saved,
Will rises in argument:
'Contra.' quod I, 'bi Cryste • that can I repreue.
And preue it bi Peter • and bi Poule bothe,
That is baptized beth sauf • be he riche or pore.'
(B.X.3^5-3W
This begins a discussion of grace and merit which will ex
tend on through the rest of this passus and will not be re
solved until the end of Passus 3(IV.

Since it is the ful

crum on which the whole poem balances, it will deserve
rather close attention.
The point Will is making, in the style of the
Scholastic dlsputatio. is that baptism and mere membership
in the legal framework of the Church are sufficient to
merit the grace required for salvation.

Such a narrow,

legalistic doctrine of grace seems "based, at least partly,
on W i t ’s teaching that Dowel is “to don as lawe techeth,"
which we have already seen above.

Scripture responds that

the law alone does not Justify sinful man:
Ac Crysten men withoute more • may nou3t come to heuen^
For that Cryst for Cristen men deyde • and confermed
the lawe,
That who-so wolde and wylneth • with Cryste to aryse,
Si cum Christo surrexlstls. etc.,
He shulde louye and leue • and the lawe fulfille.
That is— "loue thi lorde god * leuest aboue alle.
And after, alle Crystene creatures • in commune, eche
man other;"
And thus bilongeth to louye • that leueth to be saued.
(B.X.253-259)
The law which Christ "confermed" is nothing so simplistic
and mechanical as Will, here a medieval Pharisee, would
construe it to be.

The law is the law of love, and it is

this that a Christian must live if he would be saved.
Against this, Will next leads forth the old argument that
extra ecclesla nulla salus.

This is an ancient doctrinal

formula, used continually by popes and councils throughout
the Middle Ages and preserved by the Councils of Trent,
Vatican I and, in our own time, Vatican II— though with
differences in interpretation.9

pQr his part, Will inter

prets it literally, pointing to the cases of Solomon and
«

Aristotle, both of whom are damned even though they were
good m e n :

^See, for example, Vatican II*s Dogmatic Constitution on
the Church, cap. 2, a. 1^; and cf. Vatican I's Dogmatic
Constitution on the Church of Christ, cap. 6 and 7 .
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For Salamon the sage • that Sapience tau3te,
God gaf hym grace of witte • and alle his godes after,
To reule the reume • and riche to make;
He demed wel and wysely • as holy wrltte telleth.
Aristotle and he • who wlssed men bettere?
Malstres that of goddls mercy • techen men and prechen,
Of here wordes thei wissen vs • for wisest as In here
tyme,
And al holicherche • holdeth hem bothe ydampned!
(B.X.379-386)
This is a telling point, and he hastens to reinforce It
by showing how certain great sinners were saved because
they received the grace to draw them into the Church
Triumphant:
On Gode Frldaye I fynde • a feloun was ysaued,
That had lyued al his lyf • with lesynges and with
thefte;
And for he biknewe on the crosse • and to Cryste
schrof hym,
He was sonnere saued • than seynt Iohan the baptiste,
And or Adam or Ysaye • or eny of the prophetes,
That hadde ylelne with Lucyfer • many longe 3eres.
A robbere was yraunceouned • rather than thei alle,
With-outen any penaunce of purgatorle • to perpetuel
blisse.
Thanne Marye Magdaleyne • what womman dede worse?
Or who worse than Dauid • that Vries deth conspired?
Or Poule the apostle • that no pitee hadde,
Moche crystene kynde • to kylle to deth?
And now ben thise as souereynes • wyth seyntes in
heuene,
Tho that wrou3te wikkedlokest • in worlde tho thei
were.
And tho that wisely wordeden • and wryten many bokes
Of witte and of wlsdome • with dampned soules wonye.
(B.X.414-429)
The reason for Will's adherence to the law as a means to
salvation is now becoming clear.
uncertainties:

Man lives in a world of

good men go to hell and sinners go to hea

ven, if God so chooses.

Faced by such a prospect, Will

cleaves to the law because it has been instituted de

potentla Del ordlnata and offers a measure of security,
though even this security is threatened:
There aren witty and wel-libbynge • ac her werkes
t>en yhudde
In the hondes of almi3ty god • and he wote the sothe
Wher for loue a man worth allowed there • and his lele
werkes,
Or elles for his yuel wille • and enuye of herte,
And be allowed as he lyued so.
(B.X.^31-^35)
Angry and confused, Will ends this passus with a long
anti-intellectual tirade (E.X.W2.ff,), which signifies
how little he has accomplished toward reaching some genuine
understanding of Dowel.

This anxious, frustrating search,

Anselm's "fldes quaerens lntellectum.11 should not be passed
over quickly by the m o d e m reader, who is eager to get on
to something more suited to his twentieth-century taste.
Langland would not have devoted so much of his energy to
writing this account of Will's perplexed quest for Dowel
were it not that this is, doctrinally at least, the heart
of the poem.
At the beginning of Passus XI, Scripture upbraids
Will for his arrogance: "multi multa sclunt. et selpsos
nesclunt" (B.XI.2).

Will has gone too far.

He has assumed

that because he cannot fully grasp the mysterious workings
of grace, all theology is therefore nonsense.

This is a

reversal of the way intellectual pride usually operates:
in order to condemn human reason, Will uses his own reason
as an absolute standard.

Accordingly, Scripture abandons

him for a while to Fortune.

Will eventually sees the error

of following Fortune and her ladies, but when he goes to
confession he returns to his old argument concerning baptism
as a guarantee of salvation, though now admitting the value
of contrition:
Baptizyng and burying • bothe ben ful nedeful,
Ac moche more merytorie • me thynketh it is to baptize.
For a baptized man may * as maistres telleth,
Thorugh contrlcioun come • to the heigh heuene;
Sola contriclo delet peccatum.
Ac a b a m e withoute bapteme • may nou3t so be saued;
Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua. &c.
Loke, 3e lettred men • whfether I lye or do nou3te.
(B.XI.78-83)
At this point, Lewte enters and, in his function as Good
Faith,10 leads Will back to Scripture, who preaches on the
text about the many who were called but few chosen.

This,

predictably, once again raises 'Will's anxiety over the ques
tion of predestination, and we now learn that he insists on
baptism and church membership as conditions sine qua non
for salvation (extra ecclesia nulla salus) in order to re
assure himself that he is one of the elect:
Al for tene of her tyxte • trembled myn herte,
And in a were gan I waxe * and with myself to dispute,
Whether I were chosen or nou3t chosen; • on Holicherche
I thou3te,
That vnderfonge me atte fonte • for one of goddis
chosen;
For Cryste cleped vs alle • come if we wolde,
Sarasenes and scismatikes • and so he dyd the Iewes,
0 vos omnes sclcientes. venite, &c.;
And badde hem souke for synne • saufly at his breste,
And drynke bote for bale • brouke it who so my3te.
'Thanne may alle Crystene come,1 quod I • 'and
cleyme there entre
10See J. F. Goodridge's helpful commentary in his edition
of the poem (Penguin Books, rev., 1966), p. 288, n. 11.
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BJr the t>lode that he bou3te vs with • and thorugh
baptesme after,
Qul credlderit & baptlzatus fuerit, & c .
For though a Crystene man coueyted • his Crystenedome
to reneye,
Ri3tfulliche to reneye • no resoun it wolde.
(B.XI.110-121
Significantly, this goes "beyond any similar claims that
Will has made thus far.

Not only does baptism serve to

clear a man's way to salvation, but we now find that, once
baptized, it is impossible for a man not to be saved.

A

Christian may commit many sins, but by virtue of his baptism
his reason and conscience will eventually lead him to seek
God's mercy.

Though he may be "in purgatorie to brenne"

(B.XI.128) as punishment for his sins, even "to the daye
of dome" (E.XI.129), his soul will not be damned.
Will's emphasis on man's contractual relation to
God seems to bind the divine will, de potentla Dei ordlnata.
and to limit man's freedom.

A Christian may perform evil

works such that he will merit punishment, but he is not free
to choose his own damnation.

On God's side, man is predes

tined by the divine will to heaven if he is a baptized
Christian, regardless of what works he may perform.

In

terms of grace and merit, this means that merltum de congruo
is virtually eliminated and merltum de condlgno is assured
by contract.

Such a position, however, violates much that

was dear to the fourteenth-century religious mind.

While

Bradwardine or Wyclif, for example, would agree with Will
in his doctrine of predestination and his virtual exclusion
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of merltum de congruo, even they would not allow God's will
to "be bound in such a servile fashion.

Much less the mod

ern!. doctores!
Langland cannot, therefore, allow Will's argument
to go by unopposed, and almost immediately an adversary
arises who throws the whole discussion into a turmoil once
again.

Replying to Will's and Scripture's use of authori

ties, Trajan bursts in:
'3ee! baw for bokesf 'quod one • was broken oute of
helle,
Hi3te Trolanus, had ben a trewe kny3te • toke witnesse
at a pope,
How he was ded and dampned • to swellen in pyne,
For an vncristene creature; • — 'clerkis wyten the
sothe,
That al the clergye vnder Cryste • ne mi3te me cracche
fro helle,
Eut onliche loue nad leaute • and my lawful domes.
Gregorie wist this wel • and wilned to my soule
Sauacioun, for sothenesse • that he selgh in my werkes.
And, after that he wepte • and wilned me were graunted
Grace, wyth-outen any bede-byddynge • his bone was
vnderfongen,
And I saued, as 3e may se • wlth-oute syngyng of masses
Ey loue, and by lerynge • of my lyuyng in treuthe,
Erou3te me fro bitter peyne • there no biddyng my3te.'
(E.XI.135-3^7)
Here is a clear exception to Will’s generalizations about
baptism and the Church.

Trajan, in a situation rem&irkably

similar to that in St. Erkenwald. is granted a special grace
sufficient to save him even after he had died and his soul
gone to hell.

No doubt, St. Gregory's prayers had the ef

fect of bringing Trajan's case up for appeal before God,
but Trajan makes quite clear that his good works, not the
prayers of any pope, were sufficiently meritorious to evoke
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G o d ’s mercy:
’Lo, 3e lordes, what leute did • by an emperoure
of Rome,
That was an vncrystene creature • as clerkes findeth
in bokes.
Nou3t thorw preyere of a pope • but for his pure
treuthe
Was that Sarasene saued • as seynt Gregorie bereth
witnesse.
(B.XI. 14-8-153 )
Contrary to Will’s earlier argument, then, this proves the
efficacy of merltum de congruo in attracting God's genero
sity.

Trajan's good works were good in and of themselves

and thus earned (ex natura rel debita) merits which, though
not meeting the full standard of divine justice (de condign c).
God could accept by virtue of his potentla absoluta.

Con

versely, it is equally true that even for those within the
legal framework of the Church, salvation is not guaranteed
without good works on the part of man:

"Lawe with-outen

loue. . .leye there a bene" (B.XI.165).
Lewte next steps in to support and expand Trajan’s
argument in a long speech (B.XI. 14-8-310), adducing still
more evidence, as in the following lines:
For what euere clerkis carpe • of Crystenedome or elles,
Cryst to a comune woman seyde • in comune at a feste,
That fldes sua shulde sauen hir • and saluen hir of
alle synnes.
(B.XI.210-212)
This emphasis on faith and love prepares us for the resolu
tion of the problem, which begins in the next passus.
It would be difficult to determine which is the
most important passus in the poem, but a very good case

could be made out for Passus XII.

Imagination, the mind's

synthetic power in medieval p s y c h o l o g y , i s the principal
speaker here and represents the highest authority within
man to guide Will.

Imagination's Importance has already

been established by Study, who foretold that he is the one
who will finally sort out Will's intellectual problems (B.
X.115), particularly those dealing with grace and merit.
Imagination begins by noting the limitations of
the human mind, compared with the great power of God's
grace:
Clergye and Kynde Witte • comth of si3te and techynge,
As the boke bereth witnesse • to buirnes that can
rede,
Quod sclmus. loaulmur; ouod vidimus. testamur.
Of quod sclmus cometh clergye • and connynge of heuene,
And of quod vidimus cometh kynde witte • of si3te of
dyuerse peple.
Ac grace is a gyfte of god • and of gret loue spryngeth;
Knewe neuere clerke how it cometh forth • ne kynde
witte the weyes,
Nesclt allquls vnde venlt. aut quo vadit, etc.
T e .XII.66-73 )
This does not, however, have the same anti-intellectual
intent that we saw in Will's discouraged speech at the end
of Passus X.

Imagination wishes only to stress the over

riding significance of grace and man's inability ever to
understand its workings.

But he goes on to qualify this,

as Will had not done, pointing out that learning is necessaiy
in order to know how to do well:

1Bloomfield, pp* 170-3?^.
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Al-though men made bokes • god was the maistre,
And seynt spirit the saumplarye • and seide what men
sholde write.
And ri3t as sy3te serueth a man • to se the heighe
strete,
Ri3t so ledeth letterure • lewed men to resoun.
And as a blynde man is bataille • bereth wepne to fi3t^
And hath none happ with his axe • his enemye to hitte,
Namore kan a kynde-witted man • but clerkes hym teche,
Come for al his kynde witte • to Crystendome and be
saued;
Whiche is the coffre of Crystes tresore • and clerkes
kepe the keyes,
To vnlouken it at her lydynge • and to the lewed peple
3yue mercy for her mysdedes • if it wole aske
Boxomelich and benygneliche • and bidden it of grace.
(B.XII.l03-l1*O
Learning, then, is a necessary adjunct to grace.

No man

may find his way to the faith of the Church, there to find
the treasures of grace needed to merit salvation de condlgna
unless he first has learned the way from the books that
clerks have written under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
Toward the end of this speech, however, Imagination's claim
that the Church is "the coffre of Crystes tresore" seems to
agree with Will's earlier argument that extra ecclesla nulla
salus.

But it is important to note that Imagination does

not say that a non-Christian cannot be saved, only that the
man who comes "to Crystendome" can thereby receive saving
grace.
Imagination clarifies his position be referring to
the case of the Good Thief:
The thef that had grace of god • on Gode Fryday as thow
speke,
Was (saved), for he 3elte hym creaunt to Cryst on the
crosse • and knewleched hym gulty,
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And grace axed of god • that to graunten it is redy
To hem that boxomeliche biddeth it • and ben in wille
amenden hem.
(B.XII.192-195)
The

Good Thief was, of course, not a baptized Christian,

nor

was he one of the righteous Jews of the Old Testament.

God chose to elect him simply because he "boxomeliche"
asked for forgiveness for his sins and "ben in wille to
amenden hem."

This is a clear case of merltum de congruo.

B e c a u s e of the intrinsic goodness of his actions, the Good
Thief has been accepted de potentla Del absoluta.

Still,

he had the special opportunity, not afforded to many other
good non-Christians, of being physically present with Christ
and able to seek his mercy directly.
case of Trajan?

What, however, of the

Imagination answers this by pointing out

that Trajan, too, merited G o d ’s favor de congruo:
And ri3t as Troianus the trewe kny3t • tilde nou3t depe
in helle.
That owre lorde ne had hym ll3tlich oute • so leue I
the thef be in heuene.
(B.XII.210-211)
Significantly, the two scriptural texts that Imagination
cites to support his position are "aula reddlt vnlculque
luxta opera sua" (B.XII.213 ) and "Quare placult. aula volult?1
12
(B.XII.216).

The first explains how, according to the

Psalmisti God rewards men justly according to their works,
and the second, used by Imagination as a gloss on the first,
*^In the Vulgate these are Ps. 51: 13 and Ps. 13^: 6 .
Both texts are slightly changed by Langland, though he does
preserve the essential meaning.
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voices the Psalmist's humble submission before God, whose
will is supreme in all things.

Of all the passages in

Scripture he might have quoted here, these perhaps most
clearly illustrate the influence of fourteenth-century
voluntarism on Langland's poem.
Even so, the cases of Trajan and the Good Thief had
already been reviewed earlier, and it is therefore not
surprising to find Imagination supporting the view offered
by Lewte.

Eut Imagination does not stop here.

He goes so

far as to suggest that even Aristotle, Socrates, and Solomon
could have accumulated such merltum de congruo as to be
raised up to heaven, de potentia Dei absoluta:
'And where Aristotle be sauf or nou3t sauf • the
sothe wote no clergye,
Ne of Sortes no of Salamon • no scripture can telle.
Ac god is so good, I hope • that sitth he gaf hem
wittis
To wissen vs weyes there-with • (that wissen vs to be
saued,
And the better for her bokes) • to bidden we ben holden.
That god for his grace • gyue her soules reste;
For lettred men were lewed men 3ut • ne were fore of
her bokes.1
(E.XII.268-27*0
Predictably, Will balks at such an argument;
'Alle thise clerkes,' quod I tho • 'that on Cryst
leuen,
Seggen in her sarmones • that noyther ne Iewes,
Ne no creature of Cristes lyknesse • with-outen
Crystendome worth saued.’
(B.XII.275-277)
Considering the medieval respect for authority and tradition^
this would seem, perhaps, to conclude the dispute.

Still,
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Imagination presses on,
C o n t r a * ' quod. Ymagynatyf tho • and cornsed for to
loure,
And seyde, 'saluabltur vlx lustus in die ludlcl.1.
Ergo saluabltur.1 quod he • and seyde namore Latyne.
'Troianus was a trewe kny3te • and toke neuere Cristendome,
And he is sauf, so seith the boke • and his soule in
heuene.
For there is fullyng of fonte • and fullyng in blodshedynge,
And thorugh fuire is fullyng • and that is ferine bileue;
Aduenlt ignis diulnus. non comburens. sed
lllumlnans. fete.
Ac trewth that trespassed neuere • ne transuersed
a 3eines his lawe,
Eut lyueth as his lawe techeth • and leueth there be
no bettere,
And if there were, he wolde amende • and in suche wille
deyeth,
Ne wolde neuere trewe god • but treuth were allowed;
And where it worth or worth nou3t • the bileue is
grete of treuth,
And an hope hangyng ther-inne • to haue a mede for his
treuthe.
(B.XII.278-289)
Two points are especially noteworthy in this speech.
Imagination draws the inference from 1 Peter k:

First,

18 that

since the Just man will scarcely (vix) be saved on Judgment
Day, this means that the Just man— that is, one whose works
and motives are good, but who has not received a gift of
grace— will be saved.

Langland lends additional authority

to this inference by placing it within the Scriptural quota
tion ("Ergo saluabltur"). even though it does not appear in
the Vulgate from which the rest of the text is taken!^

por

^The Vulgate reads, "Et si. Justus vlx salvabltur. lmplus.
et peccator ubl parebunt?" Actually, St. Peter's point is
the opposite of what Langland makes it out to be.

readers who were not careful enough to check the source,
however, this would seem unimpeachable evidence to support
Imagination's argument.

His second major point is that

there is a special kind of baptism, a "fullyng" of fire,
that comes from believing in and following the truth re- .
vealed to a man, whether this be Christian truth or not.
So long as a non-Christian believes that his own law is good
and that there is none better, God will, according to
Imagination, reward such a man.
able:

The alternative is unthink

it is not possible that a "trewe god" would not

extend to the righteous non-Christian "a mede for his
treuthe."
With this speech Langland ends Passus XII and Imagi
nation vanishes.

To sum up what progress has been made in

defining a doctrine of grace and merit, we can recognize in
Imagination's teaching a strong emphasis on merltum de
congruo. based on the premise that good acts deserve some
reward (ex natura rel deblta) from a just God, and on God's
willingness to elect a man who has not fulfilled all the
literal requirements of ordained law.

Imagination had al

ready protected himself in advance by stressing the impor
tance of grace (B.XII.66-71; quoted above p. Ill), but this
is virtually lost now in the overwhelming emphasis in the
latter part of the passus on man's natural ability to merit
God's acceptance.

As it stands, this position is, if not

outright Pelagianism, at the very least strongly colored by
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the Ockhamist tendencies In much fourteenth-century theology*
But though Imagination may have said his last word,
Langland has by no means said his.

The remainder of the

Vita de Dowel should be read, I feel, as a qualification of
Imagination's partial discription of Dowel.

By himself.

Imagination has given us only half of the truth about God's
relation to man, expressed in terms of grace and merit,
and Langland now goes on to present Haukyn, the active man,
in order to explain the discipline a Christian must ordinar
ily undergo if he wishes to win divine favor.
In Passus XIII, Will encounters Conscience and Pa
tience, whom Conscience decides to Join in a pilgrimage to
find Dowel.

Together Patienoe and Conscience meet the per

sonification of actlva vita, one Haukyn, and point out to
him how his clothes are covered with the filth of the seven “
deadly sins, which are then described at considerable length.
Prevailing upon him to repent. Patience agrees to explain
the good Christian life to him in Passus XIV.

Thus, as

Imagination had earlier explained the value of a man's good
works in meriting salvation, so now Patience goes a step
further by showing how an active life may, or may not, lead
to merit.

Haukyn represents the everyday Christian who,

though blessed with the grace of baptism as Aristotle and
Trajan were not, has not lived up to his obligations to Co
God and, through his love for God, to be charitable

toward his neighbor.

Haukyn has devoted himself instead

to satisfying selfish desires, but he is not entirely
or irredeemably lost.

He may yet be saved if he renounces

cupiditas for carltas. according to Patience in a famous
speech on the meaning of poverty:
1Paupertas,1 quod Pacience • 'est odibile bonum.
Remoclo curarum. possessio sine calumpnla.
donum dei. sanltatis mater:
Absque sollcitudlne semita. saplencle temperatrlx.
negoclum sine dampno:
Incerta fortuna. absque, solicltudine felicitas.
(E.XIV.275 ff.)
Poverty is not so much an economic state, as we would use
the term in modern times, but rather a spiritual state.
It is truly a "donum del" in directing the vision of the
Christian to see that the things of the world, though not
evil in themselves, tempt him to turn inward, to glut his
own selfish tastes as Haukyn had done, rather than Inspire
him to lead a Christian life of love for others.

Thus, to

live a life of patient poverty does not imply living from
hand to mouth in a dreary slum area, dressed in filthy
rags; nor is it the poverty that the friars falsely claim
to live amid actual splendor.

True poverty, taken here as

a Christian virtue, the epitome of Dowel, is a proper regard
for the things of the material world as things to be used
but not coveted.

The Christian should always aspire to

charity, which is actually man's loving return to God of
the grace that God first extended to him.

This is Patienee*s
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argument, then, an argument derived from Augustine’s doc
trine of the two loves in De Genesl ad litteram (XI.xv.20)
and De civitate Dei (XIV.28).
In terms of grace and merit, Passus XIII and XIV
set forth an exposition of how a man in active life may,
though living in a state of mortal sin, receive the free
gift of grace (gratia gratis data) that will prompt him to
repent (meritum de congruo). seek reentry into a state of
sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens). and thereby live
the virtuous life of patient poverty that will earn God's
acceptance (meritum de condlgno).

In spite of whatever

radical tendencies may have sprouted from time to time in
Langland’s mind, he was quite careful to balance them by
such securely orthodox doctrine as we see here.
Passus XV is transitional.

Anima appears to warn

Will against intellectual pride again, perhaps as a correc
tive against taking Imagination too seriously:
’Thanne artow inparfit,' quod he • 'and one of Prydes
kny3tes;

For such a luste and lykynge • Lucifer fel fram heuene:
Ponam pedem meum in aaullone. et slmllls ero
altlsslmo.
It were a 3eynes kynde,1 quod he • ’and alkynnes resoun,
That any creature shulde kunne al • excepte Cryste one.
(B.XV.50-53)
This caution becomes even more specific further on in the
same speech (B.XV.68-77)» when Anima directs the accusation
of intellectual pride against those priests— "freres and
fele other maistres"— who are more interested in the
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abstractions of theology than in practicing Christian values.
By this time, Will asks what charity is (B.XV. 1*1-5)» and the
discussion which ensues extends through the whole of the
Vita de Dobet
Anima informs Will that, first of all, God's grace
is necessary for a man to live a life of charity (B.XV.2k$ ) .
Next, Anima shows how the Church has been corrupted and is
in a state of decline (B.XV.337-3^8)» such that faith alone
may now have to save the common people:

“That sola fldes

sufflclt • to saue with lewed peple" (B.XV.382), though the
Church is still the proper means of conveying charity and
grace to men:
And so it fareth by a barne • that borne is of wombe,
Til it be crystened in Crystes name • and confermed of
the bisshop,
It is hethene as to heueneward • and helpelees to the
soule.
(£.XV.*f*f8-*f50)
Aside from the question of the proper means for transmitting
grace, however, Anima is quite insistent that grace must
assist man if he is to ascend to God:
Whan the heye kynge of heuene • sent his sone to erthe,
Many miracles he wrou3te • man for to turne;
In ensaumple that men schulde se • that by sadde
resoun
Men mi3t nou3t be saued • but thoru3 mercy and grace,
And thoru3 penaunce and passion • and parfit bylef;
And by-cam man of a mayde • and metropolltanus,
And baptised and bishoped • with the blode of his herte
Alle that wilned, and wolde • with inne-wit by-leue it.
(E.XV. 539-5*1-6)
Man's own efforts ("sadde resoun") may not earn heaven;
only through mercy, grace, and faith can a man be Justified.
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Anima's teaching, therefore, expresses a clear doctrine
meritum de condigno, which seems to serve no purpose
in the larger context of the poem as a whole other than
providing, or restoring, a balance between merlta de congruo
and de condigno.
Anima does not, however, fall into the trap of
gravitating to the extreme of Bradwardlne in his reaction
against Ockhamist theology.

Free will is clearly given

an important role in salvation in the description of the
Tree of Charity in Passus XVI.

Charity, Anima points out,

grows In man at the instigation of grace, and man's soul,
the "land” in which the Tree of Charity is planted, is
leased to Liberum-Arbltrlum (B.XVI.13-17).
protected by three supports (”pyles"):

The tree is

the power of God

the Father, the Passion of Christ, and man's free will,
which is the "lieutenant” of the Holy Spirit (B.XVI.46-47).
Thus, while the tree of grace may first have been planted
by God, it must now be cultivated by man.

For when man is

threatened by temptation, he must use Liberum-Arbltrlum to
reach for the grace of the Holy Spirit that will help him
to avoid sin and lead a good life:
Ac whan the Fende and the Flesshe • forth with the
Worlde
Manasen byhynde me • my fruit for to fecche,
Thanne Liberum-Arbltrlum • laccheth the thridde plante,
And palleth adown the pouke • purelich thorw grace
And helpe of the holy goste • and thus haue I the
maystrie.
(B.XVI.48-52)
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Anima does not have thfe same Ockhamist tendencies that Lewte
and, even more so, that Imagination displayed.

Instead,

Anima preserves the need for a helping grace from God '
(gratia gratis data) more clearly than they, hut without
polarizing the dispute by insisting that man's efforts are
Irrelevant.
In the remainder of Passus XVI and throughout Passus
XVII, Will meets the three theological virtues that enable
a man to Dobet— Faith9 Hope, and Charity.

He learns that

Faith and Hope are useless without Charity (E.XVII.88-93)»
through which the Christian may be justified by the grace
of Christ's passion and death (B.XVII.9^-101).

Then, the

Samaritan, who represents ideal charity, presents analogies
to explain what man must do in order to earn this justifying
grace.

The Holy Spirit (caritas increata) will only ignite

with the flame of grace (caritas creata) those men who have
proved themselves worthy (B.XVII.217-230 and 2*j4-256).

No

man is completely worthy of meriting salvation (de condlgno)
without God's assistance, and the good works that a man does
offer to God only return the gifts that God had already
given him (E.XVII.266).

On the other hand, man's actions

can, if sins against charity, "quench'1 the grace of the Holy
Spirit in the sense that man has been created free to will
even his own moral destruction (B.XVII. 269-275).

Yet for

all this, there is always the possibility that God might
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choose, de potentla Del absoluta. to save a sinner whose
merits were only partial (de congruo) and themselves In
capable of reaching the full standard of God's justice
(de condigno):
*1 pose I hadde synned so • and shulde now deye,
And now am sory, that so • the seint spirit agulte,
Confesse me, and crye his grace • god, that al made,
And myldliche his mercy axe • my^te I nou3te be saued?'
'3us,' seide the Samaritan • 'so wel thow my^te repente,
That ri3twlsnesse thorw repentance • to reutn my3te
torne.
(B.XVII.293-298)
So strong is the fourteenth-century Interest in preserving
God's potentla absoluta that even in an orthodox discussion
of grace and meritum de condigno it is impossible for
Langland not to allow, In extreme cases, the possibility
that God will supersede his ordinances to save a sinner.
The Vita de Dobet ends after Langland's masterful
handling of the Harrowing of Hell in Passus XVII, which
dramatizes the role of Christ in man's justification.

This

leads logically into the final question of where man may
obtain the needed grace, the principal subject of the Vita
de Dobest.

While fully admitting the deficiencies of the

institutional Church, Langland suggests that Dobest is
ideally the life of grace and charity in the Church.

For

after Christ arose from the dead and showed himself to the
apostles, he explained to them the life of Dobest:
And whan this dede was done • Dobest he tau3te,
And 3af Pleres power. • and pardoun he graunted
To alle manere men • mercy and for3yfnes,
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Hym my3te men to assoille • and of alle manere synnes,
In couenant that the! come • and knowleche to paye,
To Pieres pardon the Plowman • redde quod debes.
"TbTxIX.178-182)
Even more emphatically, Grace (the Holy Spirit, or gratia
increata) goes on to explain the precise nature of this new
contract between man and God, claiming that all “grace cometh of my 3ifte“ (B.XIX.248), and conferring legal steward
ship upon the Church, represented here by Piers:

For I make Pieres the Plowman • my procuratour and
my reve,
And regystrere to receyue • redde quod debes,
My prowor and my plowman • Piers shal ben on erthe,
And for to tuyle treuthe • a teme shal he haue.1
(B.XIX.253-256)
Grace then gives Piers four sturdy oxen, the four evange
lists, and four large bullocks, the four great Western
Fathers, for his “teme.11

Eut all is not well.

The Anti-

Christ appears in Passus XX, and the Church is unable to
protect itself against his onslaught because of weakness
and dissension within.

Finally, Conscience goes in search

of Piers, praying for grace, as the poem ends:

•Bi Cryste,1 quod Conscience tho • 'I wil bicome a
pilgryme,
And walken as wyde • as al the worlde lasteth,
To seke Piers the Plowman • that Pryde may destruye,
And that freres hadde a fyndyng • that for nede
flateren,

And contrepleteth me, Conscience; • now Kynde me
auenge,
And sende me happe and hele • til I haue Piers the
Plowman!’
And sitthe he gradde after grace • til I gan awake.
(B.XX.378-384)
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Taken as a whole, Piers Plowman is a long investi
gation of the relationship between God and man.

In the

course of the poem, Langland takes up several subjects which
are not pertinent to this analysis, but the doctrine of
grace and merit is, as we have seen, one of his main con*
cerns.

Langland does not opt for one extreme pole or the

other in the fourteenth-century controversy between conser
vative Augustinians and radical Ockhamists, nor does he try
to avoid the problem altogether or pass it off in a few
facile lines.

The poem may perhaps be read as an extended

dialectic in which various positions are allowed to present
themselves and to oppose one another, with the hope that
out of this opposition would come some resolution of the
problem of grace and merit.

Though it would be unrealistic

to push It too far, the general outline of this dialectic
seems to follow a definite pattern.

The Vislo serves to

define the doctrinal problem and to raise the questions
that the Vita will attempt to answer.

After the issue of

Piers* pardon, the search for Dowel is basically a search
for ways in which a: man may merit salvation, with meritum
de congruo getting most of the attention.

In the section

on Dobet, the search concentrates more heavily on meritum
de condigno. though the value of man*s will and his works
are also accounted for.

Finally, Dobest represents how

man may ideally merit salvation (de condigno) through the
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offices of the Church, whose power has been extablished de
potentla Del ordinata.

Piers Plowman is thus not only an

important Middle English poem:

it is just as significantly

a contribution to late medieval thought.

Chapter IV:

Chaucer

Many scholars have studied Chaucer's philosophical
and religious thought, but their labors have generally been
confined to three areas: his use of Boethius' Be consola1
tlone phllosophlae. his possible sympathy with Wyclif and
2
the Lollards,
and his indebtedness to certain Church
Fathers for some of his poetic themes and for the tech
niques of patristic exegeses.^

no

one has yet investigated

in detail Chaucer's relation to the great intellectual cri
ses of his own time, however, and the much-needed study of
^-Among the most prominent studies are Bernard L. Jeffer
son, Chaucer and the Consolation of Philosophy (Princeton*
1917); Howard R. Patch, The Tradition of Boethius: A Study
of His Importance in Medieval Culture iNew York, 1935);
Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences, 2nd
ed. (New York, I960); Theodore A . Stroud, "Boethius' Influ
ence on Chaucer's Troilus," MP,XLIX (:'951“ 52), 1-9» and
Eruce L. Grenberg, "The Canon Yeoman's Tale: Boethian Wis
dom and the Alchemists," Chaucer Review. I (Summer, 1966),

37-54.
2There is an excellent summary of this controversy in
Roger S. Loomis, "Was Chaucer a Laodicean?" in 5ssays and
Studies in Honor of Carleton Brown (New York, 1940), pp.
129-1^8. See also W. A. Pantin, The English Church in the
Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1955).
^For this approach in general, see the references listed
in Chapter II, note 1. For two of its most successful
applications to Chaucer, see D.W. Robertson, Jr., A Preface
to Chaucer (Princeton, 1963) and Bernard F. Huppe, A Read
ing of the Canterbury Tales (Albany, 1964).
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his place In fourteenth-century thought remains to he writ
ten.
Virtually everyone claims that Chaucer is securely
orthodox, though at the same time frequently critical of
various malpractices in the late medieval Church.

This

judgment is confirmed when we examine his position on grace
and merit.

He avoids the stimulating speculations of the

Pearl-uoet and Langland, which are sometimes perilously
close to heresy, and seems reluctant to question traditional
doctrines, though he often makes use of them in his poems.
If we wished to compare him with an important fourteenthcentury philosopher or theologian, we could probably find
no one more suitable than Richard FitzRalph.

For like Fitz-

Ralph, Chaucer avoids the extremes of either the Ockhamists
or the conservative Augustinians in favor of a safe middle
ground between the two.

This does not mean, of course, that

Chaucer followed FitzRalph's teaching on any specific issue
to which we can point with confidence, but rather that both
men succeeded in contributing to the great debate over
grace and merit without becoming directly involved with the
principal disputants or proposing creative new positions of
their own.
The aspect of the problem of grace and merit that
seems to have interested Chaucer most is the question of
future contingents.

This had long been an issue in medieval

philosophy, one which Chaucer was evidently familiar with
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through reading Augustine and Boethius, but it took a novel
turn in the fourteenth century.

Basically, the question

asks what the relation is between God's foreknowledge, from
all eternity, of every action that man will perform and
man's capacity to act as a free moral agent.

In terms of

grace and merit, the issue is whether man's merits are de
termined by God's grace or, conversely, man may in some
fashion merit salvation by excercising free moral choice.
Bradwardine and Wyclif, as might be expected, insisted on
a strict doctrine of predestination, virtually excluding
any real merit on man's part, because they considered this
necessary to preserve their doctrines of divine omnipotence
h
and the absolute requirement of grace for salvation.
On
the other side, the Ockhamlsts chose to soften the tradi
tional insistence on divine foreknowledge in order to pro
mote their doctrines of God's absolute power, including the
power to change his mind about how future events should work
out, and of man's hope for salvation through meritum de congruo.

Although Ockham himself never went so far, some of

his followers, such as Buckingham and Adam of Woodham, spe
culated that God did not know all future events with abso
lute certainty.^
**Xeff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, pp. 103-109; Rob
son, pp,201-20?.
-*Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. pp. 23^2^0, 25025^.
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We could assume a priori that a man of Chaucer’s
learning and interests would have been aware of this contro
versy, but the point is put beyond question by his own
statement in the N u n ’s Priest’s Tale:^
But what that God forwoot moot nedes bee,
After the opinioun of certein clerkis.
Witnesse on hym that any parflt clerk is,
That in scole is greet altercacioun
In this mateere, and greet disputisoun,
And hath been of an hundred thousand men.
But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn,
Or Boece, or the Blsshop Bradwardyn,
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng,—
"Nedely" clepe I symple necessitee;
Or elles, if free choys be graunted me
To dp that same thyng, or do it noght,
Though God forwoot it er that I was wroght;
Or if his wityng streyneth never a deel
But by necessitee condieioneel.
(VII.323^-50)
Though in the very nest line he refuses to take a stand of
his own— "I wol nat han to do of swich mateere” (VII.3251)—
the passage quoted is sufficient to prove both that Chaucer
knew of the fame of this debate and that he clearly under
stood its implications.

Still, it is one thing to be aware

of a well-known dispute, even to have some knowledge of the
various positions, but it is quite different to be fully
familiar with the actual writings of

the men involved.

One

has only to think of how many of our

own contemporaries

com

ment, apparently with great erudition, on such subjects as
^All quotations are from F. N. Robinson, ed. The Works
of Geoffrey Chaucer, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1957TI
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existentialism, Freudian psychology, or Bonhoeffer’s theo
logy who have never read any primary texts by an existen
tialist, Freud, or Bonhoeffer.

Similarly, it is impossible

for us to know how much first-hand acquaintance Chaucer had
with the works of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Ockham, Buckingham,
and other controversialists of the time.

Very little has

actually been done on this subject by modern scholars, ex
cept for the brief, random comments such as we find in
7

Patch's and Bloomfield's articles on Trollus and Crlseyde.
Since Chaucer himself makes no further specific allusions
beyond the one quoted above, we must go to his works them
selves to see what evidence they may yield.

The question of divine providence and human freedom,
another way of stating the problem of grace and merit, comes
up again and again in Chaucer.

In the Knight's Tale, for

example, after Palamon has been released from prison, Arcite
tries to assuage his grief at his own plight in the follow
ing speech:
Allas, why pleynen folk so in commune
On purveiaunce of God, or of Fortune,
That yeveth hem ful ofte in many a gyse
Wei bettre than they kan hemself devyse?
Som man desireth for to han richesse,
That cause is of his mordre or greet siknesse;
And som man wolde out of his prisoun fayn,
That in his hous is of his meynee slayn.
Infinite harmes been in this mateere.

^Howard R. Patch, "Troilus on Predestination," JEGP XVII
(1918), ^06-^10; Morton W. Bloomfield, "Distance and Predes
tination in Troilus and Crlseyde." PMLA, LXXII (1957), 2 3 .
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We witen nat what thing we preyen heere:
We faren as he that dronke is as a mous.
A dronke man woot wel he hath an hous,
But he noot which the rlghte wey is thlder,
And to a dronke man the wey is slider.
And certes, in this world so faren we;
We seken faste after felicitee,
But we goon wrong ful often, trewely.
(1.1251-67)
Man, Arcite argues, may wish one thing or another, and he
may sometimes achieve and sometimes fail in his expectations.
But man is "blind to what is truly "best for himself; this
can "be decided by God alone.

Already we may see a sugges

tion of the kind of realism we usually associate with Augus
tine and his many followers in the Middle Ages.

All things

are known eternally in the divine mind, and what happens
here on earth is simply the working out of what has existed
asidea in God,

who is outside of time.

But such a position inevitably leads to conplicatlons, and Chaucer does not fail to point these out.

Pala-

mon, though free to return to his own country, may not re
main to seek Emelye’s love.

Thus, for him, the seeming good

of his liberty is actually evil:
Thanne seyde he, ”0 crueel goddes that governe
This world with byndyng of youre word eterne,
And writen in the table of atthamaunt
Youre parlement and youre eterne graunt,
What is mankynde moore unto you holde
Than is the sheep that rouketh in the folde?
For slayn is man right as another beest,
And dwelleth eek in prison and arreest,
And hath siknesse and greet adversltee,
And ofte tymes giltelees, pardee.
What governance is in this prescience,
That giltelees tormenteth innocence?
And yet encresseth this al my penaunce,
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That man is bounden to his observaunce,
For Goddes sake, to letten of his wille,
Ther as a beest may al his lust fulfille.
And whan a beest is deed he hath no peyne;
Eut man after his deeth moot wepe andpleyne,
Though in this world he have cate andwo.
VJithouten doute it may stonden so.
(I.1303-22

This raises a new problem:

if God’s foreknowledge is the

ultimate cause of all events in his creation, then God would
appear to be the source of evil.

Augustine had writhed in

uncertainty over this same point, the biggest single factor
impeding his conversion to Christianity for several years.
O

He records his anxiety in the Confessions. and the solution
o

he offered in De llbero arbltrlo. written shortly after he
embraced the faith, remained the orthodox standard in the
Church throughout the Middle Ages

and even beyond.However,

the problem was raised anew by the conservative Augustinlans
in the fourteenth century, as it was to be raised again in
the seventeenth century "by conservative Augustinlans.

For

if, in order to combat the Ockhamists, Bradwardine's "modern
Pelagians," it seemed necessary for conservatives to stress
the overwhelming power of divine grace, then the consequent
lessening of human freedom placed the responsibility for
evil back on God.

This is the significance of Falamon’s

comments on God’s "eterne graunt," which causes "greet

^Especially in Bk. V, ch. 10; Bk. VII, ch. 3 and ch. 12.
9See 3.7-71; 1.16.115; 2.19.199.
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adversitee" for even "giltelees” men.

Some might reply that

Palamon is, after all, a pagan and could not be expected
to achieve Christian insight „nto the problem.

Eut such a

reply would not explain the obviously Christian reference
to punishment in the afterlife toward the end of the pas
sage.

Such punishment is inexplicable if God is the source

of evil, and if man is incapable of acting as a free moral
agent.

Far from being "pagan,” this is a very neat reductio

of Bradwardine’s doctrine of grace.

Still, Chaucer refuses,

as in the Nun1s Priests Tale, to press his point any fur
ther:
The answere of this lete I to dyvynys,
But wel I woot that in this world greet pyne ys.
(1.1323-24)

This is an interesting instance of Chaucer’s strategy when
advancing arguments that might prove theologically contro
versial.

He seems to withdraw in favor of the "dyvynys,”

but at the same time he has clearly articulated the outlines
of his argument.
Finally, we come to the famous speech of Theseus at
the end of the tale.

This has long been associated with the

alleged "influence" of Boethius on Chaucer, a relationship
that I feel has been greatly exaggerated and perhaps just
as greatly misunderstood.

Chaucer does indeed fairly closely

paraphrase part of the De consolatlone phllosophlae in this

s p e e c h , a s he also does In several other poems, "but this
is not sufficient ground for inferring that Chaucer was al
ways approving of what he found in his source, or that he
was slavishly following Boethius' ideas without seeing in
them fourteenth-century implications which Boethius could
not have foreseen.

It is difficult, for example, to see

how Chaucer could have missed the significance for his own
times of the following lines from Theseus' speech:
What maketh this but Juppiter, the kyng,
That is prince and cause of alle thyng,
Convertyng al unto his propre welle
From which it is dirryved, sooth to telle?
And heer-agayns no creature on lyve.
Of no degree, availleth for to stryve.
(1.3035-40)

Theseus then goes on to recommend a very specific course of
action for man to follow, which closely parallels Bradwar
dine 's doctrine of grace and meritum de condigno:
Thanne is it wysdom, as it thynketh me,
To maken vertu of necessitee,
And take it weel that we may nat eschue,
And namely that to us alle is due.
And whoso gruccheth ought, he dooth folye,
And rebel is to hym that al may gye.
(1.3041-46)

Man may be at times so perverse that he "gruccheth," but his
salvation rests in his passive submission to God's will.
There is no suggestion here of man's own

merits, only of the

power of God's grace.

evident inTheseus'

This is even more

conclusion:

iOEoethius, ii, m. 8; iv, pr. 6; m. 6; 111, pr. 10
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What may I conclude of this longe serye,
But after wo I rede us to he merye,
And thanken Juppiter of al his grace?
(1.3067-69)
None of Chaucer's alert contemporaries could have been de
ceived by the reference to Jupiter in the context of such
a discussion.

This is clearly the Christian God we are

dealing with:

the Lord of History, who works all things

to his will by virtue of his grace, who has known all things
from all eternity, and who may freely choose to extend his
grace to whom he wishes.

This is the God of Archbishop

Bradwardine.
The Knight1s Tale, however, is still a fairly early
work in the Chaucer canon, and his views on grace and merit,
providence and freedom, expanded and became more complex as
his understanding of the problem deepened.

In Troilus and

Crlseyde. which comes from roughly the same period in Chau
cer's career, we already see some diversity in his approach
developing.

The most famous discussion of the problem of

providence and necessity comes in Book IV, after Troilus has
learned of his reversal of fortune.

Pandarus, ever sanguine,

tries to reason his friend out of his despair by arguing
that man does have some control over his own destiny:
Thenk ek Fortune, as wel thiselven woost,
Helpeth hardy man to his enprise,
And weyveth wrecches for hire cowardise.
(IV.600-602)
Pandarus is for action, which of course implies a certain
measure of freedom with which action could be meaningfully
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performed.

Not long after, however, Troilus responds with

his speech on necessity, perhaps the most often quoted pas
sage in the poem.
Troilus begins by presenting his own position before
going on to consider possible objections and alternatives:
"For al that comth, comth by necessitee:
Thus to ben lorn, it is my destinee.
"For certeynly, this wot I wel,"he seyde,
"That forsight of divine purveyaunce
Hath seyn alwey me to forgon Criseyde,
Syn God seeth every thyng, out of doutance,
And hem disponyth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothly for to be,
As they shul comen by predestyne.
(IV.958-966)

As with the Knightfs Tale. Chaucer is once again following
a passage from Eoethius rather closely,11 but this should
not blind us to the fact that Chaucer was writing such a
passage in the fourteenth century.

In his own historical

context, Chaucer could not have written Troilus* speech
without understanding its implications as a comment on the
fourteenth-century debate over grace and merit, no matter
what his literary "source" may have been.

This is unmistak

able as Troilus goes on to say,
"Eut natheles, alias! whom shal I leeve?
For ther ben grete clerkes many oon,
That destyne thorugh argumentes preve;
And som men seyn that, nedely, ther is noon,
But that fre chols is yeven us everychon.
0, welaway! so sleighe arn clerkes olde,
That I not whos opynyoun I may holde.
(iv.967-973)
11Eoethius, v, pr. 2 and 3 .

Aside from the rhetorical deception (Chaucer knows full well
which "clerkes" Troilus will favor in this dispute), Troi
lus does extablish two sides to the argument.

The first

side, that of the predestinarian theologians such as Brad
wardine and Wyclif, is set forth as follows:
"For som men seyn, if God seth al biforn,
Ne God may nat deceyved ben, parde,
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworn,
That purveiance hath seyn before to be.
Wherfore I sey, that from eterne if he
Hath wist byfom oure thought ek as oure dede,
We han no fre chois, as thise clerkes rede.
"For other thought, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere mo,
Hath feled byforn, withouten ignoraunce.
For yf ther myghte ben a variaunce
To writhen out fro Goddls purveyinge,
Ther nere no .prescience of thyng comynge,
"Eut it were rather an opynyoun
Uncerteyn, and no stedfast forseynge.
(IV.97^-989)

The real motive behind this argument is a desire to preserve
the doctrine of God's eternal omniscience, to protect God
from the moderai. even if this means eliminating "fre
chois."

It is well for us to recall here that some of the

more extreme Ockhamists, notably Buckingham and Adam of
Voodham, were willing to take the other half of the God-man
relationship, limiting God's foreknowledge in order to pre
serve man's freedom.

The next lines could not, perhaps,

be a more explicit condemnation of their position unless
Troilus had identified them by name— which surely would have
been odd for an ancient Trojan warrior to have done:

And certes, that were an abusioun,
That God sholde han no parfit cler wytynge
More than we men that han doutous wenynge
Eut swich an errour upon God to gesse
Were fals and foul, and wikked corsednesse.
(IV.990-99*0
Thus does Troilus dispatch the problem of future contingents.
Chaucer, of course, enjoys the protection of the rhetorical
device of using Troilus to voice these opinions.

No one

could accuse this amiable diplomat of holding a potentially
dangerous opinion in his own time, nor can we in ours
facilely attribute the same to the poet behind the character
in the poem.

Still, Chaucer’s contemporaries, at least

those who were well read and sensitive to the chief ideas
of the time, must have recognized his cunning adaptation of
the debate over grace and merit to the artistic structure
of his poem.
Another problem remains, however, since both the
Knight’s Tale and Troilus and Crlseyde deal with pagans.
We might well ask how grace and merit can be considered a
serious doctrinal theme in these poems if their central
characters are never represented as having direct knowledge
of the Christian faith, and if, as unbaptised heathen, they
might not receive the grace ordinarily required for salva
tion.

In St. Erkenwald and Piers Plowman, as we have seen,

the issue of good pagans was sometimes raised in the context
of the debate over grace and merit.

Some thinkers could

appeal to the potentla Del absoluta to accept the de congruo

merit of a righteous pagan as sufficient for salvation, but
such a teaching at least bordered closely on Pelagianism.
Chaucer skillfully avoids the problem by neither awarding
his good pagans heaven nor condemning them to hell, thus
safeguarding his religious orthodoxy and not alienating
his readers' sympathy for these characters at the same time.
This

is the compromise of the tactful artist, not the bold

ness

of the searching critic. Such, on this level at

least,

is the difference between Chaucer and Langland.
Toward the end of the Knight's Tale, for example,
we meet

the following account of Arcite*s death:

His spirit chaunged hous and wente ther,
As I cam nevere, I kan nat tellen wher.
Therfore I stynte, I nam no divinistre;
Of soules fynde I nat in this registre,
Ne me ne list thilke opinions to telle
Of hem, though that they writen wher they dwelle.
Arcite is coold, ther Mars his soule gye!
(1.2809-15)
Chaucer refuses to discuss the issue, even to present the
opinions of others on the subject of the final disposition
of souls.

He merely consigns Arcite's soul to Kars, rather

than to one of the angels, and retreats behind his now famil
iar rhetorical pose:

"I nam no divinistre."

Still, he does

allow that God will send his love, or grace, to those who
merit it, observing that this is the reason for Palamon's
final happiness wf :h Emelye:
And God, that al this wyde world hath wroght,
Sende hym his love that hath it deere aboght;
For now is Palamon in alle wele,
Lyvynge in blisse, in richesse, and in heele,

And Emelye hym loveth so tendrely,
And he hire serveth al so gentilly,
That nevere was ther no word hem bitwene
Of jalousie or any oother teene.
(I.3099-3306)
Palamon has not simply earned Emelye; he has merited God's
favor (de congruo), and God in turn has elected to reward
Palamon with "Lyvynge in blisse."

It would be tempting to

take this suggestion and apply it to Arcite as well, arguing
that if one can merit God's good will, perhaps the other
might also.

This could, I suppose, admit the inference that

God would, de potentla absoluta. possibly elect Arcite on
the basis of meritum de congruo— except that Chaucer has
already refused to entertain this possibility himself.
The case of Troilus and Crlseyde is rather different.
A great deal has been written about Chaucer's contrast be
tween earthly and heavenly love, especially by critics try
ing to reconcile the structural problem in the poem.

The

first four and a half books of Troilus seem, according to
this view, to represent one ethos, while the "palinode'1 at
the end suggests quite another.

This seems to be the famil

iar theme of caritas versus cupldltas. which pervades so
much medieval literature.12 In spite of Its popularity in
recent years, this attempt to explain the poem remains quite
unsatisfactory because, even though Chaucer does define the
limits of human love by contrast with God's love, he never
12

See Augustine's De Genes1 ad lltteram. 11.35*20; and
also De civitate Dei. XIV, 28.

condemns Troilus for loving as he did, nor does he categori
cally condemn earthly love per se.

After all, for Troilus

at least, human love is more than the "feyned" emotion that
Chaucer contrasts with Christian charity,

Troilus operates

within the only context he knows, and for him, unlike Criseyde, Pandarus, or Diomede, love has a spiritual quality
that transcends sexual experience alone,

Troilus* concep

tion of love comes, in fact, as close to the Christian con
cept of caritas as was theologically tenable without a spe
cial infusion of grace from the Holy Spirit,
In terms of a theology of grace and merit, this high,
though non-Christian, ideal of love has several very inter
esting Implications,

First, Chaucer uses the Christian

doctrine of God's conversion of man through grace as a model
to emphasize the dignity of Troilus1 love»

In Book III, as

a comment on the Joyous union between Crlseyde and himself,
Troilus celebrates the cosmic power of love:
"Love, that of erthe and se hath governaunce.
Love, that his hestes hath in hevenes hye,
Love, that with an holsom alliaunce
Halt peples Joyned, as hym lest hem gye,
Love, that knetteth lawe of compaignie,
And couples doth in vertu for to dwelle,
Bynd this acord, that I have told and telle.
"That that the world with feith, which that is
stable,
Dlverseth so his stowndes concordynge,
That elementz that ben so discordable
Holden a bond perpetuely durynge,
That Phebus mote his rosy day forth brynge,
And that the mone hath lordshlpe over the
nyghtes,—
Al this doth Love, ay heried be his myghtesi

"That that the se, that gredy is to flowen,
Constreyneth to a certeyn ende so
His flodes that so fiersly they ne growen
To drenohen erthe and al for evere mo;
Al that now loveth asondre sholde lepe,
And lost were al that Love halt now to-hepe.
(111.1744-64)
It Is hard to see how this could he either ignored or ex
plained away as cupldltas in any serious, thoroughgoing
analysis of the poem.

Troilus, pagan though he may he, has

a distinctly spiritual understanding of love as the great
cosmic force that hinds all the diverse elements of the
universe into a coherent whole.

Further, he goes on to

point out that God extends his love to all his creatures in
order to convert them hy its power and hind them in a new
moral relationship:
"So wolde God, that auotour is of kynde,
That with his hond Love of his vertu liste
To cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde,
That from his hond no wight the wey out wlste;
And hertes colde, hem wolde I that he twiste
To make hem love, and that hem liste ay rewe
On hertes sore, and kepe hem that hen trewe!"
(III.1765-71)
The sentiment expressed here, though paraphrased from a
passage in Boethius,1^ has its roots in Augustine and the
Platonic tradition.

Here is Augustine*s God, who seeks out

his creatures because of his perfect love for them, so that
he might "cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde."

According

ly, Chaucer and his fourteenth-century readers could scarce
ly have failed to recognize the implicit conception of grace
13Cf. note 10, above.

In Troilus*

'•hymn.11

Next, the narrator goes on to reveal how Troilus,
as a result of his internal, spiritual conversion, has "been
energized to perform meritorious works:
In alle nedes, for the townes werre,
He was, and ay, the first in armes dyght,
A n d certeynly, but if that bokes erre,
Save Ector most ydred of any wight;
And this encrees of hardynesse and myght
Com hym of love, his ladies thank to wynne,
That altered his spirit so withinne.
(III.1772- 7 8 )
These actions are, of course, to be expected of a knight
who lives up fully to the chivalric code, and as such they
might seem by themselves to have little moral value, at
least from a Christian point of view.

But these are not

the only manifestations of his conversion.

Even more sig

nificantly, the narrator also observes that
A n d moost of love and vertu was his speche,
And in despit hadde alle wrecchednesse;
A n d douteles, no nede was hym biseche
To honouren hem that hadde worthynesse.
And esen hem that weren in destresse.

(111.1786-90 )

Besides these clearly charitable attitudes and actions, we
even learn how Troilus has now become able to purge himself
of sins
A nd though that he be come of blood roial,
Hjjrm liste of pride at no wight for to chace;
Benigne he was to ech in general.
For which he gat hym thank in every place.
Thus wolde Love, yheried be his grace.
That Pride, Envye, and Ire, and Avarice
He gan to fie, and everich other vice.
(III.1800-6)

1^4

in Troilus1 ''hymn.’1
Next, the narrator goes on to reveal how Troilus,
as a result of his internal, spiritual conversion, has been
energized to perform meritorious works:
In alle nedes, for the townes werre,
He was, and ay, the first in armes dyght.
And certeynly, but if that bokes erre.
Save Ector most ydred of any wight;
And this encrees of hardynesse and myght
Com hym of love, his ladies thank to wynne,
That altered his spirit so withinne.
(III.1772-7 8 )
These actions are, of course, to be expected of a knight
who lives up fully to the chivalrlc code, and as such they
might seem by themselves to have little moral value, at
least from a Christian point of view.

But these are not

the only manifestations of his conversion.

Even more sig

nificantly, the narrator also observes that
And moost of love and vertu was his speche,
And in despit hadde alle wrecchednesse;
And douteles, no nede was hym blseche
To honouren hem that hadde worthynesse,
And esen hem that weren in destresse.
(III.1786-9 0 )
Besides these clearly charitable attitudes and actions, we
even learn how Troilus has now become able to purge himself
of sin:
And though that he be come of blood roial,
EJm liste of pride at no wight for to chace;
Benigne he was to ech in general.
For which he gat hym thank in every place.
Thus wolde Love, yherled be his grace,
That Pride, Envye, and Ire, and Avarice
He gan to fie, and everich other vice.
(III.1800-6)

1^5

The Christian doctrine of grace is so obvious in this pas
sage that it hardly need be pointed out.

According to or

thodox tradition, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the
sinner may be reclaimed by God's loving grace (gratia gratis
data), in terms of which the man may perform naturally good
works that merit God's further favor, ex natura rel debita,
in the form of Justifying grace (gratia gratum faclens)
with which the converted sinner can perform supematurally
good actions.

In the passage Just quoted, Troilus does per

form such supematurally good actions for, as Augustine
constantly pointed out, he could not avoid sin without the
llbertas that comes only from God's special infusion of
grace.^

This raises a rather disturbing problem since

Chaucer has attributed to Troilus actions that could not,
according to orthodox doctrine, be performed by anyone who
\

had not already been baptized.

To argue that Troilus could

do so without the sacrament is Pelagian; to argue that he
received a special dispensation, de potentla Del absoluta.
as did the magistrate in St. Erkenwald and Trajan in Piers
Plowman, is to agree with the Ockhamlsts that a good pagan
could earn Justifying grace through merltum de congruo.
Chaucer, as we might expect, refuses both alternatives.
sidesteps the whole issue, or at least the responsibility
for answering it, by attributing these passages to his
I**
Enchiridion. 30-32.

He
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literary source:

at the very end of the section, he lays

it all in the hands of "myn auctour" (III.1837).
At the end of the poem, finally, Chaucer reminds
us of the orthodox position on grace and merit:

only

through

union with Christ, presumably in the Church, may we aspire
to God's love and respond by works that may acheive meritum
de condlgno:
0 yonge, fresshe foldes, he or she.
In which that love up groweth with youre age,
Repeyreth horn fro worldly vanyte,
And of youre herte up aasteth the visage
To thilke God that after his ymage
Yow made, and thynkethed. nys but a faire
This world, that passeth soone as floures faire.
And loveth hym, the which that right for love
Upon a crois, oure soules for to beye,
First starf, and roos, and sit in hevene above;
For he nyl falsen no wight, dar I seye.
That wol his herte al holly on hym leye.
And syn he best to love is, and most meke.
What nedeth feynede loves for to seke?
(V. 1 8 3 5 - W
There is nothing original here, nor, perhaps, do we have a
right to expect some startling new doctrinal speculation
from Chaucer at this point.

Against the Ockhamists he

expresses confidence in the potentla Del ordlnata:

God will

not, as some of the radicals claimed, use his potentla abso
lute to overturn or contradict what he has ordained because
"he nyl falsen no wight."

At the same time, Chaucer draws

a contrast between carltas and cupldltas. between Christ's
redemption and "feynede loves."

He reinforces this distinc

tion by condemning the religious rites of the pagans of
ancient Troy:

1^7

Lo
Lo
Lo
Lo
Of

here,
here,
here,
here,
Jove,

of payens corsed olde rites,
what alle hire goddes may availle;
thlse wrecched worides appetites;
the fyn and guerdon for travallle
Appollo, of Mars, of swlch rascallle!
(V.18^9-53)

Many critics have recognized the problem with this "palinode," some arguing that It Introduces an Inconsistency In
the ethical stance of the poem as a whole*'* and others re
plying that such a moral Judgment as Chaucer makes at the
end Is Implicit in the poem from the very beginning.1**
Neither group manages to solve the difficulty altogether and
so, while I have no pretensions to answering the question to
everyone*s satisfaction here, I would like to put it in a
different light than has usually been offered.1^
It seems inconsistent with the high conception of
Troilus* spiritual love that we saw earlier to argue that
this, like the obviously "feynede loves" of Criseyde and
Diomede, is rank cupidity and deserves Chaucer's ccndemnatlon
15For example, C# S. Lewis' famous comment in The Alle
gory of Love (Oxford, 1936):
"We hear the bell clang; and
the children, suddenly hushed and grave, and a little frigh
tened, troop back to their master" (p. 4-3).
16
A good example is Eugene E. Slaughter, "Love and Grace
in Chaucer's Troilus." in Essays In Honor of Walter Clyde
Curry. Vanderbilt Studies in the Humanities, II (Nashville,

vm pp• 6i-?6.

17
rMy interpretation is similar to Slaughter's and the
excellent study by T. P# Dunning, "God and Man in Troilus
and Criseyde." in English and Medieval Studies Presented
to J . R . R. Tolkien on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birth
day, ed. Norman Davis and C. L. Wrenn (London, 1962), pp.
T35-182.
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at the end.

The same patristic tradition that censured

cupidity also recognized that the pagans were, like Chris-:
tians, under divine providence and sometimes showed remark
able witness to God through philosophical insight or leading
excellent lives.

Augustine, for example, carefully allowed

that some of the pagans might even be a source of divine
revelation, though obviously of not equal authority with
the Scripture.
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And so there was a clear precedent for

Chaucer, if he wished to follow it, to glorify the high
spiritual values of a good pagan while at the same time
lamenting that same man*s inability to share in the Church
Triumphant.

Chaucer achieves this delicate balance, I thinly

by a very subtle rhetoric.
After the "palinode," Chaucer neatly dodges respon
sibility for applying its sententia to Troilus by once again
retreating behind his literary source:
Lo here, the forme of olde clerkis speche
In poetrle, if ye hire bokes seche.
(V.18 5*K55)
By this device, Chaucer may disavow any charge that he has
personally censured the love of the very man whom he had
earlier praised so highly.

Further, it is interesting to

note the final disposition of Troilus* soul, which is here
so specifically described, and contrast it with the Indefi
niteness of Arcite*s afterlife in the Knight *s Tale. Tfcbilhs,

*®De doctrlna Christiana. 2.18.28.

1^9

i

unlike Arclte, Is much more clearly a moral hero as well as
a valorous knight,

Pandarus even says of him that he might

become a great saint, using language which has obvious
Christian reference:
Lat nat this wrecched wo thyn herte gnawe,
But manly sette the world on six and sevene;
And if thow deye a martyr, go to hevenef
(IV.621- 623)
But Chaucer, as a Christian who wishes to preserve his or
thodoxy, may not send Troilus to heaven.

The extra ecclesla

nulla salus concept was still much too strong in Christian
thought to allow any but the most daring thinkers to specu
late beyond it.

So, as usual, Chaucer evades the issue by

granting Troilus the reward of ascending to the eighth sphere
after death.

This is really an ambiguous solution, however,

since there was no allowance for such an afterlife in the
Christian theology.

But it is poetically appropriate to

reward Troilus in this fashion for the good life that he has
led, and it is theologically shrewd to place him in a non10
Christian "heaven." 7 In terms of the doctrine of merit,
Chaucer could not really have represented Troilus as re
ceiving merltum de condigno, but he did show Troilus per
forming good works that would merit, de oongruo. some sort
of divine favor.

Thus, for the half-merit of the pagan

Troilus, Chaucer hits upon the answer of the half-reward of
*^See Morton W. Bloomfield, "The Eighth Sphere: A Note
on Chaucer*s Troilus and Crlsevde. V, 1809," M L R . LIII (195&
^08-^10.
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the eighth sphere*

Nor was this apparently a casual choice

so far as Chaucer was concerned, for there is good evidence
that, since the stanzas describing Troilus' "salvation"
(V.18O7- 27 ) do not appear in the alpha-text of the poem, he
only made this deoision after careful study and delibera-

20
tlon.

Such an addition also improves the structure of the

poem, at least from the perspective of its doctrine, because
without it there is a very clear contradiction between the
way In which Troilus has been treated throughout most of the
poem and Chaucer's moral conclusion.

Thus, while we may not

applaud him for any stimulating new insights into the prob
lem of grace and merit, we must admire Chaucer's artistic
ingenuity in solving this problem in Troilus and Criseyde.
Interesting as these speculations about poems treat
ing good pagans may be, it is when we turn to his good
Christians that we clearly see Chaucer's doctrine of grace
and merit.

Several of the Canterbury Tales deal directly

with this doctrine and here, as in the poems we have already
considered, Chaucer is always cautiously conservative.
Though he seems at times to lean toward Bradwardlne, he
never goes to the predestinarian extremes of the Doctor
Profundus.

Chaucer evidently has no sympathy with the radi

cal Ockhamlsts, but at the same time he avoids gravitating to
the opposite pole in the dispute.

^®See Robinson's note, p. 912.

For Chaucer, God Indeed

151

must send man grace as a prerequisite for any meritorious
works that might earn eternal salvation.

Still, man has a

responsibility to God as well, to respond freely and lov
ingly to the gift of graoe and, with its help, both to avoid
sin and to live a life of charity and submission to God*s
will.
Chaucer perhaps never comes closer to Bradwardine1s
teaching on grace than in the Man of L a w fs Tale, with its
long description of how Custance endures unbelievable hard
ships with Christian submission of her will to God*s provi
dence, assisted as she is by divine grace.

After the

slaughter of the party from Rome, for example, she is put
into an open, rudderless boat to be set out to sea, and her
prayer sums up her attitude throughout the poem:
She blesseth hire, and with ful pitous voys
Unto the croys of Crist thus seyde she:
"0 cleere, o welful autur, hooly croys,
Reed of the Lambes blood ful of pitee,
That wessh the world fro the olde inlquitee,
Me fro the feend and fro his clawes kepe.
That day that I shal drenchen in the depe.
Victorious tree, proteccioun of trewe,
That oonly worthy were for to bere
The Kyng of Hevene with his woundes newe,
The white Lamb, that hurt was with a spere,
Flemere of feendes out of hym and here
On which thy lymes feithfully extenden,
Me kepe, and ylf me myght my lyf t'amenden."
(II.^ 9 - ^ 6 2 )
This kind of prayer was quite common, of course, in the
Middle Ages, and the only thing distinctive about it from
our point of view here is that Custance, bereft of any power
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to save herself, places herself utterly In the hands of God.
This implies an attitude toward grace and merit which goes
beyond the immediate, literal circumstances of Custance in
the story.

She represents the type of the good Christian,

faced with the many adversities and uncertainties of life
in this world, who must rely on divine grace rather than
human merit in the hope of ultimate salvation.

Such a

reading is supported by Chaucer's explanation of why Cus
tance did not perish at sea or,earlier, at the feast:
Men myghten asken why she was nat slayn
Eek at the feeste? who myghte hlr body save?
And 1 answere to that demande agayn.
Who saved Danyel in the horrible cave
Ther every wight save he, malster and knave.
Was with the leon frete er he asterte?
No wight but God, that he bar in his herte.
God liste to shewe his wonderful myracle
In hire, for we sholde seen his myghty werkis;
Crist, which that is to every harm trlacle,
By certeine meenes ofte, as k n o w n clerkls,
Dooth thyng for certeln ende that ful derk is
To marines wit, that for oure Ignorance
Ne konne noght knowe his prudent purvelance.
(11.470-483)
God is all-powerful, and he may extend the power of his
grace to those whom he favors, even if this means performing
miracles in their behalf.

Further, it is unwise to specu

late rashly about how God may execute his will— an interes
ting comment on the many fourteenth-century speculations
of this kind— since it is enough to know that what happens
is a result of God's having willed it.

This is all that

concerns Custance, and this, by extension, is all that need
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concern us as well.

Chaucer never says that Custance does

not have a will of her own, or even the freedom to disobey
God, but he does place such a heavy stress on providence and
grace that any question of freedom and merit seems almost
irrelevant.

If this were all of Chaucer*s poetry that sur

vived, we would probably quite reasonably describe him as a
follower of Bradwardine today.

But we do have other poems

about Christians caught in times of extreme crisis, and
their responses, while not in any sense diminishing the
importance of grace, illustrate how much value Chaucer was
willing to assign to human action.
The Tale of Mellbee is almost the direct opposite of
the story of Custance.

For the allegory of Melibeus drama

tizes the importance of man's free choice, under the guid
ance of Prudence, to regain Christian wisdom, or sapientla
(Sophie).

Accordingly, Prudence describes how Melibeus came

to be attacked ahd his daughter Sophie wounded in the first
place:
Thy name is Melibee, this is to seyn, *a man that
drynketh hony.'/ Thou hast ydrohke so muchel hony of
sweete temporeel rlchesses, and delices and honours
of this world,/ that thou art dronken, and hast forgeten Jhesu Crist thy creatour./ Thou ne hast nat doon
to hym swich honour and reverence as thee oughte,/ ne
thou ne hast nat wel ytaken kep to the wordes of Ovide,
that seith,/ 'Under the hony of the goodes of the body
is hyd the venym that sleeth the soule.'/ And Salomon
seith, 'If thou hast founden hony, ete of it that
sufflseth?/ for if thou ete of it out of mesure, thou
shalt spewe,' and be nedy and povre./ And peraventure
Crist hath thee in despit, and hath turned awey fro
thee his face and his eeris of misericorde;/ and also
he hath suffred that thou hast been punysshed in the
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manere that thow hast ytrespassed./ Thou hast doon
synne agayn oure Lord Crist? for certes, the three
enemys of mankynde, that is to seyn, the flessh, the
feend, and the world,/ thou hast suffred hem entre in
to thyn herte wilfully by the wyndowes of thy body,/
and hast nat defended thyself suffisantly agayns hire
assautes and hire temptaciouns, so that they han
wounded thy soule in fyve places?/ this is to seyn,
the deedly synnes that been entred into thyn herte by
thy fyve wittes./ And in the same manere oure Lord
Crist hath woold and suffred that thy three enemys
been entred into thyn house by the wyndowes,/ and han
ywounded thy doghter in the forseyde manere."/
(VII. liWO-26)
There is here, to be sure, some emphasis on grace, especi
ally in the suggestion that Christ has withdrawn his favor
from Melibeus.

But the most important point is that Meli

beus, a free moral agent capable of performing God's will
to the extent that he knows it, has deliberately allowed
himself to wallow in the "honey of the world, thereby losing
God's support and falling into sin.

In this passage by it

self, however, there is some uncertainty over the kind of
merit that a man may earn and the species of grace required
for such merit.

If, for example, Melibeus had defended him

self sufficiently against temptations from the world, the
flesh, and the devil, could he have avoided sin?

Would such

a defense have required prevenient grace, or is God's friend
ship contingent upon man's actions?
questions is not long in coming:

The answer to these

"For the victorie of ba-

tallles that been in this world lyth nat in greet nombre or
multitude of the peple, ne in the vertu of man,/ but it lith
in the wyl and in the hand of oure Lord God Almyghty"
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(VII,1656- 57)•

It is unthinkable that Chaucer give any

other answer because all orthodox Christians since the time
of Augustine had insisted on making all merits depend ulti
mately on the will of God,

But it is also important to

point out that Chaucer allows man as large a measure of free
dom as possible within the general context of grace, cer*
tainly much more than Bradwardine allowed, or even Chaucer
himself in the Man of Law's Tale.

In fact, the whole alle

gory of the Tale of Mellbee implicitly demands a doctrine
of human merit based on an understanding of man as a free
moral agent.

Otherwise, it is hard to see the artistic

function of Prudence In the tale,or even to see why such a
story would have any reference to the virtue of prudence
at all.
*n

Friar1s Tale, too, there is a clear emphasis

on man's freedom to make responsible moral choices, on the
basis of which his soul will finally be saved or damned.
Again and again, the devil points out to the corrupt summoner that he may not take anyone who performs some sinful,
or perhaps seemingly sinful, action to hell.

It is neces

sary first to determine the subjective guilt of the man, to
learn if he really Intends to turn away from God and lose
his soul in sin.

Only if a man is subjectively, as well as

objectively, guilty of serious sin, may the devil then claim
his soul.

This is equally true of the carter, who curses

his horses without really intending what he says
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(111.15^2-70 ), and of the summoner, whom the devil tells
Now lat us ryde blyve,
For I wole holde compalgnye with thee
Til It be so that thou forsake me.
(III.1520-22 )
Thus, man's moral freedom Is preserved here:

the devil may

■1

accompany the sinner only so long as the sinner himself
allows.

At any point, presumably, the summoner may "for*-

sake" the devil and turn back toward God.

But when his

final opportunity to do so does come, he chooses to go to
hell with the devil rather than to let the widow keep her
pan (III.1630-33).
All this is perfectly in keeping with the teaching
of the friars in the fourteenth century, for the Franciscans
had always been the champions of the theology of their bro
ther William of Ockham.

But the climate of opinion had so

developed by the end of the century that this friar, though
clearly preaching a doctrine of man's freedom— perhaps even
of the summoner's capacity to return to God's favor through
wift-rltum de congruo— feels compelled to conclude his tale
with an orthodox description of man's ultimate need for di
vine grace in the scheme of salvation:
Waketh, and preyeth Jhesu for his grace
So kepe us fro the temptour Sathanas*
Herketh this word! beth war, as in this cas:
"The leoun sit in his awayt alway
To sle the Innocent, if that he may."
Disposeth ay youre hertes to withstonde
The feend, that yow wolde make thral and bonde.
He may nat tempte yow over youre myght,
For Crist wol be youre champion and kn^jht.
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This Is probably as far as one might safely go toward af
firming man's freedom In the stormy religious atmosphere
of the time when Chaucer was writing this tale.

Man has

the power to resist temptation and sin, but he has this
power because, as in Piers Plowman. Christ will be his
knight.

Finally, in terms of its position on grace and mer

it, the Friar's Tale seems quite appropriate to the charac
ter and religious order of its teller, thus adding another
point in favor of the argument that there is a dramatic sui
tability here between tale and teller.
The Summoner1s Tale, which follows immediately, also
presents an interesting view of Chaucer's attitude toward
grace and merit.

The glib and avaricious friar in this

story raises a point which was becoming increasingly dis
turbing to conscientious men in the later Middle Ages.

The

friar, in his attempt to extract as much money as he can
from the people he is visiting, asks for offerings for
masses, trentals, and other prayers that the community of
friars would perform on behalf of the souls of others.

Up

to a point, this practice had long been endorsed in the
Church, but many friars had begun to claim that their pray
ers and masses could control God's will and give the sinner
on whose1behalf they were said a guarantee of salvation:
The clennesse and the fastynge of us freres
Maketh that Crist accepteth oure preyeres.
(III.3833-3*0

This is obviously incompatible with the fourteenth-century
insistence on the potentia Dei absoluta: in fact, such a
view of man's control over God was the principal reason
why the potentla Del absoluta became such a prominent issue
in late medieval theology in the first place.

Chaucer*s

position here and in the Pardoner*s Prologue and Tale is
quite characteristic of his time, as we saw in Piers Plowman
(e.g., B.V.648-651)• and would become increasingly common '
in the next century, finally becoming one of the central
arguments of the Reformation.
If all we were interested in in this chapter were
defining and illustrating Chaucer's place in the controver
sy over grace and merit, we might now turn to the Parson1s
Tale and conclude our discussion.
fascinating point that remains.

But there is an extremely
Chaucer uses his views on

grace and merit in a series of the Canterbury Tales, uniting
them in a thematic "group" similar to his treatment of mar
riage.

The tales involved— those by the Clerk, Franklin,

Physician, and Second N u n - a l l present women in very adverse
circumstances and all dramatize how these women respond to
their suffering in ways that bear directly on the problem
of grace and merit.
The Clerk's Tale has long been relegated by many
Chaucer critics to that limbo where his least successful
works have been consigned.

Though there is some evidence

that the tale is being taken more seriously in recent years,
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most readers seem embarrassed by the submission of Grisllde
to her maniacally overbearing husband Walter.

The typical

defense has been that the medieval mind would more readily
have accepted the story and more enthusiastically have
praised its heroine than we, with our m o d e m attitudes
21
toward female equality and the rights of wives in marriage.
This is not a particularly strong argument, however, because
even in the Middle Ages there was a strong tradition favor
ing the equality, sometimes even the superiority, of women,
as we may see in such diverse works as Pearl, Sir Gawaln and
the Green Knight. The Book of the Duchess» The Parliament of
Fowls■ Troilus and Criseyde. The Knight1s Tale. The Frank
l i n ^ Tale. The Wife of Bath's Tale, and The Second Nun's
Tale.

None of the heroines in these works exhibit the same

behavior as Grisilde, though several of them are also sub
jected to great suffering under conditions of extreme ad
versity.

Part of the problem in understanding the Clerkfs

Tale is, I think, that we have taken it too literally.

The

case for its place in the “marriage group” presupposes a
literal interpretation of Grisilde*s actions as the Clerk*s
response to the Wife of Bath,

22

but if the tale were viewed

in another manner, as an allegory of a Christian*s ideal

21james Sledd, “The Clerk *s Tale: the Monsters and the
Critics," Mg,: LI (1953)* 73-82.
22
This was first proposed, as far as I know, by George
Lyman Kittredge in his famous article, "Chaucer's Discussion
of Marriage," MP, EC (1911-12), 1*35-46?.
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behavior when faced with a conflict between God's will and
man's desire, much of the difficulty for the m o d e m reader
s'm

evaporates.
The evidence of the poem itself points away from
a literal interpretation.

Toward the end, after Walter has

finally satisfied himself that Grisilde is perfectly sub
missive, the narrator comments on the ironic difference
between patient Grisilde and the world of everyday human
beings:
This world is nat so strong, it is no nay,
As it hath been in olde tymes yoore.
And herkneth what this auctour seith therfoore.
(IV.1139-^1)
Grisilde is not a "real" wife who has been arduously, even
cruelly, tested by her husband, a woman who bears cheerfully
even the seeming murder of her children, allows Walter to
displace her in favor of a young bride, and eagerly helps
to make the arrangements for the wedding of his second wife.
Such a Grisilde would be incomprehensible to "real" readers,
medieval and m o d e m alike.

But Grisilde is, according to

the Clerk, rather a female Job.
her circumstances:

Her significance transcends

she is more than Just the suffering wife

of Walter; Grisilde is the type of the Christian struggling
with the problem of evil and finding meaning in her world
by submitting patiently to the potentla Del ordinata.

These

are, I realize, strong claims for Grisilde, but it is Chau
cer himself who first invites the comparison with Job:

Men speke of Job, and moost for his humblesse,
As clerkes, whan hem list, konne wel endite,
Namely of men, but as in soothfastnesse,
Though Clerkes preise wommen but a lite,
Ther kan no man in humblesse hym acquite
As womman kan, ne kan been half so trewe
As womman been, but it be falle of newe.
(IV.932-938)
This reference to Job does not, of course, make Grisilde out
to be nothing more than a stylized personification of "humblesse;" rather it indicates the theological dimensions of
her literal actions and renders them meaningful.

For if we

cannot sympathize with a wife who lets her husband badly
mistreat her, we can respond to her, as Christians, in terms
of the abstract virtues that she represents.

In case we

were in doubt as to what these virtues are, they are made
quite explicit at the end of the tale:
This storie is seyd, nat for that wyves sholde
Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee.
For it were inportable, though they would;
But for that every wight, in his degree,
Sholde be constant in adversitee
As was Grisilde; therfore Petrak writeth
This storie, which with heigh stile he enditeth.
For, sith a womman was so pacient
Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte
Receyven al in gree that God us sent;
For greet skile is, he preeve that he wroghte.
But he ne tempteth no man that he boghte.
As seith Seint Jame, if ye his pistel rede;
He preeveth folk al day, it is no drede,
And suffreth us, as for oure excercise.
With sharpe scourges of adversitee
Ful ofte to be bete in sondry wise;
Nat for to knowe oure wyl, for certes he,
Er we were b o m , knew al oure freletee;
And for oure beste is al his govemaunce.
Lat us thanne lyve in vertuous suffraunc^.
(lV.11^2-62)
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According to divine providence, including God's eternal
foreknowledge of how she would act, Grisilde is tempted to
rebel against the "sharpe scourges of adversitee.”

In

submitting to her husband, however, she is ultimately sub
mitting to the potentla Dei ordlnata. which is responsible
for her "exercise.”

Walter is, perhaps unknowingly, the

agent of providence in proving the moral heroism of his
wife.

Still, we are reminded several times that such "hum-

blesse” is not ordinarily possible for women to acheive by
their own merit (de conaruo). but only through a special
gift of grace that gives them the capacity for such merltum
de condlgno (e.g., IV.206-207, 395. 821-822).

In this

perspective, then, Grisilde no longer appears as a static,
two-dimensional, unbelievable character for whom we must
make awkward apologies.

She now emerges as a potent moral

force, idealized in her but present in the rest of us in
some degree, through which Chaucer allegorizes his doctrine
of providence and freedom, grace and merit.
In the Franklin's Tale. Dorigen behaves quite dif
ferently than Grisilde.

Both are similar in being good

wives, but as a "heathen" (V.1293) Dorigen does not have the
same grace as Grisilde to carry her through her suffering.
Dorigen, too, is faced with evil.

Her husband has gone to

sea, and as she looks at the sharp rocks along the coast she
fears that his ship will be lost and he drowned:
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But whan she saugh the grisly rokkes blake,
For verray feere so wolde hir herte quake
That on hire feet she myghte hire noght sustene.
Thanne wolde she sltte adoun upon the grene,
And pitously Into the see biholde.
And seyn right thus, with sorweful slices colde:
"Eterne God, that thurgh thy purveiaunce
Ledest the world by certeln governaunce.
In ydel, as men seyn., ye no thyng make.
But, Lord, thlse grisly feendly rokkes blake,
That semen rather a foul confusion
Of werk than any fair creaclon
Of swlch a parflt wys God and a stable.
Why han ye wroght this werk unresonable?
For by this werk, south, north, ne west, ne eest,
Ther nys yfostred man, ne bryd, ne beest;
It dooth no good, to my wit, but anoyeth.
Se ye nat, Lord, how mankynde It destroyeth?
An hundred thousand bodyes of mankynde
Han rokkes slayn, al be they nat In mynde,
Which mankynde Is so fair part of thy werk
That thou It madest lyk to thyn owene merk.
Thanne semed it ye hadde a greet chlertee
Toward mankynde; but how thanne may It bee
That ye swlche meenes make it to destroyen,
Whiche meenes do no good, but evere anoyen?
I woot wel clerkes wol seyn as hem leste.
By argumentz,' that al Is for the beste.
Though I ne kan the causes nat yknowe.
But thilke God that made wynd to blowe
As kepe my lord! this Is my conclusion.
To clerkes lete I al dlsputlson.
But wolde God that alle thlse rokkes blake
Were sonken into helle for his sake!
Thlse rokkes sleen myn herte for the feere.*1
(V.859-893)
Dorigen is very much troubled by the problem raised by di
vine providence, for this seems to make God responsible for
evil.

She Is unwilling, or perhaps unable, to resign her

self to the potentla Del ordlnata with the calm and resolute
faith of Grisilde.

Dorigen does not want to leave every

thing to God; she longs to exert some control over the
direction of her own destiny, even if this may be at odds

with eternal providence.

Accordingly!, in her speech quoted

above, in her bargain with Aurelius (v.989-998), and finally
in her brooding over suicide as the only way out of her pre
dicament (V,1355- 1^ 56 ), she Judges experience by her own
needs and desires without ever rising, as Grisilde did, to
a higher moral vantage point from which her petty, though
human, selfishness would appear irrelevant.

She does know

something of the laws of nature, enough at least to realize
that Aurelius has somehow altered natural law by making
the rocks "disappear*' (V.1345), but she has not moved beyond
mere sclentla to the Christian virtue of aaulentla. which
flows from sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faclens).

For

as Augustine taught, in a doctrine that shaped much of
medieval thought, ^empirical knowledge is worthless unless
a man has the wisdom, through grace, to understand the
ultimate significance of the data being considered.2^

Put

another way, this means that even a good person like Dori
gen may learn a great deal about the world about her, but
without the wisdom of Christian faith what she knows may
be confusing, disconnected, and frustrating.

It is this

distinction, I think, that finally separates Dorigen from
Grisilde in Chaucer*s overall view of man*s relation to God.
Unlike Grisilde, Dorigen may not merit (de congruo> the

2^De Trlnltate. 12.15,25
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special grace of divine wisdom; this grace Is reserved for
those who have been freely elected by God and have responded
with the "humblesse," Idealized in the C l e r k s Tale, which
constitutes merltum de condltcno.
On the other hand, Chaucer does not make of "humblesse" a merely passive resignation to fate.

There is no

real virtue where virtue has been untried, but similarly
there is no virtue in someone who is not free to make moral
decisions or refuses to take a responsible role when faced
with temptation.

Grisilde and Dorigen, for better and worse,

do function as moral agents with definite values and the
courage to try to choose what they think is right.
about Virginia in the Physician’s Tale?

But what

She is virtuous in

the way she has led her life up to the time of the story
(VI.105-117)» but she does not appear to take a real part
In the decision to sacrifice her rather than let her fall
into the hands of Aplus.

When her father announces his de

cision, she simply asks,
"Goode fader, shal I dye?
Is ther no grace, is ther no remedye?"

(vi.235-236)
And when he replies that there is no other remedy but to
kill her, she simply requests a few minutes to grieve and
then submits herself to his will:
"Blissed be God, that I shal dye a maydet
Yif me my deeth, er that I have a shame;
Dooth with youre wyl, a Goddes name!"

(VI.2^8-250)

It is important to observe here that she does her father*s
will, not her own, because this clearly sets Virginia apart
from Grisilde and Dorigen.

Further, there is a curious in

consistency in the morality in the tale.

The narrator con

cludes with the following comment on the villains:
Heere may men seen how synne hath his merite.
Beth war, for no man woot whom God wol smyte
In no degree, ne in which manere wyse
The worm of conscience may agryse
Of wlkked lyf, though it so pryvee be
That no man woot therof but God and he.
For be he lewed man, or ellis lered,
He noot how soone that he shal been afered.
Therfore I rede yow this consell take:
Forsaketh synne, er synne yow forsake.
(VI.277-286)
This Is conventional enough as an affirmation of man's
ability to avoid sin by resolute use of his free will.
What does seem odd, however, is that Chaucer makes such an
affirmation at the end of a poem which portrays the almost
total passivity of Virginia.

Oddly, too, Chaucer never

praises her as a Christian, even though her allusion to
Jephthah's daughter would have been impossible for a pagan
Roman (VI.240), and in spite of the fact that her speech
quoted above (VI.248-250) appears explicitly Christian.
Perhaps Chaucer avoids elevating her to the status of a vir
gin martyr because of the dubious morality of her sacrifice.
While the Church has always cherished her martyrs, no ortho
dox thinker has ever condoned, or even allowed, suicide as
a legitimate means of avoiding sin.

Virginia tries to give

her sacrifioe validity by drawing a parallel between herself
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and Jephthah's daughter, but this does not really absolve
her because the Church Fathers sternly condemned Jephthah's
2ij
action as thoughtless, irresponsible, and seriously sinful.
So, finally, we are faced by Virginia, who has, like other
Chaucerian heroines, been thrust into severely trying
circumstances by divine providence, has the capacity as a
Christian to face her trial courageously, as pointed out
in the conclusion to the tale, and passively cooperates in
her own voluntary death.

It is Impossible to say that

Virginia achieves merltum de condlgno. nor does Chaucer or
his narrator claim that she does.

As a consequence, we may

be left dissatisfied with this tale, for which we need
attempt no apology, because of its sterile characterization
and muddled morality.
The Second Nun's Tale is another attempt to portray
a virtuous Christian woman beset with the cruelties of
living in pagan Home, and here the moral vision of the
Canterbury Tales once again clears.

The story itself is

quite unremarkable as an example of the medieval genre of
a saint's life.

Cecile, we learn early in the tale, is

"fulfild of Goddes yifte" (VIII.275), and this is what gives
her the power she has to convert her husband and his brother
so easily.

Later, when she is faced with a choice between

renouncing her faith or embracing martyrdom, she Joyfully
24,,Richard L. Hoffman, "Jephthah's Daughter and Chaucer's
Virginia," Chaucer Review. II (196?), 25-26.
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accepts her death and even preaches to her oppressors a
sermon describing their idolatry of false gods:
"Ther lakketh no thyng to thyne outter yfin
That thou n'art blynd; for thyng that we seen alle
That it is stoon,— that men may wel espyen,—
That like stoon a god thow wolt it calle.
I rede thee, lat thyn hand upon it falle,
And taste it wel, and stoon thou shalt it fynde,
Syn that thou seest nat with thyne eyen blynde.
IIIt is a shame that the peple shal
So s c o m e thee, and laughe at thy folye;
For communly men woot it wel overal
That myghty God is in his hevenes hye;
And thise ymages, wel thou mayst espye,
To thee ne to hemself mowen noght profite,
For in effect they been nat worth a myte."
(VIII.498-511)
Like Dorigen, these pagans cannot pierce beyond empirical
knowledge to apprehend the reality of God through Christian
wisdom.

Ceoile does, of course, have this grace, and the

grace also to face horrible torture and eventual death with
extraordinary courage.

This is evidently a special gift

from God, as we see in his suspension of natural law, de
uotentla Del absoluta. in order to preserve her from the
flames (VIII.519-522).

After her death, Pope Urban offici

ally recognizes her special favor from God, an implicit
recognition that her merlta de condltmo were sufficient to
earn her salvation, by elevating her to the rank of a saint
and erecting a church in her honor (VIII.547-553)•

What

emerges from this tale of a great virgin martyr, then, is
what'Chaucer seems to have been describing in the Clerk’s
Tale, the Franklin^ Tale, and, less successfully, the
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Physicians Tale.

Man exists under the ultimate governance

of divine providence, hut from a Christian point of view he
has both the freedom and the responsibility to do his best,
with the grace that God grants him, to avoid sin and perform
works of positive merit.

Grisllde and Ceclle thus repre

sent the ideal response to God's will, while Dorlgen wil
fully tries to take things into her own hands, and Virginia
is so blankly passive that she becomes an accomplice in her
own slaughter.
Finally, nonetheless, we must come to the Parsonfs
Tale for Chaucer's clearest, most definitive statement about
the problem of grace and merit.

Man has used his natural

powers to rebel against God, the Parson tells us, and this
is why no man may redeem himself unless he is first sacra
mentally united with Christ (X.260-282).

This presupposes

that fallen man is not capable of meritum de condlgno with
out prevenient grace:
And heerof seith Seint Peter:
"Ther is noon
oother name under hevene that is yeve to any man,
by which a man may be saved, but oonly Jhesus."/
Nazarenus is1as muche for to seye as "florisshynge,"
in which a man shal hope that he that yeveth hym
remissioun of synnes shal yeve hym eek grace wel
for to do. For in the flour is hope of fruyt in
tyme comynge, and in fdryifnesse of synnes hope
of grace wel for to do./ "I was atte dore of thyn
herte," seith Jhesus, "and cleped for to entre.
He that openeth to me shal have foryifnesse of
synne./ I wol entre into hym by my grace, and
soupe with hym," by the goode werkes that he shal
doon, whiohe werkes been the foode of God; "and he
shal soupe with me," by the grete Joye that I shal
yeven hym.

(X.287-290)

God calls out to man in an Invitation to share in the divine
life (lnltlum fidel), and the man who answers the call may
merit (de congruo) the further grace (gratia gratum faciens)
to perform good works, “which werkes been the foode of God"
(merltum de condlgno), earning his salvation by meeting the
full standard of God's justice (ex deblto lustlclae).

But

if a man should not accept the invitation of grace, or
should fall back into sin after receiving It, then his good
works that he performed both in and out of the state of sin
are impotent to save him:
Soothly, the goode werkes that he hath lost, outher
they been the goode werkes that he wroghte er he fel
Into deedly synne, or elles the goode werkes that
he wroghte while he lay in synne,/ Soothly, the goode
werkes that he dide b i f o m that he fil in synne been
al mortefled and astoned and dulled by the ofte
synnyng./ The othere goode werkes, that he wroghte
whil he lay in deedly synne, thei been outrely dede,
as to the lyf perdurable in hevene.
(X.232-23**)
This closes the possibility of a man achieving "lyf perdur
able in hevene" through merltum de congruo alone, as many
Ockhamlsts argued was possible, de potentla Del absolute.
It is also interesting that Chaucer's Parson expresses com
plete confidence in the potentla Del ordlnata. in terms of
which he may be sure of the doctrine of grace and merit
that he is teaching.

On the other side, however, Chaucer

avoids polarizing the argument so that a denial that meri
ting de congruo may earn salvation contains also, as in
Bradwardine, an implicit denial of the value of merltum de
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congruo Itself.

For the Parson goes on to qualify his posi

tions
For certes, In the werkynge of the deedly synne,
ther Is ho trust to no good werk that we han doon
blforn; that is to seyn, as for to have therby
the lyf perdurable In hevene./ But nathelees, the
goode werkes quyken agayn, and comen agayn, and
helpen, and availlen to have the lyf perdurable In
hevene, whan we han contrlcloun./ But soothly, the
goode werkes that men doon whil they been in deedly
synne, for as muche as they were doon in deedly
synne, they may nevere quyke agayn./ For certes,
thyng that nevere hadde lyf may nevere quykene;
and nathelees, a*l be it that they ne availle noght
to han the lyf perdurable, yet availlen they to abregge
of the peyne of helle, or elles to geten temporal
rlchesse,/ or elles that God wole the rather enlumyne
and llghtne the herte of the synful man to have
repentaunce;/ and eek they availlen for to usen a
man to doon goode werkes, that the feend have the
lasse power of his sould./ And thus the curtels
Lord Jhesu Crist ne wole that no good werk be lost;
for in somwhat it shal availle.
(X,2^0-246)
Therefore, while a man*s works, good though they might seem,
are "dede" if performed in a state of sin, we also have the
assurance that "no good werk be lost; for in somwhat it shal
availle."

The Parson is defining an extremely subtle line

here between two complementary positions:

on one side, he

wishes to stress the need for sanctifying grace to earn
merltum de condlgno. but on the other side he tries to
give as much scope to merltum de congruo as possible without
drifting into Ockhamlsm.

He solves the problem very neatly

by allowing that a sinner may, because Christ is so perfec
tly "curteis," hope that he will be rewarded in some way—
perhaps by attracting further grace— though not in his
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present $tate having the capacity to earn his salvation.
In this way, Chaucer, through his Parson, does succeed In
affirming the orthodox tradition on grace and merit, diffi
cult though this was In the uncertain theological milieu of
the fourteenth century.
Chaucer's interest in the controversy is, as we have
seen, beyond any reasonable question.

But at the same time,

Chaucer was not one to enter upon the more dangerous and
exciting speculations that we have found in the works of
the Pearl-poet and Langland.

This does not mean, of course,

that he was a coward, lacking the moral fiber to choose
between the conservatives and radicals of his time.

Chaucer

did not hesitate to point an aocusing, often mocking, finger
at people and Institutions in his society that he found
hypocritical or corrupt.

In religious matters, he frequen

tly satirized a venal friar or the downright criminality of
summoners and pardoners.

But he never seems, at least in

his surviving poetry, to have seriously questioned the
doctrinal foundations on which his faith was built.

For

him, as for many another in the moderate, orthodox late
medieval Church, it was enough that God had revealed his
instructions to man.

And for Chaucer, as for FitzRalph

before him, this was a source of confidence and security,
not the bewildering, sometimes terrifying sense that one
gets from reading the fourteenth-century theology of God's
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potentla absoluta.

Though the boldness of other thinkers

was at times more exhilarating* it would be a mistake to
conclude that Chaucer and those like him did not also con
tribute significantly to late medieval thought*

Chaucer

had no grandiose pretensions about his role* however* and
he summed up his own aims in the modest words of his Parson:
And Jhesu* for his grace, wit me sende
To shewe yow the wey, in this vlage,
Of thilke parfit glorious pilgrymage
That hlghte Jerusalem celestial.

(X.48-51)

Chapter V:

Conclusions

After pursuing the argument of this dissertation
through four chapters, I would now like to look hack over
the material covered and try to draw some general conclu*slons.

Before doing so, however, there is a question of

methodology that must be clarified.

A great deal of facile

nonsense chokes the learned journals every year with claims
that one writer or “source" has in some important way “in
fluenced" another writer's work, while little or no consi
deration is given to the implications that underlie such
a judgment.

It is necessary, of course, for the literary

historian to construct patterns by which the relation be
tween one poet and another may be understood, but we badly
need criteria for deciding what is going to count as evi
dence of such a relation.

It is not possible, I submit,

to “prove" this kind of a connection by any conclusive
logical demonstration.

All inferences regarding causal

connections are probable at best, even when clearly based
on observable phenomena, and the risks Increase when the
subject matte^ under investigation does not submit to objec
tive verification, as in virtually all literary studies.
17*
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This does not mean that because there are risks in literary
history and oritismv we should therefore avoid these dis
ciplines altogether, but rather that we should be aware of
their tentative nature.

In drawing my conclusions here,

therefore, I make no claim that they are in any sense final,
though their probability has, I think, been established by
the evidence that we have seen.
The first chapter, describes the origins and deve
lopment of the late medieval controversy over grace and
merit.

Ultimately, this controversy is rooted not only in

dogmatic theology, which is obvious enough, but just as im
portantly in the eplstemologlcal dispute of the time.

For

the nominalists, who insisted that only sense experience is
"real” knowledge, and all attempts to move beyond it are
only probable at best, theology as a rational, scientific
discipline ceased to have value.

According to this position,

it is impossible to have any certain knowledge about God,
except what he has revealed to man, and even this is open
to question when the concept that God can overturn his or
dinances by his absolute power is introduced, as it was in
the fourteenth century.

The result of this uncertainty,

as we have seen, was that several thinkers began to argue
that this very uncertainty left man with a free hand to try
to appeal to God by his own merit, even without the help of
sanctifying grace.

All of this appeared ominously heretical

to conservative followers of Augustine, however, because
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they Insisted that all truth Is Immutable since It emanates
from the divine mind, that God would never violate his
covenant with man, and that no truly meritorious actions
could be performed by fallen man without the uplifting In
fluence of prevenlent grace.

Heresy charges flew wildly

through the overheated religious atmosphere of the time,
and scarcely any important writer in England or on the Con
tinent failed to get drawn Into the conflict and to take
some kind of stand, if only by Implication.

To be more spe

cific, radicals such as Ockham, Buckingham, Adam of Woodham,
and Uthred of Boldon were investigated by various ecclesi
astical authorities for Pelaglanism in supporting nominalist
doctrines; conservatives such as Bradwardine and Wycllf went
so far in the opposite direction that they bordered on heresy
themselves; and those who wished to find some safe ground
in the middle chose, like FitzRalph, to reiterate a safely
traditional doctrine that added nothing original to the con
troversy, but did have the value of providing security in
a rather insecure age.
Among the literary figures of the time, the Pearlpoet employed the question of grace and merit as the central
doctrinal theme of Pearl.

The debate between the dreamer,

who has obvious Ockhamist tendencies, and his conservative
Pearl leads ultimately to the conclusion, convincing even
the dreamer, that the "grace of God is gret inoghe."

Human

merits cannot, without God's prevenient grace, make a direct
claim on salvation; only God may choose who will be saved,
as well as the nature and time of this salvation.

Still,

this doctrine of grace is complemented by the corresponding
doctrine of merit in Purity, the next poem in the Cotton
Nero A.x manuscript.

For Purity dramatizes man's power to

respond to God, to exercise his moral freedom to earn God's
favor, as in the allegory of the clothes that the wedding
guests must wear to the feast.

But lest this seem to give

too much prominence to man's own merits and his own natural
powers, there is the reminder in Patience that man may mis
use these powers, as Jonah did, and that God finally con?
trols the destinies of all men through his absolute power,
which transcends mere human understanding.

This is in turn

balanced by the final poem in the manuscript, Sir Gawaln and
the Green Knight.

Here we learn that man's will is capable

of choosing evil by virtue of its freedom, but it is not
also capable of choosing the good without the assistance of
divine grace.

Gawain did, after all, commit serious sin

with Lady Bercllak, even though he had sufficient grace to
avoid his sin.

God chose, however, to save Gawain from fur

ther sin, even thottgh the knight did not merit such grace.
Still, Gawain did cooperate with this grace and reinstate
himself in God's favor through sacramental confession, though
the resolution 6f the social "sin” of keepings the green gir
dle is reserved for the meeting between Gawain and Bercllak
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at the end.

Finally, S t . Erkenwald presents a special

difficulty In using the Trajan-Gregory legend, which ordi
narily argued for merltum de congruo as a means to salvation
(as In Piers Plowman)and rejecting such merit here In favor
of a muddled doctrine of merltum de condlgno.

As an extreme

ly conservative reaction against Ockhamist theology, S t .
Erkenwald represents still another alternative in the dis
pute over grace and merit.
Piers Plowman, on the other hand, 'brilliantly dram
atizes the complicated moral struggle of Will, m a n ’s faculty
for moral action, in his search for the means to salvation.
In the Vlslo, Will learns how to gain Piers * pardon, and
this first section of the poem serves to define the doctri
nal problem, raising the basic questions that the Vita will
try to answer.

After the pardon scene„ the search for Dowel

is essentially an attempt to find out how a man may merit
salvation, with meritum de congruo receiving the principal
attention.

In the section on Dobet, the search focusses

more on meritum de condlgno. though we are never permitted
to forget the value of m a n ’s free response to divine grace.
Finally, Dobest illustrates the best way for a Christian to
eafn salvation (de condlgno) through his active participatuon in the Church, whose authority comes from God, de
uotentla ordlnata.

Taken as a whole. Piers Plowman, inclu

ding its revisions, is an extended dialectic in which var
ious positions on grace and merit are examined in an effort
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to struggle toward some resolution to this difficult problem.
Not all poets reflect their Interest In the contro
versy In the same way, however, and Chaucer takes a posi
tion similar to that of FitzRalph in reaffirming a safe,
middle-of-the-road orthodoxy without contributing any of
the exciting, sometimes dangerous, speculations of the Pearlpoet or Langland.

For Chaucer, as seen most clearly in the

Parson's Tale, rejected both the extremes of Ockham and
Bradwardine, though his doctrinal conservatism made him more
sympathetic to Bradwardine than the radical "Modern Pela
gians."

Again and again, in such diverse works as Trollus

and Crlsevde. the K n i g h t s Tale, the Man of L a w fs Tale, the
Clerk's Tale, the Franklin's Tale, and several other lesser
poems, Chaucer stresses his confidence in G o d ’s providence,
the need for grace to merit salvation, and his assurance
that God will not violate the covenant with man through
potentla Del absolute.

Although this may not have the flair

or the boldness of some of the more radical medieval think
ers, we must remind ourselves that this, too, contributed
significantly to the controversy over grace and merit.

For

Chaucer's position was the one which was ultimately to pre
vail, at least in the Catholic theology of the Council of
Trent, as well as in some of the more moderate Protestant
systems such as that of Arminius.

Without the many writers

of Chaucer's doctrinal persuasion, this moderate tradition
might have died, drowned in tte storm of religious strife in
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the next tiro centuries.
It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the de
bate over grace and merit went far beyond the academic halls
of the universities or the monastic cloisters.

Serious men

of ideas, sensitive to the theological issues of their time,
could not ignore this debate or fail to participate in it
in some way.

The Pearl-poet, Langland, and Chaucer were not

professional theologians or university professors, but they
became involved in this great issue nevertheless.

Because

they were poets, they chose to enter imaginatively into
the various doctrinal positions and to dramatize the impli
cations of each as it might be “lived*1 in the world of poe
tic fiction.

In adopting this mode of expression, they lost

some of the precision of scholastic logic, of course, but
they also gained something that the schoolmen might not
otherwise have achieved:

these poets made it possible to

feel the abstractions of theology, rather than merely think
them.

As a consequence, the Pearl-poet, Langland, and

Chaucer made a great contribution to the serious thought of
their time by articulating, each in his own way, a profound
interest in the great debate over grace and merit.
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Appendix:

A Glossary of Medieval Theological Terms

Since many of the terms used in late medieval theo
logy once had clear, precise meanings that are no longer
familiar except to specialists in doctrinal history, the
following glossary has been added to facilitate understanding
the technical terms used in this dissertation.

I do not,

however, claim to offer a comprehensive listing here, and
readers who wish to pursue these and other definitions fur
ther should consult Heiko A. Oberman’s "A Nomlnalistic Glos
sary" in his Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.,
1963 ), pp. ^59-^76, and the relevant articles in the Dlc-

tlonnaire de Th£ologle Cathollque.
Aoceptatlo ("acceptation"):

God’s free act of electing a

sinner (Justification), who may then perform works that
earn merltum de condlgno.
C(h)arltas creata ("created grace"):

the Holy Spirit's gift

of sanctifying, or Justifying, grace.
C(h)arltas increata ("uncreated grace"):

the Holy Spirit.

Ex deblto iustlclae ("owed according to Justice"):

the prin

ciple that once God has freely bound himself, de poten
tla Del ordlnata. to accept a sinner, this man's good
works will earn merltum de condlgno according to the
covenant to which God has bound himself.
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Ex natura rel deblta ("owed according to the nature of the
act"):

the principle that some acts, prompted initially

by divine grace, have such Intrinsic value that they
will always earn merit of some sort, whether the agent
is in a state of grace (cf. meritum de condlgno) or not
(cf. merltum de congruo).
Ex purls naturalibus ("through purely natural abilities"):
the concept that man has the natural power to perform
jt^

certain actions without any special gift of grace,
though it never excludes the general influence of divine
providence.

Gratia gratis data ("grace given gratuitously"):

according

to some writers, this is a state of grace that precedes
and invites the sinner to move toward sanctifying grace
through earning merltum de congruo, which will in turn
be likely to persuade God to accept the sinner; other
theologians use this term only to designate the gift
by which God gives some the power to convert others to
the faith; in both oases, this grace can coexist with
sin in the soul of the recipient.
Gratia gratum faclens ("grace making one worthy of favor"):
this is the state of sanctifying grace which makes a
sinner fully acceptable to God and motivates the reci
pient to do good (de condlgno) works; this grace cannot
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exist together with sin in a man's soul.
Habitus gratlae ("habit of grace"):

the state of sanctifying

grace which justifies the sinner and makes him accep
table to God.
Inltlum fldel ("beginning of faith"):

a term in Augustine's

theology to designate the time when, after a long
struggle, the sinner receives the gift of grace which
impels him to embrace the Christian faith.
Merltum de condlgno •("full merit"):

merit which meets the

full requirement of divine justice because it has been
earned in a state of gratia gratum faclens.
Merltum de congruo ("partial merit"):

merit which may at

tract God's generosity, even for a man in a state of
sin, to the extent that God may choose to give the sin
ner a gift of justifying grace.
Potentla Del absoluta ("the absolute power of God"):

the

omnipotence of God which, regardless of the ordained
moral order, is completely free of all restrictions
except the law of contradiction.
Potentla Del ordlnata ("the ordained power of God"):

the

power of God that is known to man through natural law
and divine revelation, including the covenant with man
to which God has bound himself.
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